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ABSTRACT
IT outsourcing has been a rich source for discussion since the landmark deal 
between Kodak and IBM in July 1989, being seen by many as the agreement that started 
outsourcing being perceived by companies as a serious strategic choice. With agreements 
generally signed for between 5 and 10 years, the research looks at what happens when an 
outsourcing agreement ends, either early or at contract end.
The research looks at IT sourcing strategies within UK private organisations using 
mixed-methods research, a qualitative case study and a qualitative survey. Two frameworks 
were developed to facilitate the research, the IT Sourcing Cycle and the IT Functions & 
Systems Diamond. The Service Dynamics (SERVDYN) instrument was also created to 
gauge factors relating to service performance, quality and relationship in the IT sourcing 
decision.
The Case Study, with data collected via semi-structured interviews and supporting 
documentation, seemed to show results different from the perception of backsourcing in 
previous studies (McLaughlin & Peppard 2006, Veltri et al 2008). It was clear that although 
the stated reasons for the decision were largely the same for outsourcing and backsourcing, 
they only appeared to tell part of the story. The Transition stage of the IT Sourcing Cycle 
proved the most revealing, with the implications for practise going further than had been 
previously found via secondary research.
The survey was sent to 794 larger private UK companies, of which 69 responded. 
The survey instrument was designed to collect the views of respondents of various reasons, 
benefits etc. for those with different IT sourcing strategies; in-house, outsourced, switched 
vendors or backsourced.
The research findings seem to suggest that although common reasons were given for 
the various sourcing options taken, there were other forces at work during the decision 
phase. Although service and relationship quality appear to play a part in the decision phase 
of the IT sourcing cycle, further research is required to ascertain if it provides a significant 
input to trigger the movement from Operation to Decision phase of the IT Sourcing Cycle.
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1 Introduction
This Chapter summarizes the background to the research presented in this thesis and 
explains the focus of the research; it looks specifically at the relevance of the research to 
the current body of literature. The research aim and objectives are detailed, along with 
the research approach taken and the thesis deliverables. Finally, the structure of the 
thesis is presented as a guide to the body o f work.
1.1 The Research Domain
Much has been written about the sourcing of Information Technology (IT) over the 
last 40 years or so and the multiple approaches that can be taken. Over the last 15- 
20 years, much of the focus within publications has been on outsourcing. However, 
Deloitte (2005) in a survey of 25 major companies in the United States found that 1 
in 4 companies brought outsourced operations back in-house. So, what makes an 
organisation review their IT arrangements and what are the options?
1.1.1 First Thoughts
Why is IT important? Raskino (2011) reported that
"On average, business leaders attribute 21 % of revenue to the IT capability o f their 
firms." (p2)
IT outsourcing has been practised by organisations all over the world since the 
trendsetting agreement between Kodak and IBM in July 1989 (Loh & Venkatraman 
1992b). On this basis, organisations that outsource some or all of their IT provision 
could effectively be handing over the management of up to 21 % of their revenue to 
a third party. What drives organisations to take such actions, and, more 
importantly, what happens when the agreement ends or is terminated?
McCue (2003) states that the original outsourcing deal between Sainsbury's and 
Accenture had a value of 17% of Sainsbury's market capitalisation. This leads to 
investors looking beyond the predicted cost savings toward the fact that it is a 
huge organisational and cultural change (McCue 2003).
The results of this research would be useful to all senior executives within an 
organisation, be they within the business or IT arena. It will enable senior 
executives to review their IT provision in a structured way that will identify those 
areas of IT that "add value' to the business as a whole.
1.1.2 Defining IT
Information Technology has been around for a number of years but first came to 
the attention of the business community because of the article by Leavitt & Whisler 
(1958). They coined the term 'Information Technology', stating that it consisted of 
several related parts, including "... techniques for process large amounts of data 
rapidly, and it is epitomised hy a high speed computer", the "... application of statistical 
and mathematical methods to decision making problems" and "... the simulation ofhigh- 
order thinking through computer programs." (Leavitt & Whisler 1958, p41)
Defining the meaning of the term Information Technology is somewhat 
problematic -  a search of Google for 'define Information Technology', for example, 
will give hundreds of different definitions. Carr (2003) defined Information 
Technology as
"The technologies used for processing, storing and transporting information in 
digital form ." (pi 0)
This definition seems somewhat passive; there is no mention of who or what
creates the information and for what purpose. It also implies that IT does not 'add
value'. This point is not surprising, given Carr's stance on IT, a position discussed
in more detail in Chapter 2. Porter & Millar (1985) widen the definition slightly,
"Information Technology must be conceived of broadly to encompass the 
information that businesses create and use as well as a wide spectrum of 
increasingly convergent and linked technologies that process the information." 
(pl49)
But what of Information Systems? Marcolin & Ross (2005) saw the IS function as
"... characterized by the IT resources that are employed, the IS activities that are 
performed and the means by which the firm leverages the function tozvard the 
achievement of its business goals." (p35)
This seems to be an all-encompassing definition very similar to the definition of 
Information Technology provided by Porter & Millar (1985), but also extends the
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definition of IS to include business related measures. This seemed to get nearer to 
the idea of IS and IT clearly seeing the two as separate but symbiotic in nature. As 
a result, a decision was taken to use the term Information Technology (IT) 
throughout this thesis when referring to the infrastructure and functions carried 
out by an IT department.
1.2 Aims and Objectives
Hussey & Hussey (1997) define the process of research as
"A systematic and methodical process of enquiry and investigation which increases 
knowledge." (p20)
The sourcing of Information Technology services for an organisation and the 
myriad of possible approaches has been the subject of a great deal of discussion 
over the last 20 years or so, much of the focus within publications has been on the 
subject of outsourcing.
1.2.1 Research Aim
The overall aim of the research is to add to the understanding of an organisation's 
IT sourcing decisions, specifically looking at the areas of outsourcing and 
backsourcing, with a view to bringing further understanding in the area of 
backsourcing as an IT phenomenon.
1.2.2 Research Objectives
Having defined the aim of the research, a literature review of the business strategy, 
change, outsourcing and backsourcing fields were conducted to gain a better 
understanding of the context of the research and to develop clear research 
objectives to focus the research. To focus the literature review, the following 
objectives were set 
Objective 1:
To understand why organisations change their IT sourcing strategy and explore the 
effects of the changes on their provision of IT.
Objective 2:
To explore what is meant by backsourcing within the IT environment.
During the course of the initial stages of the literature review, the following 
objectives were formalised to focus the research.
Objective 3:
To identify the key strategic and decision-making factors to backsource IT, and to 
contrast these with the outsourcing process.
Objective 4:
To understand the backsourcing process in comparison with the existing 
frameworks for IT outsourcing.
Objective 5:
To identify the levels of backsourcing activity within the United Kingdom. 
Objective 6:
To understand the IT Sourcing decision process in terms of the decision makers, 
motives and influences.
1.3 The Research Approach
The literature review covered a number of key themes that re-occur throughout 
the thesis; business strategy, change and the development of the IT Sourcing Cycle. 
The research looked at the current literature on IT sourcing, specifically 
outsourcing and backsourcing. There were two main forms of empirical research; a 
single case study research carried out within an organisation that had just 
completed bringing the IT Division back in-house, and a survey of UK 
organisations focusing on IT Sourcing decisions.
The Case Study provided an outstanding opportunity to study an instance of 
backsourcing in an organisation that had undergone the backsourcing process. 
Two main forms of data collection were employed; semi-structured interviews and 
the gathering of artefacts in the form of documentation created during the 
backsourcing process (meeting minutes, newsletters and other communications).
The survey was distributed to 794 UK organisations, targeting specifically the 
senior executive within IT. This was used to evaluate the IT sourcing decision­
making process and to establish the volume of organisations taking the decision to 
backsource some or all of their IT. Further, the survey contained an instrument,
SERVDYN, developed to investigate the importance of service dynamics in the 
sourcing decision process.
1.4 Thesis Deliverables
This thesis presented the following deliverables as a consequence of the research
1. The IT Sourcing Cycle Model based on the literature review and validated 
as part of the Case Study. The model was expanded to include key elements 
at each stage of the cycle.
2. Re-conceptualisation of a model originally proposed by Edwards & 
Peppard (1997) for business process reengineering, adapted for use to 
categorise IT functions and systems as either strategic or commodity.
3. A contribution to knowledge based on the detailed study of the 
backsourcing process within a large organisation, with insights for practice 
and future implementation. This specifically targets the Transition phase of 
the IT Sourcing Cycle.
4. The construction of SERVDYN, a tool for use in the forecasting of the 
decision likely to be taken at the end of an outsourcing agreement based on 
current vendor performance.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The thesis revolves around a number of key themes in IT sourcing. These are 
highlighted in Figure 1.1. The thesis has been structured in seven further chapters, 
as follows.
Chapter 2 IT Sourcing - Strategy, Change and Options
This Chapter reviews the influence of business and IT strategy and change on IT
sourcing and, specifically, outsourcing. The definitions of insourcing are explored, 
resulting in a typology of insourcing (subsequently referred to as backsourcing). It 
examines the concept of "IT as Commodity" verses "IT as Strategic" and how this 
might influence the manner in which an outsourcing agreement is managed. The 
concept of the IT Strategic Diamond is then introduced as a framework for 
categorising the significance of IT functions and systems within an organisation.
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Figure 1.1 Thesis Structure
Chapter 3 Exploring IT Sourcing as a Cycle
This Chapter proposes the idea of an IT Sourcing Cycle based on a review of 
literature on outsourcing. The IT Sourcing Cycle is examined in the context of 
backsourcing and alternatives to backsourcing are reviewed. Finally, the IT 
Sourcing Decision Framework is proposed, and a survey instrument, SERVDYN, 
constructed to explore the influence of service quality and service relationships on 
the IT sourcing decision.
Chapter 4 Methodology & Methods
This Chapter sets the scope, methodology and methods for the empirical research 
carried out. A mixed-methods approach was selected for the research using a case 
study and survey approach, adopting constructivist ontology and a critical realist 
epistemology. The research was considered as summative evaluation research - a 
combination of exploratory and descriptive research using a mixed-methods 
approach.
Data collection involved the gathering of qualitative data in the form of literature
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review, interviews, internal organisation documentation and a survey 
questionnaire distributed to 794 UK organisations.
Chapter 5 The Case Study
The Chapter presents the findings of a qualitative case study carried out within an 
organisation that had recently backsourced the whole of their IT. The Case Study 
uses the IT Sourcing Cycle, proposed in Chapter 3, as a framework for the study. 
The findings are grouped by the stages of the IT Sourcing Cycle; Decision, 
Transition and Operation. It was one of the first studies completed by an 'insider 
researcher' allowing for depth of study, particularly the Transition stage, not 
previously noted in literature.
Chapter 6 The Survey
This Chapter presents the results of the Survey administered to 794 organisations 
within the UK. The survey examines a number of areas associated with IT 
sourcing, including sourcing activities, the decision making process, the reasons 
sourcing decisions and the evaluation of the SERVDYN instrument as a technique 
for assessing IT service quality, management and relationship. The Chapter 
concludes by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of SERVDYN and the survey 
as a whole.
Chapter 7 Discussion
In this Chapter, the findings of the Case Study and Survey are discussed, along 
with the theoretical and practical implications. A re-conceptualisation of a model 
considered as part of the literature review is proposed (The IT Functions & 
Systems Triangle) and the IT Sourcing Cycle proposed in Chapter 3 is re-examined 
in light of the research findings. The effectiveness of the research is scrutinized and 
the research limitations are discussed.
Chapter 8 Conclusions
This Chapter represents the conclusions of the study. It shows how the research 
aims and objectives were met and reflects upon the research process. The 
contribution to knowledge made by this study is presented and areas for future 
research are recognized.
1.6 Summary
This Chapter has introduced the thesis and identified the focus and background of 
the research. It has documented the research aims and objectives, along with the 
research approach and structure. The next Chapter is the Literature Review.
2 IT Sourcing -  Strategy, Change & Options
This Chapter constitutes the literature review. It explores the relationship between 
business strategy, change and IT outsourcing. It reviews the current outsourcing 
literature and discusses the way IT can be viewed within an organisation. It looks at 
the different facets of the IT decision and explores the relationship between outsourcing 
clients and vendors. Finally, it proposes the IT Strategic Diamond for categorising 
functions and systems.
2.1 Introduction
A literature review is alternatives
" ...a  systematic, explicit, and reproducible method for identifying, evaluating; and 
synthesizing the existing body of completed and recorded work produced by 
researchers, scholars, and practitioners." (Fink 2010, p3)
The purpose of this Chapter is to review the body of literature pertaining to the 
first research objective - "To understand why organisations change their IT sourcing 
strategy and explore the effects of the changes on their provision of IT." In order to 
explore this domain, IT Outsourcing is used as an area of inquiry deemed useful in 
understanding why organisations change the provision of their IT.
Making the decision to outsource some or all of an organisation's IT could be 
viewed as a business decision motivated by the desire for change. Any change 
within the organisation can act a trigger for change in the way IT is sourced. Any 
decision to outsource IT is not carried out in isolation; the whole organisation can 
be affected by the decision. Whatever the reason or reasons for outsourcing some 
or all of an organisation's IT, the change within the organisation would generally 
be significant. More specifically, it affects the relationship between the outsourced 
functions and the rest of the organisation changes. The rest of the business would 
have to communicate with a third party for their IT requirements and involves a 
significant change in management behaviour within the outsourcing organisation
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(Feeney & Willcocks 1998, Willcocks & Feeney 2006).
When reviewing IT sourcing it is clear, for example, that backsourcing (bringing 
previously outsourced IT back in-house) would not be an option if the 
organisation had not previously outsourced some or all of its IT. It therefore 
seemed logical to explore why organisations outsource, so that these factors can be 
compared with those for backsourcing (i.e. the frameworks for outsourcing) before 
creating one for backsourcing. The reasons for changing to outsourcing are another 
important area to explore, so that they can be contrasted with the reasons given for 
backsourcing.
So why change at all? In this chapter, the idea of business strategy and the possible 
effect on IT strategy is considered. The motivation for change at an organisational 
level is then investigated and used as a Tens' to consider the specific motivation for 
IT outsourcing. IT outsourcing is then explored from a number of perspectives, 
including a review of theories applied to the decision to outsource. This is 
followed by a discussion of the way IT may be perceived within an organisation, 
how that may affect a decision to outsource and the way outsourcing agreements 
could be managed depending on the perception of the IT function being 
outsourced.
2.2 Business and IT Strategy
Organisations often claim that they are making decisions for strategic reasons, or 
that changes are being made because of a new business strategy. IT outsourcing, 
for example, is often couched as a strategic decision based on a desire to 
concentrate on core competencies (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani 1998, Prahalad and 
Hamel 1990). So what is meant by business strategy and IT strategy, and what is 
the relationship between them?
2.2.1 Defining Business Strategy
Strategy means many things to many people. Markides (2004) argued that, despite 
decades of research in the area, there was little agreement among academics as to 
what strategy is. It was Markides' (2004) view that strategy revolved around three
main dimensions; who are the targeted customers, what products or services will
those customers be offered and how it would achieve the first two, i.e. what
activities would it perform. Just as important was what products or services it
would not offer and therefore the activities it would not carry out (Markides 2004).
The 'who', 'how ' and 'what' dimensions were seen as a key to setting the
organisation's strategic position, providing boundaries within which the
organisation operates (Markides 2004). Loosely speaking, this definition of
strategy is comparable to part of the definition Porter (1996) proposed, although
Porter goes further, stating that it is not just 'a ' position,
"Strategy is the creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set 
of activities." (Porter 1996, p68)
Porter (1996) also argued that the activities that were considered out of scope
where 'trade-offs', creating the need for choice,
"But a strategic position is not sustainable unless there are trade-offs with other 
positions. Trade-offs occur when activities are incompatible." (p68)
Mintzberg (1987) stated that strategic position, or Strategy as Position, was just one
of five alternative ways to view strategy, articulated by Mintzberg as the five P's;
Strategy as a Plan, a Pattern, a Position, a Perspective or a Ploy. Strategy is seen as
multi-dimensional, requiring a number of definitions to encapsulate strategy as a
whole (Mintzberg et al 1998). Johnson et al (2011) went for a simple definition
"Strategy is the long-term direction of an organisation." (p3)
This represents a narrower definition than that used in a previous edition of the
same book. Johnson & Scholes (2002) stated
"Strategy is the direction and scope of an organisation over the long term, which 
achieves advantage for the organisation through its configuration of resources 
within a changing environment and to fulfil stakeholder expectations." (p32)
This definition seemed to be more comprehensive, emphasising the idea of 
competitive advantage. They go on to declare that strategy can be present at three 
levels within an organisation; corporate, business and operational (Johnson & 
Scholes 2002). Table 2.1 summarises the traits of the three levels. Johnson et al 
(2011) elaborates further saying that the three levels of strategy, corporate, 
business and operations, need to be closely linked and aligned with each of the 
others.
Strategy Level Description
Corporate Concentrates on the overall scope of the organisation. Deals 
with strategy in areas such as
• geographical scope
• diversity of products or services
• acquisitions of new businesses
• distribution of resources across businesses
Business Deals with how the individual businesses should compete 
within their own markets (also known as competitive strategy). 
Concerns issues such as
• innovation
• appropriate scale of operation
• response to competitors moves
Operational Concerns how the components of the organisation delivers the 
corporate and business strategies, in terms of
• resources
• processes
• people
Table 2 .1 Levels of Strategy
Porter (1996) did not seem to differentiate between corporate and business 
strategy, but argued that there is a difference between strategy and operational 
effectiveness. Porter (1996) stated that they are both essential for superior 
performance, but that they work in different ways. Operational effectiveness is 
concerned with performing similar activities better than rivals perform. Strategic 
positioning is all about differentiation, performing similar activities in a different 
way or performing different activities altogether (Porter 1996). This differentiation 
between strategy and operational effectiveness seemed very important, and a way 
to make a distinction between strategic and 'cost cutting' decisions, an issue that 
will be referred to again later in this chapter.
2.2.2 IT Strategy
Defining IT Strategy should be straightforward. Using the levels of strategy 
proposed by Johnson et al (2011) it would seem that IT falls into the Operational 
strategy level. However, whether this is the case would depend on how the overall 
organisation was structured. If there was, say, one centralised IT servicing all the 
subsidiaries in an organisation, for example, IT decisions would be taken at a 
corporate level. If each subsidiary had their own IT, then IT decisions would be 
made on this lower level, possibly subject to policy dictated centrally. The issue,
then, would seem to be how to align IT strategy and business strategy. Harris et al
(1983) believed that
"When properly managed, technology complements business strategy in mature 
companies, drives business strategy in high-technology companies and, in most 
industries, can be leveraged to achieve a sustainable, competitive advantage in the 
marketplace. The key lies in formulating the right technology strategy and, 
ultimately, integrating it into the corporate planning process." (p28)
Peppard & Ward (2004) stated that it was accepted that technology had no 
inherent value and was unlikely, on its own, to be a source of competitive 
advantage. It was through business changes and innovations that added value 
could be realised. Wilson (1991) believed that the emphasis should be on the whole 
of IT and not just the technology itself, as it was the whole that defined a route to a 
competitive strategy.
Baets (1992) proposed that IT alignment to business strategy was a key activity.
Goldsmith (1991), concurred with Baets (1992),
"Information strategies need to be developed in the same process and at the same 
time as the business strategy, if  competitive advantage is to be secured from IT 
systems." (p67)
Peppard & Ward (2004) proposed a move from IT strategy to what they called TS 
capability7. In essence, the IS capability was seen as key to the Business and IT 
strategies, but also relied on the business and IT operations., we return to Porter's 
(1996) proposal that strategy and operational effectiveness are both essential for 
superior performance.
So, it would seem that a consensus has been reached. IT strategy, like any other 
strategy created in an area of the organisation, should be created at the same time 
as, or because of, business strategy (Johnson et al 2011). The issue with this 
assertion is that the second part, because of, implies an order, i.e. business strategy 
then dictates IT strategy. It also raises another issue in terms of the formulation of 
business strategy - the levels within an organisation proposed by Johnson et al 
(2001). How closely connected are the executives that formulate business and IT 
strategy? If the two are to be devised at the same time (Goldsmith 1991), it is 
implied that the senior IT executive is part of the Board of Directors. However, 
Moynihan & Heller (2008) seemed to indicate that this is far from the case, with
only 5.7% of the United States Fortune 1000 having a Chief Information Officer on 
the Board of Directors. If this is correct in the wider context, the gap between the 
formulation of business strategy & IT strategy is implicit and implies a w hat/how  
relationship between business and IT strategy. Business strategy is the "what"; IT 
strategy is one of the "hows", along with marketing strategy, sales strategy, etc.
Moving on to focus specifically on IT strategy, there is another area that needs to 
be addressed. IT strategy and IT infrastructure and systems being seen as strategic 
seem to create confusion in literature. Bloodgood & Salisbury (2001) believed that 
four characteristics of a resource must be present for it to be a basis of sustainable 
competitive advantage. These are that it should be valued in the situation it is to be 
used, it should be rare, it must be inimitable (i.e. it cannot be copied) and finally, it 
must be non-substitutable (i.e. it is not possible to accomplish the same thing 
through a different set of resources). Could this be said of all IT? This area will be 
returned to later in this chapter.
2.3 Why Change?
To understand the rationale for outsourcing, it is necessary to look at why 
organisations instigate change at the organisational level, in order to change their 
IT sourcing strategy. To understand why change within an organisation occurs, it 
is necessary to review; why organisations instigate change, levels of change and 
their organisational effects and how change is managed.
2.3.1 Why Organisations Instigate Change
Why instigate change within an organisation? If the organisation is profitable and 
achieving its goals, what is the driver for change? Business strategy is often the 
driver, the key being that any organisation operates within a changing 
environment (Johnson & Scholes 2002). Change is implicit within strategy, gaining 
or maintaining an advantage over competitors implies change -  standing still 
allows the competition to catch-up or get ahead in market terms. However, change 
is not just driven by strategy. As Porter (1996) identified, strategy and operational 
effectiveness are equally important to an organisation. Change can therefore be 
driven by a desire to improve operational effectiveness. Either way, change has to
be seen within the context of the organisation within which change is taking place.
Change within organisations seems almost perpetual and has been the subject of 
much discussion over the last 50 or 60 years, with the discussion 'kick-started' by 
Lewin (1951). Clemmer (1995) has an interesting take on change management, 
saying that "change management" is an oxymoron, based on the assumption that 
it is an orderly thinking and implementation process that plots a course of action. 
The underlying idea is that change cannot be 'managed' and that it is the 
willingness, at all levels within an organisation, to change that is important 
(Clemmer 1995). This idea would seem a little extreme, although it may be seen 
that change management, like any plan, has to adapt as circumstances change. 
Most changes start with a plan, however rudimentary. The art of a successful 
change is to adapt as circumstances alter (Johnson et al 2011).
Goldstein & Burke (1991) stated that
"Organizations tend to change primarily because of external pressure rather than
an internal desire or need to change." (p5)
This definition of change seems to imply that the desire to change within an
organization is a reactionary process driven by change in an organizations
environment. Looking at the objectives for change, Burke (2002) identified that
change is generally systemic,
". ..some aspect of the system, such as the organisation's managerial structure or 
the reward system, is selected for change. Usually, this selection is made as the 
result of a previous diagnosis and in collaboration with the relevant people within 
the organisation." (p49)
Essentially the change objective is systemic because a change to one part of a 
system (i.e. the organisation) will eventually affect other parts, resulting in a total 
system approach. Also, the target for change is at an organisational level and not 
an individual level (Burke 2002).
If change is systemic, what change strategies could be employed? Bloodgood and 
Salisbury (2001) applied the Resource Based View of the firm to look at strategies 
for organizational change. Four types of change were proposed and have been 
summarized in Table 2.2, along with an example of how such a change strategy
might apply to IT.
Change Strategy Description IT Example
1). Business as usual This strategy involves performing 
activities as they have always 
been performed. May include 
minor variations in operations.
Purchase of new system & 
demanding that it functions 
the same as the one it is 
replacing.
2). Acquiring new 
resources without 
reconfiguring
This is concerned with simply 
buying new resources and using 
them as they were designed.
Outsourcing agreement to 
maintain legacy systems at a 
reduced cost
3). Reconfigure existing 
resources
Using resources already owned 
by the organisation by increasing 
the efficiency or effectiveness of 
those resources to achieve a 
better ‘fit’ with the external 
environment
Re-organisation to facilitate 
closer working relationships 
between IT and business 
functions
4). Reconfigure with new 
resources
The novel use of both existing 
resources and those that the firm 
may acquire. These resources are 
combined in new and different 
ways in order to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the 
organization.
Purchase of new hardware/ 
software or engagement of 
outsourcing partner for new 
system development
Table 2.2 Strategies for Change
Looking at the strategies for change advocated by Bloodgood & Salisbury (2001), it 
could be viewed that only 'reconfigure with new resources' provides an 
opportunity for strategic improvements in terms of a move towards the creation of 
a core competence. Mintzberg et al (1998) proposed a Change Cube, where the two 
major dimensions of change within an organisation; firstly strategy, where the 
organisation is headed and secondly, the state the organisation is in. The assertion 
was that both have to be considered when instigating change (Mintzberg et al 
1998). In terms of the Change Cube (Mintzberg et al 1998), the 'reconfigure with 
new resources' proposed by Bloodgood & Salisbury (2001) aligns most to a change 
in strategic vision involving rethinking or reconceiving.
2.3.2 Levels of Change
The way a change, or series of changes, are introduced within an organisation goes 
toward the speed and the type of change introduced. Weick & Quinn (1999) looked 
at change in terms of episodic or continuous change. Episodic change is 
characterised as those changes that tend to be infrequent, discontinuous and 
intentional. This type of change fits most closely the framework proposed by
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Lewin (1951) in terms of unfreeze, change and refreeze. It was labelled episodic 
because
"...it tends to occur in distinct periods during which shifts are precipitated by 
external events such as technology change or internal events such as change in key 
personnel" (p365)
This also aligns more closely to revolutionary change. Burke (2002) sees
revolutionary change as a 'jolt' to the system being reviewed and changed. One of
these 'jolts' was characterised as a change in mission for the organisation (Burke
2002), effectively a change in strategy. Johnson et al (2011) saw revolutionary
change as a process that required rapid and major strategic change with a culture
change. For continuous change, Weick & Quinn (1999) and defined this as being
"...used to group together organizational changes that tend to be on-going, 
evolving, and cumulative." (p375)
This type of change has often been associated with Total Quality Management 
(Jarrar & Aspinwall 1999); the key is that this type of change is evolutionary or 
incremental in nature. Johnson et al (2011) go further, stating that evolutionary 
(incremental) or revolutionary (big bang) change are both transformational in 
nature, it is the speed of change that is the differentiator. It is also stated that 
change can be a realignment within the organisation, being either an adaptation 
(incremental) or a reconstruction (big bang approach) as proposed by Johnson et al 
(2011) .
2.3.3 Managing Change
For Mintzberg et al (1998), change can take one of three forms; planned, driven or
evolved. Each of these, by their nature, is managed in different ways. Evolved
change could be likened to the 'bottom up' approach to change. Burnes (2004)
argues that the Culture-Excellence approach to organisations, proposed by Peters
& Waterman (1982), suggested that the approach of planned change was too
inflexible and slow to change
"For proponents of Culture-Excellence, the world is essentially an ambiguous place 
where detailed plans are not possible and flexibility is essential." (Burnes 2004, 
p988)
Evolved change is considered 'organic', in that it is guided by those in the 
organisation outside of positions of significant authority (Mintzberg et al 1998) and
can lead to what Glad well (2000) terms as the dipping point'. This is where little 
changes can have a ripple effect until a tipping point, the point of critical mass, is 
reached and the change becomes mainstream. Another way of looking at this 
could be that this tipping point results in an emergent strategy, part of what 
Mintzberg et al (1998) termed as the Learning School of strategic thinking. This 
type of change is, by definition, evolutionary in nature, and the change itself could 
be seen as incremental. Only when it reaches critical mass could it transform to a 
'big bang' approach if rolled out to the rest of the organisation.
Mintzberg et al (1998) defined driven change as change that was guided by an 
individual or small group in authority that ensures it happens. This type of change 
is often in the shape of rationalising, restructuring or repositioning and can be 
evolutionary or revolutionary, incremental or 'big bang'.
The final type, planned change, is probably the type most associated with the idea 
of strategic change within organisations. This is the 'top-down' approach to change 
first proposed by Lewin (1951), in what was seen as a seminal work in the area, 
and is seen as integral to strategic management (Mintzberg et al 1998). Again the 
nature of change could be evolutionary or revolutionary, incremental or 'big 
bang'. In a 'top-down' approach to strategic change, Johnson et al (2011) sees 
middle management as the implementers of change.
Any major change within the organisation could be a 'trigger' or 'tipping point' to 
review the way IT is sourced within an organisation. Changes in IT sourcing 
requirements are not a unique organisational change phenomenon. Looking at 
studies discussing organisational change, Business Process Reengineering (BPR) 
and IT outsourcing provides an interesting comparison. BPR, like outsourcing, is a 
management process that has a significant effect on an organisation. Table 2.3 
provides a comparison between different examples of a change involving general 
organisational change, Business Process Reengineering and outsourcing. Goldstein 
& Burke (1991), provided for general organisational change, Kallio et al (2004) 
identified drivers for BPR and Baden-Fuller et al (2000) identified drivers for 
outsourcing.
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Goldstein & Burke 
(1991)
Kallio et al (1999) on BPR Baden-Fuller et al (2000) 
on Outsourcing
A new competitor snares a 
significant portion of a firm's 
market share.
Internal inefficiency within a 
company’s current operations 
observed for example as high 
cost or low quality.
Catch-up: despite a slow 
moving environment the firm 
has fallen behind its 
competitors;
An old customer is acquired 
by a giant conglomerate that 
dictates new sales 
arrangements.
Changed customer/supplier 
requirements for current 
products or services observed as 
low satisfaction or high pace of 
losing customers or suppliers.
Changing value chains: the 
firm must respond to 
changing customer needs;
New government 
regulations or economic and 
social conditions that create 
long-term changes in the 
availability of the labour 
force.
External changes uncontrollable 
and unpredictable to the industry 
in the forms of, for example, 
tighter economic conditions, new 
legislation or advanced 
technology.
Technology shifts: the firm ’s 
core is outdated because of 
new technology;
A new invention offers the 
possibility of changing the 
organization's existing 
production technology.
Emerging markets: new 
markets are available to the 
firm because of rapid 
changes in technology and 
customer demand.
Table 2.3 Comparing Drivers for Change
The degree of Tit' between Goldstein & Burke (1991), Kallio et al (2004) and Baden- 
Fuller et al (2000) appears to be clear. In the case of BPR and outsourcing, should 
this apparent alignment be a surprise? Both BPR and IT outsourcing are seen as 
major organisational change events (Hammer & Champy 2001, Lever 1997), 
usually carried out as a result of real or perceived problems (Hammer 1990, Earl 
1991). As such, both BPR and outsourcing are revolutionary, rather than 
evolutionary in nature (Hammer & Champy 2001, Lever 1997). They are seen as 
second order or transformational change (Burke 2002).
2.3.4 Summary
The drivers for change within an organisation appear to be well documented; 
changes within an organisation or its environment force the review of current 
strategy. Business and IT strategy are symbiotically linked. A change in the former 
will lead to a change, or at least a review, of the latter. However, why would it 
lead to the outsourcing of IT? Changes in the direction of an organisation, because 
of either strategy or operational effectiveness, lead organisations to review all of 
their operations, of which IT is only one. It is during the review of IT that a 
decision may be made to change IT strategy in order to meet the new business
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objectives, with outsourcing often seen as one of the options. The reasons for, and 
benefits of, outsourcing are discussed in detail in the following section.
2.4 IT Outsourcing
Outsourcing, as a concept, has been the subject of academic discussion for nearly a 
hundred years (Ellram & Maltz 1990), starting largely from papers written by Ford 
Whitman Harris first published in 1913 (Erlenkotter 1990). IT outsourcing, on the 
other hand, has been a specific topic of discussion since the much-vaunted 
agreement between Kodak and IBM in July 1989. Loh & Venkatraman (1992b) 
heralded this as a landmark agreement that had a profound effect on outsourcing 
being perceived by companies as a serious strategic choice. Porter (1996) stated 
that
"The popularity of outsourcing and the virtual corporation reflect the growing 
recognition that it is difficult to perform all activities as productively as 
specialists." (p63)
The IT Outsourcing market as a whole is big business. According to US-based 
sourcing advisory business Technology Partners International's (TPI) figures for IT 
Outsourcing (for industry-wide total contract value over $25m), the IT outsourcing 
market in 2008 was worth $69 billion globally (TPI 2009). It is no small wonder 
that there is so much interest in IT outsourcing, from both an academic and 
commercial perspective. So what is outsourcing and why do organisations do it?
2.4.1 Defining IT Outsourcing
The idea of outsourcing or contracting-out work to a third party has been around
for many years and is by no means limited to IT sourcing (Fill & Visser 2000,
Mantel et al 2006). Huff (1991), for example, cites the use of Facilities Management
as the pre-cursor to what is now commonly termed as outsourcing. As a result,
there have been many definitions of what constitutes 'outsourcing7. Although
others have defined what is meant by IT outsourcing (Lacity & Hirschheim 2003,
Lankford & Parsa 1999, Gilbert 1993, Fitzgerald & Willcocks 1994), the most
common definition used in literature seems to be that given by Loh and
Venkatraman (1992a),
"... the significant contribution by external vendors in the physical and/or human 
resources associated with the entire or specific components of the IT infrastructure
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in the user organisation." (p9)
This definition clearly emphasises the IT element in the definition of outsourcing. 
In this context 'infrastructure' includes equipment, staff, applications, methods 
and policies required to provide system services. This has been used as the 
definition for IT outsourcing throughout this paper.
The provision of IT services within an organisation is an evolving phenomenon. 
Lee et al (2003), for example, proposed a timeline based on outsourcing trends. 
Currie & Willcocks (1998) identified four types of IT sourcing decision: total 
outsourcing; multiple-supplier outsourcing; joint venture/strategic alliance 
sourcing; and insourcing. The latter, in this context, was seen as the 'in-house' 
sourcing of IT requirements. Brooks (2006) also split IT sourcing into four types: 
total outsourcing, selective outsourcing, total insourcing and 'body shop 
outsourcing' -  the latter being the use of external support managed by internal 
personnel. It would seem, therefore, that IT sourcing is an area that has multiple 
possible solutions. For outsourcing, Brooks (2006) identified no less than thirteen 
variants of selective outsourcing discussed in various publications.
Teng et al (1995b) noted that the nature of outsourcing agreements had evolved 
since the 1970's. Loh & Venkatraman (1992a) proposed alternative types of IS 
outsourcing based on the internalisation of human and physical resources. Lee et 
al (2003) advocated an outsourcing timeline that tracked the changes in the types 
of outsourcing deal since the 1960s. This can be extended into the 21st century, 
where there appears to be a shift away from the 'total solution' prevalent in the 
1990s towards 'selective solution', termed as 'just right outsourcing' by Aron et al
(2005). Whatever flavour of outsourcing is selected by an organisation or for 
whatever reason; the general process to move from internal resource to an external 
vendor would seem to be broadly the same. If the outsourcing process is broadly 
the same, how is outsourcing perceived within literature?
2.4.2 Outsourcing theories
Many theories have been developed to assess outsourcing, particularly the 
decision process, from many perspectives. Earlier publications on outsourcing
tends to concentrate on cost savings, using transaction cost economics, otherwise 
referred to as transaction cost theory, to analyse and justify outsourcing decisions 
(Williamson 1985, Wang 2002, Aubert et al 2004).
Loh and Venkatraman (1992a) determined a negative relationship between IT 
performance and outsourcing. Low economic returns on IT investment appeared 
to influence organisations toward outsourcing more of their IT infrastructure. It 
was acknowledged by the authors that the study findings were limited to 
economic factors within the decision process and recommended that further 
research was required in other areas to gain a better understanding of the IT 
outsourcing phenomenon (Loh and Venkatraman 1992a). Subsequent research has 
moved towards other theories as it became clear to some authors that a 
'transaction cost' view of outsourcing did not reflect the whole picture, and that 
other approaches were more appropriate (Hancox & Hackney 1999). Table 2.4 
summarises a number of theories applied to outsourcing, along with the authors 
that applied them.
Cheon et al (1995) proposed a conceptual model for studying outsourcing that 
combined Resource-Based Theory, Agency Costs Theory, Resource-Dependence 
Theory and Transaction Costs Theory, asserting that
"We believe that such a framework can provide guidance in examining the various
aspects of the outsourcing phenomenon in a consistent and cumulative manner."
(P215) '
The observation is that each theory provides a 'w indow' or Tens' on outsourcing. 
The conceptual model proposed by Cheon et al (1995) seems to encompass all 
facets of the outsourcing decision by combining the theories used elsewhere and 
would appear, at first sight, to cover all the required areas. However, Cheon et al
(1995) do not appear to comment on the relationships between the different 
theories and how they link or contradict each other, other than a cursory 
acknowledgement that the theoretical concepts are interrelated.
Theory Premise Author
Agency Cost 
Theory
The outsourcing decision is based on 
the most efficient contract in terms of 
the agency costs, i.e. the costs 
incurred because of the disparities 
between the objectives of the client 
and those of the vendor.
Bahli & Rivard (2003), Hancox & 
Hackney (2000), Oh et al (2006), 
Gottschalk & Solli-Saether (2005), 
Tiwana & Bush (2007)
Resource-Based
Theory
Outsourcing is a way of filling gaps in 
IT resources and capabilities not 
available internally. The focus is an 
internal analysis that clarifies IT 
requirements
Zhao & Calantone (2003), Mclvor 
(2009), Wang et al 2008), 
Gottschalk & Solli-Saether (2005), 
Cheon et al (1995)
Resource-
Dependence
Theory
Outsourcing is used to obtain 
resources through exchange with third 
parties in order to reduce uncertainty in 
the environment. The focus is 
external, with an acknowledgement 
that the organisation is dependent on 
external resources.
Cheon et al (1995), Oh et al 
2006),
Transaction 
Costs Theory
Outsourcing is used to reduce costs, 
contracting to a vendor or vendors 
those activities that can be obtained 
externally at a lower overall cost. The 
focus is on cost and the comparison 
between internal and external IT costs.
Zhao & Calantone (2003), Bahli & 
Rivard (2003), Hancox & Hackney 
(2000), Yang & Huang (2000), Oh 
et al (2006), Aubert et al (2004), 
Mclvor (2009), Gottschalk & Solli- 
Saether (2005), Tiwana & Bush 
(2007)
Table 2.4 Outsourcing Theories
Dibbern et al (2004) note that there had been a shift in outsourcing literature over 
time, from focusing on reducing the cost of IT to looking more at the strategic 
aspects of the outsourcing decision. It was also noted that a closer examination of 
the role that factors related to power, politics, and interpersonal relationships play 
in the sourcing decision was needed to move research in the field forward 
(Dibbern et al 2004). This perception is examined in section 2.5 when looking at 
backsourcing.
One final thought on the use of theories in outsourcing. As was noted earlier, 
outsourcing theory seemed to start from transaction cost theory. It has become 
clear that, increasingly, outsourcing is being investigated using multiple theories. 
Cheon et al (1995) is a classic example. Kern & Willcocks (2000) used Relational 
Contract Theory and Social Exchange Theory, and Gottschalk & Solli-Saether (2005) 
used 11 management theories, finding that core competence management and 
stakeholder management were the most critical success factors. Therefore, it would 
seem that there is no 'one size fits all' in terms of outsourcing theories; which ones 
to apply to outsourcing depend on the area of interest. Interestingly there also
appears to be a move from concentrating on costs in early outsourcing literature 
towards treating outsourcing as a strategy -  this is a concept expanded further in 
section 2.6.
2.4.3 Of Reasons and Benefits
The reasons for, and benefits of, outsourcing appear to be inextricably linked. 
Many authors talk about either reasons or motives for outsourcing, for the purpose 
of this discussion the two are used interchangeably.
Kremic et al (2006) proposed that there are three motivations for outsourcing - 
cost, strategy, and politics. The five most frequently discussed expected benefits 
from outsourcing were cost savings, quality improvement, greater flexibility, 
access to skills and talent and an increased focus on core functions (Kremic et al, 
2006). Earl (1991) identifies cost savings, corporate style or policy factors, quality, 
flexibility and accountability as the five main arguments in favour of outsourcing. 
Cost savings seem to predominate as one of the main motives for outsourcing, not 
surprising then that attempts were made to understand the decision to outsource 
using transaction cost theory (Loh and Venkatraman 1992a, Aubert et al 2004). As 
discussed earlier, the move towards an organisation outsourcing IT to concentrate 
on core competencies became more prevalent (Lonsdale & Cox 2000). When 
looking at the motives for outsourcing, it seems they can broadly divide along the 
lines of Porter (1996) as either for strategic reasons or operational efficiencies.
The idea of when outsourcing should be undertaken has also been a cause for
debate in literature. Fowler and Jeffs (1998) believed that an IT function that was
perceived to be 'in trouble' should not be outsourced until it was under control.
This conflicts with a number of other authors within the area, who advocate what
effectively amounts to 'disposing of the problem child'. Verhoef (2005), for
example, talks of the temptation of throwing the problem "...over the fence" (p276).
Fowler and Jeffs (1998), however, state that
"...it is unlikely that problems can be consistently and effectively 'outsourced away' 
without substantial internal efforts." (pl24)
Seemingly concurring with this, Currie & Willcocks (1998) came to the conclusion
that
"One of the salient points arising from empirical research into IT resourcing 
decisions is the tendency of organizations to develop short-term solutions and 
thereby overlook potential long-term problems." (pl41)
This idea of outsourcing for the wrong reasons a theme that emerged later as part 
of the findings of the Case Study in Chapter 5.
Lonsdale & Cox (2000) summarized the main outsourcing motives quoted by 
managers during research
• Focus resources on core activities • Improve time to market
• Cost reduction • Convert fixed cost to variable
• Benefit from a suppliers investment 
and innovation
Although most of these motives are often mentioned in outsourcing literature
about (Kremic et al 2006), it is the last motive "convert fixed costs to variable" that
provides a possible insight into something other than a cost or strategic motive.
Moving the cost of IT sourcing from a fixed to a variable cost provides a boost to
the balance sheet (Hall & Liedtka (2005). It was also suggested that there was a link
between CEO (Chief Executive Officer) compensation and large scale outsourcing
decisions, the conclusion reached was that the way the financial rewards of a CEO
were structured could have a significant effect on large scale IT outsourcing
decisions (Hall & Liedtka 2005).
"In summary, our results suggest that CEOs make irreversible large-scale IT 
outsourcing decisions due to factors that include firm financial desperation, firm  
cash needs, and the desire to maximize personal compensation." (Hall & Liedtka 
2005, p215)
It would seem, therefore, that the political and personal motivations of a CEO 
could have an effect on an outsourcing decision. As will be illustrated later as part 
of the Case Study (Chapter5), it can also have an effect on backsourcing.
Baden-Fuller et al (2000), Willcocks and Choi (1995) and Strassmann (1994) all 
argue the advantages and disadvantages or provide a 'model' for outsourcing 
decisions. Benko (1993), for example, constructed a comprehensive list of the 
advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing that seemed to encapsulate 
observations made by others. The advantages given by Benko (1993) are quoted in
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numerous articles on outsourcing as the benefits of outsourcing. Kremic et al 
(2006) in a comprehensive review of outsourcing literature, created a list of the 
expected benefits and potential risks that looked surprisingly similar to the list of 
advantages and disadvantages compiled by Benko (1993). Both lists could also be 
seen as broadly the same as those found by Lonsdale & Cox (2000). As this type of 
exercise is a 'well-trodden path', no attempt was made as part of this research to 
duplicate it. However, an exercise was carried out to compile what appeared to be 
the most common reasons for outsourcing, using Kremic et al (2006) as a steer.
Compiling the most common reasons given for outsourcing was important. It 
provided the input for part of a survey of UK organisations on their IT sourcing
decisions carried out as part of the empirical research for this thesis.
Reason Identified by Author/s Category
Cost reduction Oh et al (2006), Lonsdale & Cox (2000), 
Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2002), 
Antonucci et al (1998), Willcocks et al 
(1995), De Looff (1995), Shepherd 
(1999), Huff (1991)
Operational efficiency
Focus on core capabilities Lonsdale & Cox (2000), Quinn and 
Hilmer (1994), Kakabadse & Kakabadse 
(2002), Antonucci e ta l (1998), Lankford 
and Parsa (1999), Willcocks et al. 
(1995), Huff (1991)
Strategic
Capital infusion Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2002), 
Lonsdale & Cox (2000)
Strategic
Transfer fixed costs to 
variable
Lonsdale & Cox (2000), Kakabadse & 
Kakabadse (2002), Antonucci et al 
(1998), Shepherd (1999), Currie & 
Willcocks (1998), Huff (1991)
Operational efficiency
Greater flexibility Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2002), 
Willcocks et al (1995)
Strategic
Access to skills/expertise Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2002), 
Antonucci et al. (1998), Willcocks et al 
(1995)
Strategic
Quality improvement Antonucci et al. (1998) Operational efficiency
Faster delivery of new 
systems
Lonsdale & Cox (2000), Kakabadse & 
Kakabadse (2002), Quinn and Hilmer 
(1994)
Strategic
Access to latest 
technology/infrastructure
Lonsdale & Cox (2000), Antonucci et al 
(1998)
Operational efficiency
Political reasons Cronk & Sharp (1995), Willcocks et al 
(1995),
Strategic
Improve
accountability/management
Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2002), Huff 
(1991)
Operational efficiency
Table 2.5 Reasons for Outsourcing
The reasons for outsourcing illustrated in Table 2.5 can be categorised using the 
reasons for change proposed by Porter (1996), either for strategic reasons or to 
achieve operations efficiencies. However, there are ambiguities. Capital infusion, 
for example, could be to reduce bank borrowing (operational efficiency) or to fund 
new product development (strategic). However, the categories have been assigned 
on the balance of the original motives purported by the authors listed in Table 2.5.
The reasons given for outsourcing viewed in isolation, however, do not tell the 
whole story. In order to get a full picture of the outsourcing debate it is necessary 
to look at the reasons organisations give for not pursuing the outsourcing route. 
The reasons for keeping IT in-house could be viewed as being similar to the 
disadvantages of outsourcing, with Benko (1993) providing a comprehensive list of 
these disadvantages. However, not all reasons could be seen in this light. One 
example might be that IT was viewed as being a core part of the business. These 
reasons, however, have been articulated in other literature. Table 2.6 represents a
summary of the reasons given for keeping IT in-house.
Reason Identified by Author/s Category
IT is seen as core business Currie & Willcocks (1998), 
Barthelemy (2003), Goo et al (2007)
Strategic
High level of in-house 
technical expertise
Currie & Willcocks (1998), 
Barthelemy (2001), Earl (1996)
Strategic
In-house IT seen as cost 
efficient
Currie & Willcocks (1998),
Barthelemy (2001), Whitten & Leidner 
(2006), Whitten & Wakefield (2006), 
Hurley & Schumann (1997)
Operational efficiency
Inadequate supplier/market 
conditions
Currie & Willcocks (1998),
Barthelemy (2003), Whitten & Leidner 
(2006)
Operational efficiency
Synergy between business 
and IT
Currie & Willcocks (1998), Barthelemy 
(2003), Benko (1993), Hurley & 
Schumann (1997)
Strategic
Lack of trust about supplier 
motivation
Currie & Willcocks (1998), Barthelemy 
(2003), King & Malhotra (2000), Benko 
(1993)
Strategic
Retain up-to-date technical 
expertise
Currie & Willcocks (1998), 
Earl (1996), Benko (1993)
Strategic
Quality improvement Antonucci et al. (1998) Operational efficiency
Table 2.6 Reasons for IT Staying In-house
Table 2.6 seemed to illustrate that a number of the reasons given for IT remaining
in-house represent the antithesis of reasons given for outsourcing, the idea that the 
in-house provision was seen as cost efficient being a prime example. The list of 
reasons in Table 2.6 was used as part of the Survey completed and documented in 
Chapter 6.
2.4.4 Managing the Outsourcing Agreement
Once outsourcing has been completed, the main task for the client is monitoring 
the provision of the service detailed in the contract. The research covering the 
management of an outsourcing agreement and the relationship between the 
customer and the vendor is another well-trodden path in IT outsourcing literature. 
Managing the outsourcing agreement would seem, at first sight, to be 
straightforward. In common with a multitude of other buyer/supplier 
relationships, the original outsourcing agreements tended to be controlled and 
enforced through a contract and the use of Service Level Agreements, or SLAs 
(Willcocks & Choi 1995, Miranda & Kavan 2005). This approach predominated 
largely because transaction cost economies were used as a framework for 
understanding economic activities (Goo et al 2009). However, Dwyer et al (1987) 
made a legitimate point, arguing that each buyer/seller exchange is treated as a 
discrete event and not as an on-going relationship. It is argued that the 
development of the relationship is beneficial for both sides (Dwyer et al 1987). 
Even with a relationship building process in place, management of a relationship 
using a contract alone can be problematic. Most business contracts tend to be 
incomplete (Richmond et al 1992), often signed by the client in a hurry to start the 
agreement (Lacity & Hirschheim 1993). Alborz et al (2003) commented specifically 
on SLAs, stating that most are defined poorly with a focus on technical 
requirements rather than business need, with performance measures based on 
technical definitions and not business rules. As a result, the service does not meet 
business need, leading to a dissatisfaction that can weaken the client-vendor 
relationship (Alborz et al 2003). This matter became relevant for ClientCo in the 
Case Study covered in Chapter 5.
The notion of a relationship between client and vendor has been developed further
in literature. Elitzur & Wensley (1997) stated that it was often a requirement of an 
outsourcing contract for the outsourcing organization and the vendor to establish 
an intimate relationship. They go on to state that such an ongoing relationship can 
lead to a reduction of monitoring of the agreement and an increase in trust. Goo et 
al (2008) emphasised that trust and commitment were becoming increasingly 
important in outsourcing relationships and the formulation of SLAs, as part of the 
contract management process. This move towards maintaining the relationship 
between the client and the outsourcing vendor does not come as a surprise. 
Chakrabarty et al (2007) found that service quality and relationship quality were 
significantly and positively related and that both contributed to overall user 
satisfaction. The idea of service quality and relationship quality is developed 
further in Section 3.2.
Kishore et al (2003) advise that outsourcing should be considered more as a 
management of relationship with service providers rather than as a simple 
subcontract for IT services. Oliver (1990) suggests a number of determinants of 
cooperative relationships, of which necessity, reciprocity, efficiency and stability 
apply to the principle of outsourcing. Jahner & Kremar (2007) proposed a typology 
of outsourcing relationships, with five different relationships categorised by key 
relationship factors and the strategic intent, ranging from commodity supplier to 
strategic alliance partner. The proposed typology was then used to put forward 
the idea that different governance mechanisms were needed for different 
relationships. On this basis, it would seem that the contract and monitoring of 
SLAs within an outsourcing agreement would always be required. Poppo & 
Zenger (2002), for example, see formal contracts and relational governance as 
complementary. Although SLA's are usually documented as part of the formal 
contract, how could relational governance be measured? This is covered in detail 
in Section 3.2.3.
How the outsourcing agreement is managed is only part of the story, which of the 
parties has ownership and control over the IT assets that are subject to the 
agreement can have a significant influence on the success or failure of the
agreement, this is covered in more detail in section 2.4.6
2.4.5 The Importance of an Exit Strategy
Once the outsourcing process to the vendor is completed, what next? McLaughlin 
& Peppard (2006), for example, assert that over 80% of IS outsourcing contracts are 
renegotiated during the lifetime of the agreement. Although the source of this 
figure is not clear from the paper, why such a high figure? A number of issues 
need to be considered when looking at the operation of an outsourcing agreement, 
not least of which are culture, management processes and procedures, contract 
management and service and relationship management (Gong et al 2007). 
However, what if any of these factors break down to the point where the 
outsourcing client wants to terminate the agreement or chooses not to renew? An 
organisation would have to review their IT sourcing options and make a decision 
as to how to source some or all of their IT again. So the question again is what 
next? The outsourcing process does not just consist of the decision-making process 
and management of the subsequent contract. The options available to 
organisations beyond the termination or completion of the outsourcing agreement 
should be considered at the outset of the decision making process given the 
attrition rates for outsourcing contracts noted earlier.
The area that seems to have been largely overlooked within current outsourcing 
literature is that of an outsourcing contract 'exit strategy'. A search on the database 
Business Source Premier (completed April 2012) using the keywords of "exit 
strategy" and "outsourcing" only yielded one peer-reviewed journal article, that of 
Barthelemy (2001). There were no peer-reviewed articles for the keywords "exit 
plan" and "outsourcing".
Shepherd (1999) did allude to the idea of an exit strategy, stating that the lack of a 
suitable exit strategy could lead to the contract termination and handover of the 
areas under contract being very complex,
"...requiring a great deal of co-operation from the incumbent if disruption was to be 
avoided." (p81)
The omission, or poor definition, of an exit strategy (with appropriate exit clauses)
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within the original outsourcing contract has the possibility of opening a whole
Pandora's box of legal and issues for the client and the vendor should switch
vendors or backsourcing result from the sourcing decision (Whitten & Leidner
2006). However, an effective exit strategy could facilitate the re-negotiation of an
existing contract, switching supplier or bringing IT back in-house. Barthelemy
(2001) issued a cautionary note on this,
"Companies seldom realize how difficult and costly it is to end an IT outsourcing 
contract. That knowledge may make some companies less eager to outsource in the 
first place." (p66)
It would seem that bringing outsourced IT back in-house has the propensity to be 
like trying to 'put the Genie back in the bottle'.
2.4.6 Power, Asset Ownership and Control
Asset ownership and control are synergistic in nature. Williamson (1985), when
looking at transaction costs, argued that whoever owns the means of production
has control and that external ownership increases transaction costs. Hart & Moore
(1990) also stated that the ownership of an asset is important as ownership implies
control. This is derived from the earlier work of Hart (1989), who stated that
.ownership of an asset goes together with the possession of residual rights of 
control over that asset; the owner has the right to use the asset in any way not 
inconsistent with a prior contract, custom, or any law." (pl765)
Cullen et al (2005) took the idea of asset ownership and expanded it within the
context of IT outsourcing, proposing a framework of resource ownership in an IT
outsourcing agreement that divided the types of resource into three categories;
assets (e.g. hardware, software), facilities (e.g. office site, data centre) and labour
(direct and /o r management). Cullen et al (2005) went on to explain that
"Ownership is not literal; it identifies the party holding facility or asset leases, 
for example, or the party holding the labor agreement with contracted staff." 
(p374)
This definition, more aligned to residential right theory, is slightly different from 
those used in Transaction Cost Theory, where the focus is on the investment made 
by the asset owner. The emphasis is more on who has control of the asset.
Asset ownership and control has particular relevance in a case of a total
outsourcing agreement. The assets (staff and hardware, software etc.) are often 
transferred to the vendor for an agreed payment, This validates a point made 
earlier, where the client often outsources to receive a capital injection (Lonsdale & 
Cox 2000), converting fixed capital IT costs into variable operational costs in the 
process.
Alongside the idea of asset ownership within IT outsourcing is asset specificity, 
one of the main tenants of transaction costs theory. For asset specificity, the key is 
how scarce the asset is. Williamson & Tweedy (1986) recognised only two types of 
asset specificity - highly specific and non-specific. Hart (1989) specified that these 
assets were split into nonhuman (non-specific) and human (highly specific) assets. 
This has major implications for IT outsourcing in that the IT staff will invariably be 
transferred to the vendor with IT infrastructure generally being transferred as 
discussed in the previous paragraph. King & Malhotra (2000) stated that assets are 
specific when they cannot be used outside of the outsourcing relationship. 
However, it does allow the vendor an opportunity to gain knowledge that can be 
used for the benefit of their potential customers. This could lead to a potential 
threat to the client.
With a vendor having control over the some or all of a client's IT, including the 
highly specific assets; can this control be misused within an outsourcing 
agreement? An important part of managing an outsourcing contract and 
agreement is the level of autonomy granted to the vendor. The vendor is engaged 
to manage the outsourced IT so that the client does not have to be concerned with 
the day-to-day operation. With this, however, comes a significant risk. The vendor 
is in a position of power that can be taken advantage of through opportunistic 
behaviour. Goo et al (2007) proposed that a stringent contract, along with strong 
governance could minimise the occurrence of opportunistic behaviour. Gottschalk 
& Solli-Saether (2005) seemed to concur, stating that
"The contract should prevent opportunistic behaviour in an efficient collaborative
environment with balance of power between client and vendor." (p694)
An all-encompassing contract, however, is a double-edged sword, as it can also 
restrict agility and flexibility, resulting in addition cost (Goo et al 2007).
How can a vendor behave opportunistically? Clemons & Hitt (2004) identified 
three types of opportunistic behaviour
• Poaching, where information transferred to the vendor to aid the 
performance of the contract is deliberately used outside the contract for the 
vendor's own benefit
• Deliberate underperformance by the vendor, where the client cannot 
monitor performance
• Abuse of power, where the client becomes dependent on the services of the 
vendor.
If a power imbalance exists between the client and the vendor, with the latter being 
dominant, the third of the bullet points listed above becomes a real risk, especially 
when renegotiating or discussing the extension of an existing agreement.
2.4.7 Knowledge Management
Johnson & Scholes (2002) stress the importance of knowledge and knowledge 
management when considering strategic capability. Does an organisation lose 
knowledge because of IT outsourcing?
Anderson & Parker (2002) looked at the effect of learning on the make or buy 
decision, specifically on the production of components and their integration into 
complete products. Although the subject matter was not IT, some learning seemed 
transferable to this arena. The authors themselves commented that the models 
developed could be applied to internet commerce, where the difficulty was in 
integrating the different parts of the system (Anderson & Parker 2002). One of the 
key comment findings was that when a component is outsourced, the learning 
accrues to the suppliers rather than the client organisation. However, learning of 
integration only occurs if the component and the integration process are 
outsourced to the same supplier, in which case the supplier accrues the benefit 
(Anderson & Parker 2002).
King and Malhotra (2000) make the point that outsourcing can often lead to a 
deterioration in an organisations ability to innovate as they are accumulating little 
technical knowledge. The assertion is that
"For sustainable competitive advantage, companies must learn and assimilate new
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technologies, tacit skills and competencies that will become the basis of future 
initiatives. Firms that rely on outsourcing may find their internal skill sets 
deteriorating as they become docked out' from learning new skills and technologies 
that are critical to participating in industry evolution." (King & Malhotra 2000, 
p331-2)
This is tied to the fact that the potential success of the outsourcing relies on the 
transfer of information from the client to the vendor, so that the latter can carry out 
its contractual duties (Clemons & Hitt 2004). Once this initial exchange has taken 
place there may be a tendency for the information exchange to dwindle as the 
client is excluded from new skills and technologies moving forward (King & 
Malhotra 2000). This is one of the aspects that can lead to opportunistic behaviour 
on behalf of the vendor, as discussed previously. Bhagwatwar et al (2011), when 
talking of knowledge management during the backsourcing transition phase, 
stated that
"The role of co-operation of the outsourcing vendor is critical here because the 
vendor has complete knoivledge of the various steps that were followed when the 
outsourcing took place. It is important for the company to communicate and co­
ordinate with the vendor because this will not only lead to early detection of risks 
involved but will also ensure that the backsourcing process is completed quickly." 
(pi 70)
This would seem to be a little simplistic, at worst, naive. To believe that a vendor 
would cooperate at all times during the transfer of IT back to the client seems 
somewhat misguided. As in most business dealings, a party looks after their own 
interests first (Clemons & Hitt 2004). King & Malhotra (2000) noted that the threat 
of opportunistic behaviour by the vendor during an outsourcing agreement is a 
real threat. This has already been discussed.
Feeny & Willcocks (1998) proposed a framework of IS Core Capabilities, with these 
capabilities (or roles) are based around business, technology or service 
competencies, with a number of roles requiring the combination of competencies.
Business and IT vision
/  Vendor 
development
Making 
technology 
\  work /
Figure 2.1 IS Core Capabilities (Feeny & W illcocks 1998)
When outsourcing, a number of the core capabilities are implicitly transferred to 
the vendor, 'design of IT architecture', for example. This leaves a gap in the client's 
capabilities that could lead to issues as the outsourcing agreement progresses over 
time.
2.4.8 Summary
From the literature review, it would seem that IT outsourcing could have a 
significant impact on an organisation in terms of strategy and change. Outsourcing 
to concentrate on core capabilities has been shown as not being as straight forward 
as it first appears. Outsourcing can actually inhibit an organisation's ability to 
change and innovate, the balance between the client and the vendor is a delicate 
one, where a power imbalance in favour of the vendor can lead to opportunistic 
behaviour that adversely affects the client.
If a client is unhappy with an outsourcing agreement and renegotiation does break 
down, what are the options? One is to switch vendors, the other is to bring the 
outsourced IT back in-house. This latter option will be considered next.
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2.5 IT Backsourcing
Research in the area of IT backsourcing has only begun to surface over the last five 
years or so. Within the UK, backsourcing was more commonly termed as 
insourcing and, to a certain extent, still is. Insourcing is seen as the process of 
bringing IT back in-house. This leads to a problem. Preliminary research 
demonstrated that there are a number of different interpretations of what 
constitutes insourcing. These alternative definitions need to be explored in order to 
settle on a working definition for bringing outsourced IT back in-house.
2.5.1 Defining Insourcing/Backsourcing -  the alternatives.
The origins of the term insourcing are many. Currie & Willcocks (1998) state that
insourcing is where an organisation chooses to do all the work in-house, hiring
external contractors short term for specific projects if necessary. Hirschheim and
Lacity (2000) defined insourcing as
"...the process of evaluating the outsourcing option but confirming the continued 
use of internal IT resources to achieve the same objectives o f outsourcing." (plOO)
Both Currie & Willcocks (1998) and Hirschheim and Lacity (2000) seem to agree 
that insourcing implies the use of internal IT resources.
Hirschheim and Lacity (2000) advocated four Archetypes of Insourcing; these are 
listed in Table 2.7.
1. Senior executives enable internal IT managers to cut costs -  internal bids made in 
competition with prospective outsourcing vendors to drive down costs.
2. IT managers terminate failing outsourcing contracts -  often poorly negotiated, 
terminating the outsourcing contracts resulted in cost savings and improved 
performance.
3. IT managers defend ‘insourcing’ -  i.e. an outsourcing evaluation is used to ‘confirm’ that 
keeping IT in-house was the better option.
4. Senior executives confirm the value of IT -  support and faith in IT is traditionally strong 
so outsourcing bids are not even considered.
Table 2.7 The Four Archetypes of Insourcing
Archetypes 1, 3 and 4 could be argued as keeping IT 'in-house' -  changes in 
sourcing strategy do not result from the decision-making process. Archetype 2, 
however, does result in a change in IT sourcing -  previously outsourced IT is 
brought back in-house. Alternatively, Slaughter (2004) defines insourcing as
"The expansion into the United States by foreign-headquartered multinational
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firms." (pi)
Amiti & Wei (2005) concurred with Slaughter (2004) in what seems to be an
American definition of insourcing, i.e. that
"...the phrase US 'insourcing' refers to the outsourcing from the rest of the world to 
the United States." (Amiti & Wei 2005, p314)
King and Malhotra (2000) developed a framework for the use of internal markets 
as an alternative to outsourcing. This was implicitly dubbed as 'insourcing' 
although no definition of what was considered as 'insourcing' was offered. 
Broadly, the views expressed by King and Malhotra (2000) coincided with 
Hirschheim and Lacity (2000) in this context, although 'insourcing' was not seen as 
a process 'to go through', but a framework for IT sourcing that used an internal 
market mechanism. It could be argued that 'insourcing' as used by King and 
Malhotra (2000) is normal operation in an organisation with an internal IT 
division.
On initial observation, it would seem that there is no single definition of 
insourcing. More appropriate would be an initial classification or taxonomy of 
what constitutes insourcing found in Table 2.8.
1. The expansion into the United States by foreign-headquartered multinational firms (Amiti 
& Wei 2005, Slaughter 2004).
2. Termination of outsourcing contract and bringing outsourced area back ‘in-house’ 
(Hirschheim and Lacity 2000, Verhoef 2005).
3. The process of evaluating the outsourcing option but confirming the continued use of 
internal IT resources to achieve the same objectives of outsourcing. (Hirschheim and 
Lacity 2000).
4. Doing the IT function in-house, hiring external contractors short term for specific 
projects if necessary. (Currie & Willcocks 1998).
Table 2.8 An initial taxonom y of Insourcing
More recently, insourcing has been synonymous with organisations that have 
taken their outsourced IT back 'in-house'. Vining & Globerman (1999) termed this 
as 'backsourcing', as have others (Verhoef 2005, Whitten & Leidner 2006, 
McLaughlin & Peppard 2006).
Looking at the taxonomy of insourcing, the definition of what constitutes 
insourcing from an American perspective (Amiti & Wei 2005, Slaughter 2004) 
seems to be at odds with the other definitions -  it appears to be standard business
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by multi-national companies (Johnson & Scholes 2002). The definition of
insourcing by Hirschheim and Lacity (2000), that of considering outsourcing but
keeping IT 'in-house', seems to be a label for the decision rather that a process
followed. Such a decision is, in reality, an agreement that IT sourcing should
continue 'as is'. Bringing IT back in-house from an outsourcer appears to be the
most common and appropriate use of the word 'insourcing' within the UK.
Whether 'insourcing' or 'backsourcing', as proposed by Vining & Globerman
(1999), is more appropriate could be argued further. However, for the sake of
clarity, and for the purpose of this research, the term backsourcing will be used.
Backsourcing is defined (by the author) as,
"The process followed by an organisation to bring some or all of its previously 
outsourced IT function back in-house as an internal unit of the organisation."
2.5.2 Looking at the Decision Making Factors
It has been noted that the backlash against IT outsourcing started as early as 1997 
(King & Malhotra, 2000). However, research in this area has only started to emerge 
in the last decade.
It could be viewed that the decision to backsource is the result of an IT sourcing 
review and, as such, is just one of the outcomes from such a review -  contract 
renewal and switching to another vendor being other possible alternatives 
(Whitten & Leidner 2006). Given the time, effort and cost an organisation may 
have expended to outsource its IT, why would it want to reverse the process?
Overby (2005) was one of the first articles to discuss backsourcing, specifically at JP 
Morgan Chase after the merger with Bank One. The merged organisation ended 
the outsourcing agreement JP Morgan Chase previously had with IBM. Senior 
management appeared to give the same reasons for backsourcing IT that were 
given for the original outsourcing agreement (Overby 2005). However, Lacity et al
(1996) noted, during their research, that two out of fourteen organisations with an 
original total outsourcing deal had bought IT back in house. It would seem that 
organisations have been practising backsourcing; it had just not been termed as 
backsourcing until authors (such as Overby & Verhoef) started labelling the
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process of bringing IT back in-house as backsourcing.
McLaughlin & Peppard (2006) looked at backsourcing decisions through a 
collection of media releases, newspaper and journal reports and company 
accounts. Wong (2008) and Veltri et al (2008) followed a similar approach. These 
studies concentrated on data available from secondary sources. Whitten & Leidner
(2006) provided one of the first insights, via empirical data, into the decision to 
either switch vendors or backsource previously outsourced IT in the context of 
application development. Applying the reasons for business decisions used by 
Porter (1996) created by Dibbern et al (2004) to categorise reasons given for the 
outsourcing decision provides interesting results for the reasons given for the 
backsourcing decision.
The reasons for backsourcing found by Whitten & Leidner (2006) seem to 
correspond closely with those found by others. It would seem that a switch in the 
perception of IT's importance to the organisation, senior management changes 
within the client, cost, desire to regain control of IT and a poor relationship with 
the vendor were all major contributors. Some of the reasons are apparently 
straightforward and quantifiable - excessive cost, for example. Executive 
Management changes or an organisation acquisition/ merger could lead to overall 
business review and change. It could therefore be viewed that strategic and 
economic factors are predominantly objective. However, the organisational factors 
are more subjective. The relationship between the client organisation and the 
vendor, and the feeling of loss of control by the client, are more difficult to 
quantify. It could be viewed that the perceived quality of the service or 
relationship are more open to subjective influence. Veltri et al (2008) note that 
although the reasons of a backsourcing can be identified, it is not possible to state 
what the most important reason was. They go on to state that the importance of 
each reason cannot be gauged, or which one of the reasons provided the tipping 
point for the re-evaluation of the outsourcing contract(Veltri et al 2008).
The decision factors in Table 2.9 have also been categorised using Porter's (1996) 
split into strategy and operational effectiveness. The reasons for backsourcing by
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author (Table 2.9) have been summarized and used for the survey instrument. 
These can be found in Table 2.10.
Decision
Factors
Whitten & 
Leidner (2006)
McLaughlin & 
Peppard (2006)
Wong (2008) Veltri et al 
(2008)
Strategic • IT seen as a 
competitive 
asset
• IT seen as 
strategic rather 
than commodity
• Changes in 
business 
environment
• Business 
change and 
evolution
• Technology 
change
• Management 
change
• Desire to regain 
control
•
• Changes in 
strategic 
directions
• Changes in IT 
role
• Changes in 
organizational 
structure (due to 
acquisition, 
mergers, etc.)
• Vendor merges 
with other 
organizations
• New 
management
• Loss of control
• IT resources 
accessibility
• External 
changes 
(acquisition)
• IS role 
change
• New 
Executive
• Loss of 
control
• Know-how 
mismatch
•
Operational
Efficiencies
• Poor price
• Poor 
relationship 
with vendor
• Poor service
• Contract 
problems
• Vendor fails to 
achieve profit 
from agreement
• Failure to meet 
objectives
• Cost
• Service quality
• Excessive 
cost
• Poor service
Table 2.9 Reasons given for Backsourcing
Reviewing the reasons given by organisations earlier for outsourcing and 
backsourcing appear to be broadly similar. So what else contributes to the decision 
to backsource rather than re-negotiate or switch vendors?
Backsourcing can be a painful process and is risky for the client (Overby 2005), 
why would an organisation expose themselves to such risk to the IT provision and 
a risk to the organisation as a whole?
Reviewing the reasons for backsourcing discussed earlier (Table 2.9), backsourcing 
for reasons of operational efficiencies seem clear-cut. This could be phrased as 
Terminated for cause", where the outsourcing venture is placed under so much 
pressure that renegotiation or termination are the only options. Kern et al (2002) 
term this as the "Winners Curse", where the successful vendor in the bidding 
process bids at too low a price or agrees to contract conditions that it finds it 
cannot meet, or the cost to the client is deemed too far in excess of the original
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contract cost.
Strategic motives also seem straightforward initially. An organisation with 
outsourced IT that has been acquired by another will almost inevitably review the 
whole of the merged organisation, including IT sourcing. Such a review may result 
in backsourcing (Veltri et al 2008). However, there is an anomaly. One of the 
reasons noted by many of the articles looking at the backsourcing decision was 
that IT was now seen as a competitive asset or as strategic (Whitten & Leidner, 
2006 and McLaughlin & Peppard, 2006). This could be viewed as evidence of an IT 
area perceived as commodity and therefore outsourced, subsequently re-evaluated 
as strategic because of the change in perception of IT within the business. The re­
categorisation of TT as Commodity' to TT as Strategic' also raises other issues; 
does such a process imply that backsourcing is the only option at the end of the 
outsourcing agreement? Switching vendors would appear to continue to imply TT 
as Commodity'. It could also be that a relationship with an outsourcing vendor 
that was originally deemed as strategic did not work as anticipated.
Reason Identified by Author/s Category
Lack of visibility of IT - desire to regain control Wong & Jaya (2008), 
Veltri et al (2008), Overby 
(2003)
Strategic
Change in role - IT now seen as strategic to the 
organisation
Wong & Jaya (2008), 
McLaughlin & Peppard 
(2006), Whitten & Leidner 
(2006), Veltri et al (2008)
Strategic
Vendor failure to achieve specific objectives McLaughlin & Peppard 
(2006), Whitten & Leidner 
(2006), Veltri et al (2008)
Operational
Efficiencies
Change in organisation strategy Wong & Jaya (2008), 
McLaughlin & Peppard 
(2006), Overby (2003)
Strategic
Changes within organisation (merger or 
acquisition)
Wong & Jaya (2008), 
McLaughlin & Peppard 
(2006), Veltri et al (2008)
Strategic
Outsourced systems did not keep track with 
technology change
McLaughlin & Peppard 
(2006), Veltri et al (2008)
Operational
Efficiencies
Changes within organisational Senior 
Management
Wong & Jaya (2008), 
McLaughlin & Peppard 
(2006), Veltri et al (2008), 
Overby (2003)
Strategic
Cost savings did not materialise Whitten & Leidner (2006), 
Veltri et al (2008)
Operational
Efficiencies
Table 2 .10 Backsourcing Reasons used for the Survey
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Table 2.10 lists the reasons for backsourcing summarised earlier. These are the 
reasons used as part of the survey described in Chapter 4. Applying Porter's (1996) 
classification, it would seem the categories are evenly split between being driven 
by strategy (strategic) and operational efficiencies.
Again, as with the reasons for outsourcing, there are ambiguities. The desire to 
regain control, for example, could be to reduce runaway costs (operational 
efficiency) or to use IT to build a new competitive advantage (strategic). 
Consistency, in terms of the categories used for outsourcing, was maintained for 
the reasons for backsourcing.
As with outsourcing, a number of risks of backsourcing (Table 2.11) were 
identified by those that looked at the backsourcing process carried out by 
organisations to date (McLaughlin & Peppard 2006, Veltri et al 2008, Wong & Jaya 
2008). These were subsequently augmented by risks identified during the Case 
Study phase of this research to generate a list of backsourcing risks for use during 
the survey phase of the research.
Reason Category
Loss of senior management and/or key staff OperationalEfficiencies
Lack of knowledge of the process to bring IT back in-house OperationalEfficiencies
Deterioration of relationship with the vendor OperationalEfficiencies
Loss of IT technical knowledge OperationalEfficiencies
Lack of in-house IT management experience OperationalEfficiencies
Transference of Vendor contracts with third Parties OperationalEfficiencies
Disruption to business operations OperationalEfficiencies
Table 2.1 I Identifying Backsourcing Risks
An observation can be made here - all of the risks for backsourcing can be 
classified as having an effect on operational efficiencies -  in this case a negative 
one. This could be because the risks themselves are based around the transition
from the vendor and the subsequent operation of IT once the transition is 
complete. However, it is possible that some of the reasons illustrate the ambiguity 
seen earlier when looking at outsourcing and backsourcing reasons. Loss of IT 
technical knowledge, for example, could inhibit an organisation's ability to 
innovate -  a strategic consideration.
With the limited research so far into the backsourcing domain, it seems a number 
of questions still arise, indicating gaps in current research.
2.5.3 Backsourcing -  Gaps in Current Research
A review of literature indicated a number of areas for further research. Literature 
for Backsourcing had largely concentrated on data available from secondary 
sources (McLaughlin & Peppard 2006, Wong 2008, Veltri et al 2008), with Whitten 
& Leidner (2006) being an exception. It would seem that the lack of empirical data 
on the number of organisations that have subsequently backsourced after 
outsourcing was an area requiring further research. This was surprising given that 
outsourcing, as defined previously, has been prevalent for over 25 years.
2.5.4 Research & Case Study Objectives
Looking at the literature review on backsourcing and the introduction of the IT 
Sourcing Cycle discussed in Chapter 3, it would seem that Figure 2.2 is a 
representation of the IT Backsourcing Domain. This was used as a basis for the 
Case Study research discussed extensively in Chapters 4 and 5. This depiction of 
the backsourcing research domain highlighted gaps in current literature. These led 
to two primary areas of investigation during the case study stage, the first 
concerns the decision making process, the second being the process of transition of 
an IT Division from the outsourcer and its subsequent operation within the newly 
merged organisation.
The first area covers the decision making process - how was the decision arrived 
at, what were the perceived problems within the organisation that prom pted the 
decision. Additionally, what were seen as the strategic and competitive advantages 
from moving in the chosen direction, i.e. backsourcing? Secondly, the process,
where there are two particular areas of interest. The first is the actual mechanics of 
the backsourcing process. This could best be described as "due diligence', i.e. what 
has to happen for the transfer to take place. This is more of an 'information 
gathering' exercise to provide a background for the second area.
D e c is io n
T r a n s i t io n
Figure 2.2 The IT Backsourcing Domain
The second area covers how the transfer takes place and the ways in which the 
interests of both parties are protected. Inherent in IT is the documented and tacit 
knowledge of the organisation and the individuals in terms of the business and IT 
systems operation and development (Willcocks et al 2004). For an organisation 
carrying out backsourcing, the conjecture is that the transfer and management of 
this knowledge is key to the organisation moving forward successfully at the 
completion of the backsourcing process. Referring to the original Research 
Objectives, five Case Study objectives were formulated.
(3) To identify the key strategic and 
decision-making factors to 
backsource IT, and to contrast these 
with the outsourcing process.
To explore the importance and the drivers of the 
decision stage in backsourcing.
(4) To understand the backsourcing 
process in comparison with the To understand the decision making process and the options explored.
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existing frameworks for IT 
outsourcing. To discover the ‘mechanics’ of the transition stage and the problems or barriers, that become apparent in 
backsourcing.
Exploration of the importance of knowledge 
management and the retention of key personnel in the 
backsourcing process.
To determine the differences in the operation stage for 
backsourcing.
Table 2 .12 Case Study Objectives
Using the IT Sourcing Cycle (proposed in Chapter 3), Figure 2.2 and Table 2.12 as a 
framework, four research questions were formed to guide the inquiry.
Research Question 1
Is the decision stage more risky for outsourcing than backsourcing?
Firstly, the supposition is that the decision stage for outsourcing is more risky as it 
signals a change in IT strategy that affects the whole organisation (Fowler & Jeffs 
1998, Kremic et al 2006). It is also more risky because an organisation has to select 
the correct supplier. In the case of ClientCo, where a Total' outsourcing approach 
was adopted, it could be considered higher-risk compared to a multi-vendor 
approach (McFarlane & Nolan 1995). To a certain extent it is a Teap in the dark', 
the actual performance of the vendor cannot be judged until after the transition 
has been completed. It is this aspect that Aron et al (2005) conceptualise as strategic 
(opportunistic behaviour) and operational (suboptimal performance) risks that 
provide the greatest areas of concern for an organisation embarking on 
outsourcing.
The decision stage would seem different for backsourcing. It is an evaluation of 
alternatives (stay with vendor, switch vendors or backsource), with risk 
assessments of each alternative. Once the decision to backsource has been made, 
the risks associated with the decision are encountered within the transition and 
operation phases.
Research Question 2
Is the transition stage, in terms of 'mechanics', more problematic for backsourcing 
than outsourcing?
For an outsourcer, the transition of IT from the client is essentially part of normal 
business practice, albeit not without risk (Bahli & Rivard 2003, Gong et al 2007). 
For an organisation backsourcing IT, it may be a 'one off' operation, an exercise 
they have not done before and may not do again. Does this uniqueness give rise to 
problems, anticipated and unforeseen?
Research Question 3
Is knowledge management and the retention of key personnel more important in 
the backsourcing transition process than in outsourcing?
An outsourcer will probably have access to a 'pool' of technical expertise that can 
be called upon if key personnel are lost or, as has been articulated, supply skills 
and expertise not available within the client (Kakabadse & Kakabadse 2002, 
Antonucci et al. 1998, Willcocks et al 1995). A backsourcer would have to identify 
gaps and recruit accordingly. This could be a time consuming exercise during 
which the organisation could be exposed.
Research Question 4
Is the Operation stage for outsourcing and backsourcing different?
When dealing with 'total' outsourcing or backsourcing where the change affects 
the whole of IT, it is proposed that the Operation stage is different from 
outsourcing or backsourcing. For outsourcing, IT is integrated within an existing 
IT structure of the vendor -  essentially a Tike for like'. For backsourcing, IT is 
integrated back into the 'business' of the organisation, the issue would be that the 
backsourcing organisation may have had only a limited sight of IT as a business 
function (Veltri et al 2008).
2.5.5 Summary
The Backsourcing literature to date has predominantly concentrated on the 
backsourcing decision (Whitten & Leidner 2006, McLaughlin & Peppard 2006, 
Wong 2008, Veltri et al 2008). When a previously outsourced IT arrangement has 
been brought back in-house, it is not unreasonable to assume that some of the 
same issues occur to those when the IT was previously outsourced. This 
assumption highlights a gap in current literature - very little is known about the 
backsourcing process other than that stated by organisations that have 
backsourced their IT. The issue is that what have been placed in the public domain 
are the details an organisation is willing to articulate. Research in the area of the 
backsourcing process would also be of benefit; what made an organisation review 
their outsourcing agreement, why choose backsourcing rather than re-negotiating 
or switching vendors? During the backsourcing process, what were considered the 
significant risks and issues?
Finally, what steps were taken to integrate the IT back within the organisation 
structure and culture? The longer the IT area has been outsourced the larger the 
adjustment necessary and the more the backsourcing process resembles a merger 
or acquisition. There are two things to consider. Firstly, the 'detachment' from the 
client organisation and the effect that has on staff and secondly, if the outsourcing 
agreement ran for a number of years some of the staff working for the vendor may 
never have ever worked for the client. How would this affect any transition?
Barclays outsourced software application development and maintenance to 
Accenture in a six year deal, stating quicker response to change, resource flexibility 
and lower costs as the reasons (Accenture 2004). Barclays has recently brought the 
outsourced functions back in-house at the end of the contract, citing 'commercial 
reasons' for the decision, stating that the in-house option was the most efficient 
model for the work (King 2010). Previously, Barclays announced in August 2008 
that they would not be renewing a Business Process Outsourcing agreement with 
Siemens, one that had started in 2000 and renewed in 2005 (Thomas 2008). Were 
the two decisions made by Barclays made in isolation? A more reasonable
explanation would seem to be a shift in business strategy. Wong (2008) made an 
interesting point; organisations appear to backsource to correct existing problems 
and to exploit new business opportunities. Once again, we come back to two of the 
motivations for outsourcing being mirrored for backsourcing. It really does appear 
that there is nothing new under the sun.
2.6 Revisiting IT Strategy
In an earlier section, the idea of IT strategy and its link to business strategy was 
discussed. However, the issue of how IT and its constituent parts are perceived by 
the organisation when formulating business and IT strategy is also important. 
From the experience of the researcher, an IT strategy could be as basic as a decision 
to outsource everything to a vendor or as complicated as matching current and 
future IT to each objective in the business strategy. This raises a question. If the IT 
strategy is aligned with the business strategy, and is an integral part of the 
organisation, as Goldsmith (1991) suggests, is IT strategic?
2.6.1 ‘IT as Commodity’ vs. ‘IT as Strategy’
Over the years outsourcing has been the subject of research from many
perspectives, from the original 'make-versus-buy' (Loh & Venkatraman 1992a), to
several types of outsourcing identified by Verhoef (2005) and Brooks (2006).
Willcocks and Choi (1995) talk of using outsourcing as a strategic alliance rather
than a buyer/supplier relationship. King (2005) seems to validate the strategic
alliance view, stating that the outsourcing decision has gone beyond the make-
versus-buy decision with issues such as core competencies and critical success
factors becoming important. Talk of strategic alliances and core competencies
returns the discussion to the issue of strategy, business and IT. Interestingly,
Hancox & Hackney (1999) found, in a study of local authorities and private sector
organisations, found that outsourcing IT as a way of concentrating on core
competencies was not a major motive for outsourcing. Hall & Liedtka (2005) stated
that large-scale IT outsourcing
"... involves the divestiture o f all or most IT assets including commodity assets and 
those specific to the organisation's business strategy." (pl94)
So the argument turns to what to outsource and why. Research by Fowler and Jeffs
(1998) proposed a hierarchy for when outsourcing should be undertaken, stating 
that the strategic importance of a system should dictate if that system is to be 
outsourced. This approach implies that outsourcing should be selective. This 
argument against total outsourcing on strategic grounds brings into focus the issue 
of the way IT is seen within an organisation.
Carr (2003) started a real debate within the IT area, Stewart (2003) said
"Unsurprisingly, "IT Doesn't Matter" has generated an enormous amount of 
controversy." (pi)
Carr (2003) argued that IT is a commodity that does not provide an organisation 
with a competitive advantage. This brings IT back to the "make verses buy" 
argument for outsourcing advocated in some of the outsourcing literature (Loh 
&Venkatraman 1992b). Others see IT as strategic; Quelin & Duhamel (2003) go as 
far as to state that an outsourcing decision lies not just as a business strategy, but 
also as part of corporate policy, as it changes an organisation's boundary. This 
would apply for any amount of outsourcing, be it minimal, selective or total.
Like many things, the reality is probably somewhere in the middle of these two 
extremes. Some parts of IT could be seen as a commodity within the context of the 
organisation. Huff (1991) discussed the idea of outsourcing the Teast strategic' of IS 
activities along the lines of Fowler & Jeffs (1998), quoting an IS Executive talking 
about Data Centre assets, stated that
"How you use the iron is strategic, but the iron itself is not strategic" (p62)
Hall & Liedtka (2005) widened the definition of a commodity asset,
"Commodity IT assets are easily obtained in the marketplace. ” (pl94)
Chen et al (1995) seemed to concur with this, observing that certain IS functions are 
more inherently commoditised. For example, for many organisations a network 
could be seen as a commodity -  just a method of communicating between different 
sections of the business. For a telecommunications company such as Cable & 
Wireless, networks would be seen as a core competence and therefore viewed as 
strategic. Tiernan and Peppard (2004) concur with Carr (2003) that parts of IT are 
like a utility and therefore outsourcing is a legitimate strategy. However, they go
on to state that there are parts of IT that should never be handed over to an 
external provider. Hirschheim et al (2003) makes a point that may go some way to 
explaining why executives and senior managers within an organisation may see IT 
as a commodity,
"We believe that easy to use technologies such as PC technology in the '80s and the 
Internet technology in the '90s contributed to the false trend in top management 
expectations that computer systems are increasingly simple and inexpensive to 
develop, maintain and support." (p24)
King & Malhotra (2000) go further, stating that many senior executives mistakenly 
classify all IT activities as a commodity and that the business contribution of IT is 
overlooked because it is accounted for as an overhead. It is this perception of IT by 
senior executives that seems to have "opened the door" for others to exploit. Carr 
(2003), for example, argued strongly that it was the ubiquity of IT that meant it did 
not matter strategically and would seem, at face value, to be correct. IT is a 
commodity or, to re-categorise the statement slightly, IT infrastructure is a 
commodity. Carr (2003) made a compelling and cogent argument that IT was a 
commodity or even a utility as more and more suppliers flood the market with 
PC's, servers, storage, telecoms etc. The crux of the argument was that as there are 
so many suppliers it is no longer possible to gain competitive advantage using IT, 
as competitors can quickly catch up (Carr 2003). For IT functions, those defined as 
underpinning processes by Edwards & Peppard (1997), a commodity classification 
seems applicable.
However, taking Carr's statements, it might be possible to draw an analogy with 
the electricity industry; one used by Carr (2003) to 'illustrate' IT's utility. IT goes 
beyond the infrastructure, just as electricity goes beyond generation and 
distribution. For IT, IBM or Hewlett Packard may sell you the hardware, but 
would not insist on what applications should run on it (unless they were selling 
consultancy services as well!). For electricity, EDF or Scottish Power would not 
advise on how many TVs you should own or what refrigerator or washing 
machine you should buy.
So, what is meant by 'IT as Commodity' and 'IT as Strategic'? For the purpose of
this research, TT as Commodity' is defined (by the author) as
'Those elements of IT that are readily available from a number of suppliers in the 
marketplace. Such elements include hardware, networks and softivare (i.e. IT 
Infrastructure) freely available to all organisations.'
TT as Strategic', adapted from Porter (1996) is defined (by the author) as
'Those IT elements or systems that enable a unique and valuable position in the 
organisation, involving a different set of activities from that of the competition."
The challenge, then, is how to categorise IT functions or systems as either 
commodity or strategic. Literature provided two interesting frameworks to 
examine, the Strategic Diamond (Edwards & Peppard 1997) and the WISE Grid 
(McKeen & Smith 2003). These will now be explored in turn.
2.6.2 Capabilities, Functions & Systems
There are a number of ways IT could be 'sliced and diced'. Most common, in 
outsourcing terms, is at an IT Function level. Many articles look either at the 
outsourcing of the whole IT function or at functions within IT (Cronk & Sharp 
1995, Apte et al 1997, Fowler & Jeffs 1998). This, again, could be split on the based 
on 'IT as Commodity' or TT as Strategic'. Legacy Application Support, for 
example, could be categorised as Support in the WISE Grid discussed later in this 
Chapter. There are any number of organisations, such as Infosys and Tata 
Consultancy Services (TCS) that provide such services. This introduces the idea of 
utility (multiple possible suppliers) and lack of core competence (legacy) that 
would put Legacy Application Support firmly in TT as Commodity'.
At this stage, a differentiation has to be made by what is meant by functions, 
capabilities and systems. For the purpose of this research, the following definitions 
have been adopted. 'Capabilities' are the tangible and intangible assets used to 
develop and implement functions within the business, each function will have 
unique capabilities, as well as capabilities in common with other functions (Ray et 
al 2004). 'Functions' are areas of an organisation; Finance, Marketing and Human 
Resource Management are seen as functions of an organisation, as is IT 
(Hodgkinson, 1992).
An 'IT Functional area' is a sub-function within the IT function, areas such as
Applications Development, Application Systems Support, Data Centre Operations 
& Support and IT Helpdesk. 'Systems' are those organised operations (consisting 
of one or more processes) that support functions within the organisation. These 
systems, at a business level, may or may not include IT systems. An TT System' 
supports a specific business function (at the business process level); although an IT 
System could be used by multiple business functions. A Data Warehouse, for 
example, may be designed for the marketing function, but the data used to feed 
Finance IT systems to calculate Sales. The TT System' to 'business function' 
relationship is often a 'one to many' relationship in large organisations. Figure 2.3 
illustrates the concept of capabilities, functions and systems.
Capabilities
Functions & 
SystemsFunctionsACME Inc
Marketing Human Resources Marketing > Finance
IT Division Finance
 __
IT SystemsIT System 1
IT Functions
Application
Development
Data Centre 
Operations IT Help Desk
Figure 2.3 Capabilities. Functions and Systems
This differentiation between the different layers is important in view of the way IT 
is grouped when considering outsourcing. Total outsourcing, for example, would 
consist of outsourcing the complete IT function. Selective outsourcing, in contrast, 
would consist of outsourcing an IT sub-function (such as the Help Desk) or the 
support of a specific IT system (such as Finance). The multi-layered nature of IT 
needs to be considered when looking at outsourcing opportunities.
2.6.3 The Strategic Diamond
IT systems used by organisations are often in use for a number of years in the 
experience of the researcher -  a system lifecycle of 15-20 years is not uncommon. If 
an organisation were to outsource some of its IT because it was no longer 
considered strategic, on what would it base that judgement? With the move 
towards selective outsourcing (Brooks 2006), this decision takes on more 
prominence.
Lacity et al (1996) proposed a framework for selecting IT outsourcing candidates, 
based on the contribution of the IT activity on business operations and business 
positioning. Although this is useful in terms of the IT activity compared with 
business position, it does not take into account the concept of IT as either 
commodity or strategic. Edwards & Peppard (1997) presented a framework, the 
Strategic Diamond, which may provide another way of looking at the TT as 
Commodity' verses TT as Strategic' dilemma. The Strategic Diamond, in its 
original form, was used to categorise business processes so that the best candidates 
for Business Process Reengineering could be selected, i.e. those that would provide 
the biggest benefit. It was an attempt to classify the contribution of the process to 
the delivery of the business strategy. Cronk & Sharp (1995) extended the work of 
others on a classification of non-strategic or core competence processes and used 
this to classify systems and infrastructure along the same lines. The original 
process classification bore a resemblance to the original framework used by 
Edwards and Peppard (1997) to create the strategic diamond for processes. Could 
the same be completed for IT and create a framework that could differentiate 
between commodity and strategic IT?
A framework for IT overlaying the Strategic Diamond could be completed on one 
of two levels, either at an IT function or an IT system level. Looking at the IT 
function level, for many organisations it would be straightforward to categorise 
some functions. For example, in most organisations the IT Help Desk could be 
categorised as an underpinning IT function, in that it facilitates the smooth 
running of the other areas in the overall triangle. It may be difficult, however, to
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categorise an IT function as competitive and, by extension, strategic - the best that 
it may be possible to say is that it could definitely be commodity, desktop 
purchasing and support being a good example.
Those IT Functions or Systems with 
which the organization intend to 
oiiperform the competition
Those IT Functions or Systems 
that provide the future 
required capabilities
Competitive 
IT Functions/
Systems , 4
\  Transformation 
IT Functions/
Systems J  i
******
Qualifying \  y  Underpinning 
ITFunctions/ A  /  IT Functions/
Systems Systems
Those IT Finctions or Systems 
that are necessary to exist 
in the chosen industry and 
are to be uniquely organised
Those IT Finctions or Systems 
that are necessary to east in 
the chosen industry and 
are to be organized on a 
communal basis
The IT Strategic Diamond
Indicates possible moves between triangles (Adapted from Edwards & Peppard 1997)
Figure 2.4 The IT Strategic Diamond
Edwards & Peppard (1997) proposed that the Competitive and Transformation 
processes made up the Strategic Diamond (Figure 2.4). Those processes that 
directly contributed to business strategy and competitive advantage could be 
considered a core competence as described by Prahalad & Hamel (1990). If an IT 
System were key to such a process, it would seem reasonable that it too was 
considered as a core competence. Additionally, Edwards & Peppard (1997) 
suggested that processes (and by the researcher's extension, IT Functions and 
Systems) can move between categories. Firstly, an IT function designed to create a 
capability, a transformation system, would have served its purpose once the 
capability has been created. The created system would then move to become 
competitive, qualifying or underpinning. Secondly, a competitive system loses its 
advantage as, over time, the competition replicates the system or improves on it. 
At this stage, if the organisation cannot improve the system to regain competitive
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advantage, it would be reclassified as Qualifying IT System. Finally, it may be 
possible to improve a Qualifying IT System to the point where it provides 
competitive advantage, thus moving to the Competitive triangle.In summary, it 
would seem that the IT Strategic Diamond provides a framework for assessing IT 
functions and systems as commodity (Qualifying and Underpinning) or strategic 
(Transformation and Competitive). For an IT system to be classified, the 
underlying business process classification would be the key determinant. For IT 
functions, it would depend on the 'output7 from that function and whether it has 
the potential to provide competitive advantage. Table 2.13 looks at the IT functions 
(adapted from Fish & Seydel 1999, Barthelemy 2001) used in the Survey (described 
in later Chapters) and are classified according to their 'perceived contribution7 to 
an organisation.
IT Function Strategic Diamond Classification
Applications Development T ransformation/Competitive
Applications Support & Maintenance Qualifying/Competitive
Data Centre Operations & Support Underpinning
Desktop Support (PC support & software maintenance) Underpinning
IT Help Desk Underpinning
Support operations (equipment maintenance/service) Underpinning
Systems Support & Maintenance Qualifying
T elecommunications/LAN Underpinning
Table 2 ,13 Classification of IT Functions
Interestingly, it would seem that only the Applications Development Function 
provides the ability to generate strategic advantage, a notion supported by Andreu 
& Cibbora (1996). This makes sense to a certain extent, as only in the area of new 
systems development could competitive advantage be gained - the creation of a 
business ability that competitors lack. Application Support and Maintenance could 
be competitive or qualifying depending on whether the underlying systems that 
are under support/ maintenance are competitive or qualifying. Does this appear to 
be a conflict? No, because a competitive system could be classed as competitive for 
a period of time, during which it is unreasonable to assume that it will not be bug 
fixed or amended to improve functionality. Andreu & Cibbora (1996) also
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proposed that organisations should take a good look at their existing IT systems to 
see if they are strategic but not identified as such, or have systems that, with some 
modification or addition, could create a competitive advantage.
Characteristic Apply to IT?
The resource should be valuable in the 
situation it is to be used
This could apply to an IT application enabling 
a core competence business process
The resource should be rare Discounts IT infrastructure
The resource must be inimitable (i.e. it cannot 
be copied)
Discounts IT infrastructure and the use of 
Application packages unless highly tailored
The resource must be non-substitutable (i.e. it 
is not possible to accomplish the same thing 
through a different set of resources)
Implies uniqueness which again points to an IT 
application
Table 2 .14 Resource Characteristics for Core Com petencies
Can the proposal that only IT Applications development, as a function is strategic 
be validated? Earlier in this chapter, the proposal by Bloodgood & Salisbury (2001) 
was explored, looking specifically at the characteristics needed for something to 
provide sustainable competitive advantage. Table 2.14 looks at each of these 
characteristics and applies it to IT. If an IT system is classified as being competitive 
using the IT Strategic Diamond, does it automatically make it a core competence? 
This would depend on the underlying business process. Looking at the four 
characteristics of a resource able to provide sustainable competitive advantage 
proposed by Bloodgood & Salisbury (2001) seems to validate the argument (Table 
2.14).
The lesson here seems to be that organisations may have IT-enabled core 
competencies they were not aware of, simply due to the nature of the IT 
applications themselves. It would seem, from the classification of IT functions 
made previously (Table 2.13), the identification of application development by 
King (1994) and the guidelines proposed by Andreu & Cibbora (1996), that it is IT 
applications only that could be considered as providing core competence/ s within 
IT. This seems to validate the same point made earlier in this section.
If the IT Strategic Diamond, as adapted, seems a good fit for classifying IT 
functions and systems, are there any other frameworks that could complete a 
similar function? One such framework is the WISE grid devised by McKeen &
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Smith (2003).
2.6.4 Applying the WISE Grid to IT Outsourcing
Building on the idea of 'IT as Commodity vs. IT as Strategic', McKeen & Smith 
(2003) proposed a strategy for managing IT using the WISE grid. Cronk & Sharp 
(1995) separated the IT function into IT Services and IT Infrastructure. For the 
latter, they argue that outsourcing is appropriate at the beginning and end of the 
technology lifecycle. This seems to align somewhat with the WISE Grid, where the 
potential strategic value of a technology is considered to reduce over the lifetime 
of the technology (McKeen & Smith 2003). At the beginning, as an emergent 
technology, consultants could be used. Towards the end, outsourcing would be 
appropriate, as the technology would have matured and taken on the attributes of 
a commodity. For IT Services, a similar approach is taken, with each system 
broken down and categorised as one of supply, maintain, broker or contract out. 
Broker or contract out is defined as being provisioned by a resource external to the 
organisation. Given this partition, could the WISE Grid be divided along the same 
lines? Figure 2.5 depicts the application of the WISE Grid to the IT Outsourcing 
decision along the lines suggested by Cronk & Sharp (1995).
The idea of strategic value within the WISE Grid elements hints that it could be 
applied in other ways. Instead of looking at technologies, perhaps the grid could 
be used to view IT capabilities, functions or systems. For example, could the 
W atch/ Invest half of the grid (Figure 2.5) be categorised as TT as Strategic' and the 
Support/Eliminate half be considered as TT as Commodity'?
In summary, is the WISE Grid a more comprehensive framework than the IT 
Strategic Diamond on which to base outsourcing decisions? Compared with the IT 
Strategic Diamond, the WISE Grid highlights a number of issues. The main issue 
with the WISE Grid is its inflexibility; it focuses on technology rather than IT 
functions or systems, assuming that existing functions and systems can be adapted 
easily to leverage the new technology. Although it could be adapted to focus on IT 
functions and systems, the idea that these follow a fixed path through the grid is 
misleading. As has been articulated earlier, it is possible for a function or system
that is considered as non-competitive become competitive again as the result of 
changes or additions.
WISE Grid
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— Provide training to build resident 
skifHevels
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Figure 2.5 The WISE Grid
The IT Strategic Diamond allows the classification of an IT function or an IT system 
within one of the four areas; transformation, competitive, sustaining or 
underpinning. This allows an organisation to then identify and concentrate on 
those functions or systems that are classified as Competitive. The IT Strategic 
Diamond is also flexible; it allows functions and systems classification to change 
over time, for strategic to commodity or visa-versa. If an organisation were to use 
the IT Strategic Diamond to track the progress of functions and systems on a 
regular basis it could not only provide an input into the outsourcing decision 
process, it could also illustrate if the organisation is gaining competitive advantage 
through the use of IT.
2.7 Discussion
The apparent 'disconnect7 in literature between IT and the organisation is attention 
grabbing. Zsu et al (2001) were one of the few authors to suggest that the
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outsourcing process starts with a business plan,
"The decision to outsource a Junction, like many other business decisions, should 
start with a sound business plan. This plan should adequately identify all costs 
associated with the current method of conducting business and all costs that are 
anticipated once outsourcing is deployed. It should also document other factors 
involved or considered when determining the feasibility o f outsourcing." (p374)
This enforces a point made earlier, that IT strategy cannot be made in isolation, 
and it has to be created because of the overall business strategy.
Fowler and Jeffs (1998) advocate that, rather than IT being seen as a commodity 
that can be outsourced, there are deeper-rooted organisational drivers for 
outsourcing. User frustration and cultural alienation between IT and senior 
management can lead to the business desire to make a radical change in terms of 
its relationship with IT. The desire within an organisation to initiate change can be 
for a number of reasons. Outsourcing could be seen as merely another way of 
instigating change within an organisation (Handley & Benton 2009).
One of the key questions is what initiated the desire for change -  what factor or 
factors contributed to the trigger for a review of the existing IT arrangements? 
Once again, the question is 'why change?'The decision to outsource is the strategy, 
not what to outsource. The level of outsourcing to undertake, be it selective 
sourcing or total outsourcing, is the strategy -  what is outsourced can then be 
categorised as commodity or strategic.
Quelin & Duhamel (2003) argue that outsourcing goes beyond business strategy 
and lies within the area of corporate policy, because any outsourcing agreement 
with a vendor modifies the organisation's boundaries as a legal entity. It also 
affects
"...company-wide resource allocation policies and asset management practices, 
outsourcing decisions often involve several divisions in large, diversified 
companies..." (Quelin & Duhamel 2003, p647)
Bahli & Rivard (2003) go further, stating that the 'relatedness' between the client 
and the vendor can have an adverse effect on the client's business performance. 
Two types of relatedness were identified, direct or indirect links to an in-house IT 
operation and direct or indirect links to another outsourced IT operation. The risk
59
identified was that clashes between areas could lead to the organisation's ability to 
deliver its own products could be compromised. It would seem, then, that the 
issue of 'IT as Commodity' verses TT as Strategic' has a knock-on effect for the 
management of the contract and the importance of the service relationship. If IT is 
seen as commodity, a standard management contract controlled by a formal 
contract may be seen as sufficient, as 'IT as commodity' is seen as simply another 
utility service (Jahner & Kramer, 2007). TT as strategic', however, would require 
additional controls and a different type of service relationship. Although formal, 
contractual arrangements were important, informal mechanisms became more 
critical the more strategic the arrangement was considered by the parties (Jahner & 
Kramer, 2007).
One thought though - is outsourcing actually a strategic element? Lacity & 
Hirschheim (1993), for example, stated that an outsourcing vendor could never be 
a strategic partner because the profit motive is not shared. One of the most 
common reasons given for outsourcing is to cut the cost of providing IT services to 
the business (Kremic et al 2006) with outsourcing justified using Transaction Costs 
Theory (Gottschalk & Solli-Saether 2005, Tiwana & Bush 2007). This is typically the 
definition of improving operational efficiencies (Porter 1996), it is not business 
strategy.
Figure 2.6 represents the subject areas deemed as important to this literature 
review of outsourcing. It illustrates how each of the areas has an association with 
others and can influence decision made in that area.
D efin itio n
Outsourcing
Reasons & Benefits
Managing the Agreement
IT as Commodity' vs. 'IT as Strategic’
IT Strategy
Figure 2.6 The IT Outsourcing Domain
Finally, it is interesting to note that although there is a body of research on the 
effects of outsourcing on the elements of an organisation being outsourced, there 
appears little coverage of the effects of the outsourcing decision on the rest of the 
organisation. This would seem to be an area ripe for exploration, but was 
considered to be out of scope of this research.
2.8 Summary
Strategy seems to be more than just planning for the future (Johnson et al 2011), 
this is an activity carried out by every organisation - does this make it strategy? 
Concentrating on core competence, often quoted as one of the main reasons for 
outsourcing, can result in missing core competencies of the future (Porter 1996). As 
has been noted in the discussion on strategy, core competencies do not last forever, 
strategy is also about being able to react and move beyond your competitors 
(McFarlan & Nolan 2003). If the organisation is tied to a restrictive outsourcing 
agreement, it may be limiting the opportunity to innovate in the future. Brown & 
Hagel (2003) maintain that the strategic impact of IT investment lies in the
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cumulative effect of continued initiatives to innovate business practices.
The level of change within an organisation would also seem to be dictated, to a 
certain extent, by the IT sourcing strategy. The degree of outsourcing can set the 
type of change the organisation faces, be it evolutionary or revolutionary. 
Outsourcing the whole of IT could be seen as a revolutionary change brought 
about by a change of business strategy, whereas selective outsourcing, where only 
a specific area is outsourced, could be evolutionary in nature. The issue here is 
how much selective sourcing then makes it revolutionary. This could be judged on 
many levels; percentage of IT budget, the effect of the changes on the IT 
department and the rest of the business. One way might be to ask the question 
"does it change fundamentally the business processes?" If the answer is yes, then 
the effect on the rest of the organisation alone makes it a revolutionary change.
So, it seems that strategy and a requirement for change are both pre-cursors of an 
outsourcing decision, but is a decision to outsource a strategy or just a desire to 
improve operational effectiveness? Returning to Porter (1996), operational 
effectiveness is all about doing similar things better than the competition. This 
seems to encapsulate TT as Commodity'. TT as Strategy' is, in a nutshell, about 
undertaking similar activities in a different way (IT enabled change) or different 
activities altogether (IT driven change). Again, it seems that Porter's (1996) 
definition of strategy applies to IT strategy as well.
Given that outsourcing and backsourcing represent opposites in terms of IT 
sourcing decisions, two questions come to mind; are the stages completed for each 
the same and do these stages re-occur whenever a decision is taken to review the 
sourcing of IT?
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3 Exploring IT Sourcing as a Cycle
This Chapter looks at the formation of an IT Sourcing Cycle through analysis of 
outsourcing literature. This Cycle is then validated by applying it to Backsourcing. 
Other options available at the end of an outsourcing agreement are reviewed. Finally, 
the difficulty o f measuring the effectiveness of a vendor sendee relationship is discussed 
and the SERVD YN instrument for measuring Service Performance, Quality and 
Relationship is proposed to address this.
3.1 Reflecting on Outsourcing Literature -  the Sourcing Cycle
During a review of current literature on IT outsourcing, it became clear that the 
authors have varying perspectives, from looking at the outsourcing decision in 
terms of motives, risks, benefits and process (Earl 1991, Pinnington & Woolcock 
1995, Loh & Venkatraman 1992a), to looking at contract and relationship 
management (Kern & Willcocks 2000, Kishore et al 2003).
What emerges from analysing numerous articles on outsourcing is that they can be 
broadly divided into categories based on the timeline of the outsourcing process, 
the researcher "hunch7 or hypothesis was that there were broadly three phases in 
an outsourcing process; decision, transition and operation. To validate this, an 
analysis of literature was completed, the objective being to confirm the hypothesis.
3.1.1 Research Method
The next issue to be addressed was how to carry out the analysis of the literature 
in scope. Meta-analysis was considered, but discarded as an approach because it is 
a method to summarize and compare the results of a large number of quantitative 
studies on a particular topic (Bryman & Bell 2003). Content analysis was then 
examined as a suitable approach. Silverman (2006) stated that content analysis was 
an accepted method of textual investigation. Originally associated with a 
quantitative research strategy, a definition by Bryman (2008) seems to suggest that,
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"Content analysis is an approach to the analysis of documents and texts that seeks 
to quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and 
replicable manner." (p275)
Silverman (2006) noted the difference between quantitative and qualitative 
content analysis, with the former concerned with statistical analysis and the latter 
with reporting extracts that illustrate particular categories. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe 
& Lowe (2002) noted that a content analysis of qualitative data is time consuming. 
More importantly, for the analysis of the articles used by Gonzalez et al (2006), the 
categorization scheme was based on content and not context. The preference, 
therefore, was to use quantitative content analysis.
Bryman (2008) and Silverman (2006) broadly advocated the same approach to 
quantitative content analysis; select texts, construct a coding frame, code all 
materials and analyse data. Following a deductive approach, the coding frame was 
based initially on the phases of outsourcing proposed by Lever (1997). It became 
clear during the early stages of analysis, after an initial pilot of 10 articles, that it 
was difficult to split the 'Discovery' and 'Negotiation' phases, as it appeared that 
they both dealt with what could be considered the outsourcing 'decision'. 
Similarly, Lever's (1997) 'assessment' phase could be best summarised as contract 
'operation'. It was at this point that the idea of Decision, Transition and Operation 
as the three distinct stages of an outsourcing process emerged.
3.1.2 Selecting Articles for Analysis
The selection of journal articles to include as part of the analysis posed a 
conundrum - how to avoid selecting journal articles that 'fitted' the hypothesis. It 
has clearly not been feasible to review all articles published on outsourcing since 
its emergence in 1989 -  the sample size is simply too vast. A number of approaches 
were then considered, from limiting the timeframe of the articles through to 
limiting the journals to review. Finally, a decision was taken to re-examine an 
analysis of outsourcing literature undertaken by another author.
Two reviews of literature published in 2006 were identified as potential candidates
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- Kremic et al (2006) and Gonzalez et al (2006). It is acknowledged that although 
such an approach avoids bias in the article selection process on behalf of this 
researcher, it would not avoid any bias introduced by Kremic et al (2006) or 
Gonzalez et al (2006).
Kremic et al (2006) undertook a review of 206 publications using a 'decision 
support framework'. On closer inspection, the 'decision support framework' was 
used to analysis the outsourcing benefits, risks, motivations or factors, seeming to 
limit the scope of publications to the decision process (Kremic et al 2006). It also 
became clear that the publications included non-peer reviewed 'trade magazines', 
such as 'Computerworld', 'Management Today' and 'The Practical Accountant'. 
Some of these articles were just reporting on trends within outsourcing or 
agreements that had been signed. Because Kremic et al (2006) concentrated on the 
decision phase and partially used non-peer reviewed literature; a decision was 
made not to use this study as a basis for further investigation. The purpose of the 
study was to look at all the stages of outsourcing, not just concentrate on the 
decision stage.
Gonzalez et al (2006) set the aims of their review as to analyse the literature to 
identify the main topics and the methodologies most often applied to the study of 
outsourcing, choosing 131 journal articles for review. They stated that,
"The paper thus provides a review of articles about IS outsourcing published in the
most prestigious journals of the IS area and journals of Management or Business."
(Gonzalez et al 2006, p821)
Gonzalez et al (2006) did not restrict the scope of the review to one particular 
phase or subject area and the majority of the articles came from peer-reviewed 
journals or reputed journals on Management or Business, such as the 'H arvard 
Business Review' or 'California Management Review'. A decision was therefore 
made that the articles used by Gonzalez et al (2006) would form the basis for 
further analysis. A full list of references and articles used was available after an 
exchange of emails with the corresponding author.
3.1.3 Article Analysis
Using Gonzalez et al (2006) as the source for the articles to be analysed resolved 
one of the issues in terms of article selection. The final criteria for the selection /  
omission of an article were carried out as part of the analysis itself -  did the article 
actually discuss some aspect of the outsourcing process. This aspect is included as 
part of the findings of the overall analysis, with this group of articles defined as 
being unclassified.
Having finalised the research method and an initial coding frame (the IT Sourcing 
Cycle), a final decision had to be made -  how to carry out the analysis of the 
articles themselves. The general approach applied to categorise the articles was 
that used by Swanson & Ramiller (1993). As with Swanson & Ramiller (1993), the 
interest in each of the articles was its 'substantive content', i.e. in which of the three 
outsourcing stages the article could be categorised. The focus was primarily on the 
research question. However, this posed a problem when analysing articles from 
journals such as the Harvard Business Review. Consequently, the analysis of each 
article was widened to include the abstract, introduction, discussion section, and 
conclusion. Each article was read and analysed to determine the research questions 
or objectives and the stage of outsourcing under discussion or research. This stage 
of analysis did require a degree of interpretation, but it was found that most of the 
articles could be placed within categories without too much ambiguity. Each 
article obtained was analysed to ascertain the general area of the outsourcing 
process it covered based on the areas under discussion. For example, articles 
discussing motives for outsourcing were considered as dealing with the decision 
phase. Table 3.1 lists the keywords and concepts associated with each stage of the 
outsourcing process. It should be noted that some keywords and concepts appear 
in more than one stage, the differentiator in this case is the context in which the 
keyword or concept is used. For example, Service Level Agreement can apply to 
decision (when discussing the construction of a contract) or operation (when 
discussing the actual performance of the vendor).
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Decision Transition Operation
v  Cost savings
s  Greater flexibility
s  Concentrate on core 
competencies
s  Augment staff
s  Quality improvement
s  Internal politics
S Setting of SLA’s
s  Knowledge management
s  Knowledge transfer
s  Transfer of staff
s  Additional costs of 
transition
s  Opportunistic behaviour
K Hidden costs 
v' Loss of control 
v' SLA measurement 
s  Relationship management 
v' Loss of knowledge 
s  Vendor politics 
s  Re-negotiation 
s  Opportunistic behaviour
Table 3.1 Article Analysis -  Keywords and Concepts
These keywords and concepts were also validated against, for example, the 
reasons for outsourcing. The theories mentioned earlier in Section 2.4.2 could be 
applied in a number of contexts. Transaction Cost Theory, for example, could be 
used as justification for outsourcing, or as a measure of outsourcing success. 
Theories are also used as a Tens' on the area being scrutinised and could be 
applied to any of the phases of the outsourcing cycle. The use of these theories has 
therefore been excluded from Table 3.1.
3.1.4 Analysing Gonzalez et al (2006)
Of the original 131 articles analysed, 15 were unclassified due to either not looking 
at the outsourcing process or dealing generically with issues such as contract 
workers or general trends in outsourcing. This left 116 articles for classification. 
The central hypothesis for the coding frame and analysis, depicted in Figure 3.2, is 
that outsourcing can be divided into three stages that could be perceived as 
cyclical in nature.
Looking at the results of the analysis (Table 3.2), the most striking aspect was the 
pre-dominance of articles that covered the outsourcing decision. These accounted 
for nearly half of the articles; well over half when also including those articles that 
were classified as covering both decision and operation.
One facet that may explain the bias towards decision is the year in which the 
articles were published. For those covering the decision stage, 40 out of the 60 
articles were published prior to the year 2000, with another seven of the 10 
covering decision and operation. This may be of relevance given the
acknowledged 'start' of outsourcing in 1989 with the Kodak-IBM agreement (Loh 
& Venkatraman 1992b). The 'collective academic consciousness' may have been 
focused on the drivers for outsourcing, rather than how outsourcing operated 
within organisations, in the early stages of outsourcing adoption. In the articles 
used by Gonzalez et al (2006), this seemed to be confirmed by only 17 of 44 articles 
covering just the operation stage appearing in the same time period (i.e. prior to 
2000). As further confirmation, in 1995 only 4 of 17 articles covered just operation, 
whereas only 4 out of 14 articles covered decision in 2004 in what appears to be a 
potential switch of emphasis. This seems to confirm the shift in literature from 
reducing cost to strategic intent noted by Dibbern et al (2006), and validates 
somewhat the choice of source for the article analysis.
Outsourcing Stage No of Articles Percentage of Total
Decision only 60 45.8
Transition only 0 0
Operation only 44 33.6
Decision and Operation 10 7.6
All stages 2 1.5
Unclassified 15 11.5
TOTALS 131 100
Table 3.2 Gonzalez et al (2006) Article Analysis
In conclusion, it seems that the hypothesis that outsourcing literature can be 
segregated into three stages is a valid one. Each of the stages has specific objectives 
and outcomes, each feeding into the next stage in the cycle. However, how does 
this cycle compare with others that have been proposed?
3.1.5 Considering Alternatives to the IT Sourcing Cycle
Lever (1997) divided the outsourcing relationship into four specific phases - 
Discovery, Negotiation, Transition and Assessment. Others considered that 
Discovery and Negotiation were two parts of the same stage (Quelin & Duhamel 
2003, Mantel et al 2006). Zsu et al (2001) separated the outsourcing process into 
four stages - business plan, the developing stage, the implementation stage, and 
the post-outsourcing review. Dibbern et al (2004), in a thorough analysis of 
outsourcing literature, divided the outsourcing process into two main areas; the 
decision process, covering the why, what and which questions and the
implementation process, covering the how and outcome areas. This was also based 
on the decision model proposed by Simon (1960). Dibbern et al (2004) appeared to 
cover the outsourcing decision process and the way the resultant agreement would 
be managed, but did not seem to consider the transition to the vendor. This could 
be considered as the transition from the original state to the desired state, what 
Lewin (1951) terms as the change phase. An initial mapping analysis of the phases 
of outsourcing proposed by various authors presented a confusing picture, as 
illustrated by Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3 .1 IT Stage Mapping
It seemed that although broadly the same stages were employed. Activities were 
used in different combinations and, in the case of Simon (1960) and Dibbern et al 
(2004), transition was almost completely ignored. Even those that seemed to have a 
transition phase (Lever 1997, Chen & Soliman 2002) placed little emphasis on it.
Cullen et al (2006) proposed an outsourcing lifecycle that listed all the tasks 
necessary, in their view, to complete a successful outsourcing project. The 
outsourcing process was split into four phases, (Architect, Engage, Operate & 
Regenerate) broken down into nine separate building blocks (Appendix 8).
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Cullen et al (2006) defined building block seven (BB7) as Transition and included 
all of the tasks that would be expected when transitioning som e/all of IT to a 
vendor. Cullen et al (2006) argues that transition is a key phase in the outsourcing 
process and that if not carefully planned, the transition has a danger of never 
completing. However, transition's inclusion in the Operate phase seems to 
exemplify the background of the main author (that of a consultant). Transition 
would fall into the operate stage for the vendor, but would it be the same for the 
client? Although this model is one of the few to recognise the cyclical nature of IT 
sourcing decisions, as well as acknowledging that action has to be taken at the end 
of an agreement, it suffers from a bias towards the Decision phase of outsourcing 
similar to that noted earlier in outsourcing literature in general.
Although Sara Cullen (Cullen et al 2006) is a highly knowledgeable individual 
within the field of outsourcing, her background is in consultancy. In the author's 
experience, a consultancy background (the author worked for a consultancy for 
several years) enforces the notion of rigidity of process -  steps that need to be 
followed in order to complete a project. This is further validated by the final stage 
in the Outsourcing Lifecycle Model (Cullen et al 2006), regenerate (also referred to 
as BB9: Refresh). In an organisation practicing outsourcing (total or selective), the 
progress and success of the agreement would be reviewed at regular intervals. In 
the experience of the author, this occurs annually, as a minimum, when looking at 
budgets for the following year. Organisations also carry out regular strategic 
reviews, these would include a review of IT performance. It would seem, then, that 
the final stage of the Cullen et al (2006) cycle is superfluous.
Looking at the comparison of the Outsourcing Lifecycle Model (Cullen et al 2006) 
and the proposed IT Sourcing Cycle (Figure 3.2), it is apparent stages do not 
match. The lack of a specific transition stage seems to validate the findings of the 
literature research and the analysis of the Gonzalez et al (2006) articles, where the 
transition stage seemed to be largely overlooked or trivialised. Within the IT 
Sourcing Cycle proposed by the researcher, Transition is illustrated as an equally 
important stage alongside Decision and Operation.
3. Handover 
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1. Tipping 
Point
2. Activation 
Point
Decision
Operation
Transition
Figure 3.2 The IT Sourcing Cycle
One final refinement was made to the IT Sourcing Cycle. Cullen et al (2006) noted 
that the dividing lines between the four phases of the Outsourcing Lifecycle Model 
can often be blurred, transition tasks taking place whilst the final details of the 
contract (engage phase) are being carried out. For the IT Sourcing Cycle, however, 
it is perceived that the three stages are divided by specific points or actions (Figure 
3.2). Thus;
1. Tipping Point - the point at which the conclusion is reached that the IT 
sourcing arrangements need to be reviewed.
2. Activation Point -  the point at which the contract with the proposed vendor 
is agreed (contract signed) and transition can start.
3. Handover point -  the point at which the client officially relinquishes control 
of the area of IT subject to the outsourcing agreement and the vendor takes 
control.
The introduction of the '3 points7 clearly delineates the phases of the outsourcing 
cycle, creating a focus for the end/beginning of each phase.
The final stage of the analysis process was to look at what the characteristics were 
of each of the phases proposed. Given the analysis of the articles, what type of 
activities would be included in each of the stages proposed?
3.1.6 The Outsourcing Decision
The decision to outsource IT usually starts with a review of the current IT 
arrangements (Lever 1997). Kremic et al (2006) proposed an outsourcing decision 
framework that appears to encapsulate the decision process. However, this 
framework could be seen as incomplete on three fronts. Firstly, it implies that once 
the decision is taken not to outsource the process is at an end. Benko (1993) points 
out that
"An in-depth outsourcing evaluation can in itself be an agent o f change. The 
process may be therapeutic, serving as a catalyst for performance assessments and 
quality improvements." (p45)
This supports the point made by Hirschheim and Lacity (2000) that the IT sourcing 
review process can lead to changes in the internal IT without actually resulting in 
outsourcing. Secondly, it implies that all organisations have a starting point of no 
current outsourcing arrangements. Outsourcing as an IT option in its current form 
has been around for over 20 years, so this assumption would seem unrealistic for 
many organisations. Lacity & Willcocks (2001), for example, found that around a 
third of companies studied had cancelled outsourcing contracts. Finally, the 
motivation for outsourcing seems to miss a key point -  what was the trigger for a 
review of IT in the first place? What factor or factors contributed to the tipping 
point that led to a review of the existing IT sourcing arrangements?
Outsourcing has been seen by many organisations as the solution to real or 
perceived organisational issues with IT. It would seem that a move from Operation 
to Decision in the IT sourcing cycle can be summarised as a desire for change with 
the tipping point having a number of contributing trigger factors, any one of 
which may be The straw that broke the camel's back'. Changes to the overall 
organisation have often precipitated changes in IT sourcing strategies. Mergers 
and acquisitions are bound to force the newly created organisation to review IT,
not least because there may be two departments that need to be merged 
(McLaughlin & Peppard 2006). However, it is when organisations are not driven 
by such events choose to change IT sourcing arrangements that the interest lies, 
particularly in terms of bringing back in-house a previously outsourced IT 
provision. This is discussed in more detail later in the Chapter.
The overall IT sourcing decision has moved beyond the Outsourcing Decision 
Framework proposed by Kremic et al (2006). The 'outsource or not to outsource' 
model is unrealistic given the starting point for a number or organisations is 
outsourced IT. McLaughlin & Peppard (2006) proposed a simple model for the 
review of the outsourcing decision. However, Figure 3.3 represents a framework 
that recognises a number of possible starting points for an organization's IT 
sourcing cycle and the factors that contribute to the decision making process.
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Figure 3.3 The IT Sourcing Decision Framework
Whether an organisation is considering outsourcing for the first time or reviewing 
existing outsourcing arrangements, the framework recognises that the decision 
making process is essentially the same.
In summary, an organisation carrying out a decision making process has three 
options; stay with the existing IT provision, switch from in-house to outsourcing 
(or to different vendors if outsourced) or bring outsourced IT back in-house. Once 
the Decision phase has been completed there is an Activation Point, the point at 
which the agreement is activated and the Transition to the vendor commences.
3.1.7 The Outsourcing Transition
Once the decision has been made to outsource some or all of an organisation's IT, 
the next stage of the IT sourcing cycle in this context would be the Transition. This 
is the movement of that aspect of IT that is subject to the change -  the processes 
and procedures followed and the decisions made to effect the transition.
This phase is effectively the organisational change required to get from 'where we
are' to 'where we want to be'. If an organisation decided not to outsource, for
example, this may still represent changes to the organisation highlighted as
required/ desirable by the review process that took place in the decision phase.
Hirschheim & Lacity (2000) state that
"The outsourcing threat may overcome political obstacles and allow IT managers 
the freedom and power to propose and implement drastic cost cuts." (pl07)
These changes in internal structure would still represent a change in the 
organisation and transition would be necessary - it would just not be to a vendor 
but to a new internal structure.
As has been previously mentioned, searches within outsourcing literature 
indicated the transition stage of outsourcing, although acknowledged, did not 
appear to have been the focus of significant research. This was also confirmed, to a 
certain extent, through the analysis of the Gonzalez et al (2008) articles in a 
previous section of this chapter. The lack of research within this area could be for a 
number of reasons, perhaps lack of access to what could be considered a 
commercially sensitive area for the vendor or because procedures and methods 
rely on those requirements of the vendor taking over the area being outsourced. 
One illustration of how this stage in the outsourcing cycle has been overlooked can 
be found in Mahnke et al (2005). Here, the authors look at the IT outsourcing
process but go straight from decision to outsourcing management. Bahli & Rivard 
(2003) briefly mention transition when looking at the risks of outsourcing, but only 
in the respect of unexpected transition and management costs. The antecedents to 
unexpected transition costs are said to be related to the outsourcing organisation's 
lack of expertise with the outsourced activity and lack of expertise of outsourcing 
(Bahli & Rivard 2003), a stance with which Klepper & Jones (1998) concur.
So what could be important during the transition phase that requires a different 
approach? Gottschalk (2006) maintained that knowledge management was key in 
the transfer of operations between the two parties taking part in the relationship. 
Research by Gong et al (2007) seemed to confirm that the transfer of people and 
knowledge to the vendor was an area that needed to be actively managed. 
However, it is difficult to ascertain if knowledge management is key to the 
transition phase given the lack of research in the area. Of the 131 articles 
previously reviewed from Gonzalez et al (2006), only two were categorised as 
discussing transition, and in both cases the articles discussed all phases of an 
outsourcing agreement (Huber 1993, Lee 1996).
Barthelemy (2001) found that transition costs have been often more than 
organisations expected and, frequently, organisations could only quantify the 
transition in terms of elapsed time. Gong et al (2007) also found that good 
transition management could strengthen the commitment and trust between the 
two parties. However, as with the majority of articles that did cover the 
outsourcing transition, it was discussed as part of other processes and not covered 
as a phase in the outsourcing process in its own right.
A final observation on the way transition has been dealt with in research. The 
limited articles that highlighted transition were all an 'after the event' judgement 
based on the 'outside looking in'. In all it was a case of what the organisation 
under investigation was willing to reveal. This does not necessarily provide the 
full picture as will be illustrated in Chapter 7.
Once the Transition is complete, there is a Handover Point, the point at which the
vendor takes over the day-to-day operation of the area subject to the outsourcing 
agreement.
3.1.8 The Outsourcing Operation
Operation corresponds to the assessment phase proposed by Lever (1997) and 
implementation phase in the outsourcing model of Dibbern et al (2004). 
Implementation can be defined as "to perform' or to 'carry into effect' a contract or 
agreement (Dibbern et al 2004). However, this stage of outsourcing is about the 
operation of the agreement and implementation does not seem to emphasize this. 
A differentiation has also been made in terms of name from Lever's assessment 
phase that seems to apply to outsourcing. 'Operation' is the name adopted by ITIL 
V3 for this stage of the IT lifecycle and can apply to any IT sourcing arrangement 
moving forward - whether it be outsourcing, backsourcing, maintaining the 
current IT sourcing arrangement or switching vendors for an existing outsourcing 
agreement (Iqbal & Nieves 2007).
Operation could also be seen as the 'status quo' in terms of organisational change. 
Essentially the organisation is moving forwards with the IT structure that was set 
in place by the transition phase, but would be subject to adjustments as the 
agreement progresses. This stage of the IT sourcing cycle, in some ways, represents 
the biggest management challenge in the outsourcing process for an organisation - 
the movement from managing the IT process to managing an outsourcing contract 
(Fenny & Willcocks 1998). Looking at the cycle from the prospective of introducing 
change, it could be argued that the Operation phase is actually the start of the IT 
sourcing cycle. Operation would be the steady state proposed by Lewin (1951), 
where reaching the tipping point would move an organisation from Operation to 
Decision, from steady state to "unfreeze" (Lewin 1951).
Finally, the end of the contract or the desire of an organisation to terminate or re­
negotiate an existing contract, represents a move in the cycle to the decision phase 
again, what McLaughlin and Peppard (2005) term the 're-evaluation point'. Where 
this re-evaluation leads to bringing the IT function back in-house, the organisation 
is participating in what has been termed as the 'in- and outsource cycle' (Verhoef
2005, P276).
3.1.9 Applying the IT Sourcing Cycle
When re-evaluating an outsourcing contract, an organisation has three options; 
stay with existing vendor, switch vendors or backsource. Which of the reasons for 
IT backsourcing decision listed in Table 2.9 were more important in terms of the 
final decision to stay with the existing vendor, switch vendors or backsource? It 
may not be possible, as Veltri et al (2008) suggests, to find the most important 
reason. However, the Case Study and Survey attempts to do so.
It is interesting that Whitten & Leidner (2006) is one of the few studies to look at 
the reasons why an organisation might switch outsourcing vendors. This study did 
not investigate the reasons for switching vendors rather than backsourcing, 
concentrating on product, service and relationship quality and switching costs as 
potential indicators. It would seem, though, that if the choice is to backsource, 
there is a Decision process that has to be undertaken.
Turning the attention next to transition in terms of the backsourcing process, while 
outsourcing IT vendor is experienced in transition, as it would be something 
completed on a regular basis for numerous clients. For an organisation 
backsourcing IT, it may be an activity that they have never completed before and 
would therefore require a huge learning curve. Veltri et al (2008) confirmed this by 
stating that backsourcing is not easy, and requires significant expense and 
expertise by the organisation bringing its IT back in-house. Allen and 
Chandrashekar (2000) noted that there are differences between outsourcing 
manufacturing and services. For services, it was noted that
"Transition is more visible, requires more communication to minimise problems;
disruption is often unavoidable because services cannot be stored and new
contractors are introduced to the site." (p27)
Allen and Chandrashekar (2000) noted the risks of transitioning services to an 
outsourcing vendor; it would seem this applies to backsourcing also. Bringing 
outsourced IT back in house could be seen in the same light as a company merger 
or acquisition; the longer the agreement the further apart the outsourcing
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organisation and the outsourced IT personnel would become. Cartwright & 
Cooper (1993) talk of the need for cultural compatibility between organisations 
that participate in mergers or acquisitions, citing that this incompatibility 
sometimes leads to failure. It was found that the ability to integrate the new 
company was seen as the most important factor for acquisition success (Cartwright 
& Cooper, 1993). This implies that a successful backsourcing process would also 
require successful re-integration of the backsourced IT into the rest of the 
organisation. This gives rise to two questions; is Transition more problematic for 
backsourcing than outsourcing and is the Operation stage different for outsourcing 
and backsourcing. These questions are addressed as part of the Case Study.
It could be argued that backsourcing suffers from similar issues during the 
transition phase as have already been identified for outsourcing transition by 
Cullen et al (2006), such as ensuring there is a viable sourcing alternative in place. 
This implies that the Transition phase is important for the overall success of the 
backsourcing process. However, such a position would need to be verified in 
further research.
The Operation phase for backsourced IT would be the same as any organisation 
with an in-house IT provision, bringing with it the same risks, issues and 
management challenges. Post-transition in backsourcing, integrating the IT 
Division back into the business organisation with a new management structure 
would seem to be one of these challenges. Changing the management function 
from monitoring an outsourcing agreement to managing the IT function requires a 
completely different skill set (Feeny & Willcocks 1998). A good analogy for this is a 
little like going everywhere in a taxi then having to learn to drive yourself. 
However, once the IT function had been transitioned back in-house, this would be 
considered as "business as usual'.
Figure 3.4 represents the Backsourcing framework in terms of the areas to be the 
focus of investigation for the Case Study and Survey research.
Finally, what is not known from the various press releases and other secondary
data on backsourcing collected by McLaughlin & Peppard (2006), Veltri et al (2008) 
etc. is what precipitated the change in IT strategy. Was it because of a major shift in 
business strategy or maybe because of a breakdown of relationship with the 
vendor? Neither of these reasons would likely to be disclosed to the wider world 
on commercial grounds (Overby 2003). It would seem that the lack of recent data 
on the number of organisations that have subsequently backsourced after 
outsourcing is an area for further research. This is addressed by the Survey.
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Figure 3.4 Backsourcing Framework
The important point to consider is that most of the previous research on 
backsourcing has concentrated on The outside looking in', as is discussed in 
Chapter 4 and 5; an opportunity arose to study backsourcing 'from the inside'. 
This was to provide insights that were hitherto unavailable.
3.1.10 Summary
Upon first examination, it would seem that the stages of outsourcing; decision, 
transition and operation fit the IT Sourcing Cycle proposed in an earlier section in 
this chapter. The cycle seems to fit neatly with Lewin's (1951) three phases of
change. Moreover, the expansion of Lewin by Schein (1988) seems to be a closer fit 
to the IS/IS Sourcing Cycle. Schein (1988) proposed that the stages of change 
overlapped and labelled them unfreezing, changing and refreezing. This seems to 
reflect closer the way the outsourcing process would work within an organisation. 
Although the signing of the outsourcing contract may represent the move from 
decision to transition, in reality discussion with staff would already be taking 
place. This 'fluidity' at the edges of the stages could be illustrated by the move 
between unfreezing and the changing stage. Schein (1988) saw the changing stage 
as involving "cognitive restructuring", where organisational members have to see 
things differently and act differently as a result. In outsourcing, staff being made 
aware of an impending outsourcing agreement would definitely see things 
differently, something verified by the researcher's own experience. This seems to 
encapsulate the idea of transition in respect of the outsourcing process.
Reviewing the Backsourcing process through application of the IT Sourcing Cycle 
seems to confirm that the Cycle is applicable to both outsourcing and 
backsourcing. Whether IT is in-house or with an existing vendor, the tipping point 
for the Decision phase is when a judgement is made at a senior level within the 
organisation that the existing IT provision needs to be reviewed.
3.2 Stay or Switch -  Deciding on the Future
If an organisation chooses to review their IT sourcing arrangements, the decision, 
initially involves one of two options; keep to the existing arrangements or switch 
to a new one. Whatever the starting point, be it in-house or outsourced IT, the start 
of the decision phase is broadly the same. Bearing in mind that it seems, from the 
results in Table 2.9, the reasons for backsourcing were similar to those given for 
outsourcing, what could sway a decision to switch vendors or backsource?
3.2.1 Switching Vendors
Up to this point, the IT sourcing decision has been discussed in terms of either 
outsourcing or backsourcing. If IT is outsourced, the other possibility is to switch 
vendors. Why would an organisation choose to change vendors either during or at 
the end of an existing outsourcing agreement? A list of reasons for switching
80
vendors was constructed from literature and, like the reasons for backsourcing, 
seemed very similar to the reasons given for outsourcing.
Whitten & Leidner (2006), in one of the first empirical studies to look at 
backsourcing or switching vendors, found that high levels of product quality and 
service quality seemed to drive the decision to switch vendors. It was also stated 
that those that chose to switch vendors also had low levels of switching costs and 
relationship quality.
Reason Identified by Author/s Category
Change in organisation strategy Whitten & Wakefield 
(2006)
Strategic
Changes within organisation (merger or 
acquisition)
Lei & Hitt (1995) Strategic
Outsourced systems did not keep track 
with technology change
Whitten & Leidner (2006), 
Goo et al (2007)
Strategic
Changes within organisational Senior 
Management
Whitten & Leidner (2006), 
Barthelemy (2003)
Operational efficiencies
Cost savings did not materialize Barthelemy (2003), 
Whitten & Leidner (2006), 
Whitten e ta l (2010)
Operational efficiencies
Contractual issues with vendor Goo et al (2007) Operational efficiencies
Table 3.3 Reasons for Switching Vendors
During such a decision process a number of factors come into play, one of which is 
the perception of the current IT service provider -  be they in-house or a vendor. 
With a low level of relationship quality identified in those that chose to switch 
vendors, could this be a determinant on whether to switch vendors or backsource. 
Could this play a role in the decision to backsource?
3.2.2 Service Performance, Quality and Relationship
During the discussion on managing the outsourcing agreement in Chapter 2, what 
became clear was the move towards managing an outsourcing agreement not just 
through the contract and SLAs, but also through the use of relationship 
management. Service performance and to a certain extent, service quality 
measurement can be achieved through contract management and the monitoring 
of SLAs. Poppo & Zenger (2002) found that relational governance was as 
significant as measurement of an outsourcing agreement by SLAs and that the 
working relationship between the parties was important. Chakrabarty et al (2007)
found that a high relationship quality between the client and the vendor added to 
the effectiveness of the outsourcing project. However, as Alborz et al (2003) 
pointed out, the outsourcing working relationship is a complex and difficult factor 
to research.
With the contract, SLAs and relationship management all forming a key part of 
managing the outsourcing agreement, the difficulty is how to ascertain the level of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a vendor providing an outsourcing service. It 
could be that the perception of the service being delivered is at odds with the 
standard methods for measuring the service -  Service Level Agreements, legal 
constraints, service reviews etc. One example of the perception mismatch 
identified by Ho et al (2003) was that the vendor would not act on tasks that were 
not covered by an SLA. For the vendor, this was acceptable as they were 
complying with the contract, but for the client? Goo et al (2008) identified another 
problematic area that can arise with SLAs - it is possible that the SLA is designed 
to align specifically with a contract clause, but the clause does not require either 
party to act if the SLA is breached.
Many outsourcing deals appear to go beyond the buyer/supplier relationship. 
Grover et al (1995) state that the relationship is often at a strategic level based on 
mutual benefit. The idea of mutual benefit moves the agreement beyond that of a 
buyer/supplier relationship and seems at odds with the assertion by Lacity & 
Hirschheim (1993) that an outsourcing vendor can never be a strategic partner 
because the profit motive is not shared. This assertion by Lacity & Hirschheim 
(1993) opens up a huge discussion on whether there is such a thing as a strategic 
alliance within the field of IT outsourcing and, notably, the difference between 
mutual benefit and the profit motive. This discussion, however, is beyond the 
scope of this research.
If a relationship or alliance were seen as strategic, the perception of the agreement 
by the client would extend beyond that which is measurable by SLAs and moves 
into the realm of more subjective measurement. It is in this circumstance that the 
relationship between customer and vendor can break down without either party
being able to articulate why. Grover et al (1996) found that
"The ability of the provider to provide service quality beyond expectations has a 
significant direct impact on benefit attainment as evidenced by the significant 
variance explained by service quality." (pl05)
It is the aspect of the service quality that could be key when considering the action
to take at the end of an agreement. If an agreement it terminated early, it could be
postulated that the perception of the vendor's service quality/perform ance/
relationship by the client is negative. If the agreement has reached the end of the
contracted period, the decision to renew, switch vendors or backsource could be
influenced by this perception of the vendor. Kern & Willcocks (2002) found that it
was often subjective measures, such as user satisfaction surveys, that were crucial
to judging the success of outsourcing,
"... although services were delivered according to agreement, in many situations 
they did not satisfy user requirements." (p9)
Subjective measures such as user satisfaction surveys would be in addition to the 
quality requirements and measures built into the outsourcing contract.
Chakrabarty et al (2007) expanded on the work of Whitten & Leidner (2006) by 
looking at the outsourcing relationship between the client and the vendor on three 
levels -  service quality, service relationship and user satisfaction. The research 
appears to support the positive correlation between service quality and 
relationship quality. However, Szmigin (1993) maintains that the relationship 
between two organisations changes over time, so both parties have to recognise 
change and act on it where necessary. The issue is how the service relationship can 
be measured to create a benchmark and then over time to track the progression of 
the relationship.
3.2.3 Measuring Service Relationship
If service performance and, to an extent, service quality can be measured largely 
by contract adherence and SLAs, how can service relationship be measured? For 
this, it is necessary to look outside the field of outsourcing & IT into other areas of 
management research. Early efforts at the measurement of service quality first 
surfaced in the marketing arena. Parasuraman et al (1988) developed an 
instrument to measure service quality that was subsequently adapted for use in
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assessing Information Systems service quality (Kettinger & Lee 1994). 
Parasuraman et al (1991) looked at customer expectations and asked if they 
changed over time. They concluded that the customer relationship was central to 
exceeding customer expectations and that the customer relationship building was
. .process intensive, requiring responsive, assured, empathetic service over time."
(p44)
Parasuraman et al (1991a) saw the purpose of SERVQUAL as a diagnostic 
methodology for uncovering broad areas of a company's service quality shortfalls 
and strengths and that provides a basic skeleton for looking at underlying service 
quality. The importance of using SERVQUAL as a two-part measurement 
approach to carry out a gap analysis between expected and perceived levels of 
service was seen as lengthening the survey instrument, but deemed worth it for 
obtaining the gap scores. Suggestions were made on how to create a one­
dimensional instrument that could still provide an element of gap analysis but 
reduce replication within the survey instrument itself (Parasuraman et al 1991).
The advantages and disadvantages of SERVQUAL have been the subject of 
substantial debate since SERVQUAL was first advocated by Parasuraman et al in 
1988 (Parasuraman et al 1988,1991,1991a, Teas 1993, Kettinger & Lee 1994, Cronin 
& Taylor 1992). It was out of the original discussions that Cronin and Taylor (1992) 
proposed SERVPERF, a shortened version of SERQUAL that excluded the 
'expected' part of SERVQUAL. Cronin & Taylor (1992) concluded that the 22 
performance items advocated by Parasuraman et al (1988) adequately defined the 
domain of service quality but, along with Teas (1993), raised concerns about the 
use of the customer perception/ expectation gap as the specification of service 
quality. Parasuraman et al (1994a), on the other hand, state
"SERVQUAL is a tool to obtain a reading of attitude level, not a statement about
how the level was developed." (pll2)
The point being made is that SERVQUAL was designed to measure perceived 
service quality, i.e. an attitude level and that it makes no attempt to measure how 
the level was arrived at by the respondent. This would seem to be important when 
looking at the IT sourcing decision. Whether an organisation at the end of an 
outsourcing agreement makes a decision to renew, switch or backsource the IT
resource in question, it is possible that the decision is made based on the 
organisation's attitude, among other things, to the current vendor or to 
outsourcing in general.
Pitt et al (1995) carried out a study to assess the validity of SERVQUAL within an 
Information Systems (IS) setting via the construct validity appraisal used originally 
by Parasuraman et al (1988). Pitt et al (1995) concluded that SERVQUAL was a 
suitable measure of IS service quality, but noted a number of limitations, one being 
the low reliability of the tangibles construct. However, it was acknowledged that 
SERVQUAL was well suited for benchmarking, as it was a general measure of 
service quality (Pitt et al 1995). In subsequent literature, both SERVQUAL and 
SERFPERF have been used as a measure of Information Systems service quality 
(Kettinger & Lee 2005, Kang & Bradley 2002, Carr 2002, Landrum et al 2009). 
However, the research represented by these articles did not involve an outsourcing 
agreement. In addition, both SERFPERF and SERVQUAL measure five elements - 
tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance and empathy. A key attribute 
missing is that of trust, an important component found in a number of studies 
covering outsourcing service quality (Alborz et al 2003, Goo et al 2007, Kern & 
Willcocks 2002).
3.2.4 Moving towards IT Service Measurement
Taking a different approach, Gronroos (1984) proposed a perceived service quality 
model. Gronroos (1984) saw service quality as consisting of two elements, technical 
quality (what the customer receives) and functional quality (how the customer gets 
the technical outcome). The two elements are said to combine to create an image of 
the service (Gronroos 1984). Szmigin (1993) built on the work of Gronroos and 
others in the realm of business to business relationship (b2b), terming the technical 
and functional quality as 'hard' and 'soft' quality, combining them to indicate 
'process satisfaction'. The concept of 'outcome' quality was also introduced, the 
key being that 'outcome' quality is
"... susceptible to outside pressures and environmental conditions, but it is still a 
part of the overall quality on which a supplier will be judged and which zvill relate
to overall satisfaction zvithin the relationship." (Szmigin 1993, p9)
Outcome quality looks at the 'big picture7 - does the vendor meet the business 
requirements and not just IT targets; essentially, is the vendor making a difference 
to the 'bottom line'? The idea of outcome quality is particularly appealing within 
an outsourcing scenario. For example, large-scale outsourcing can affect the way 
the organisation is perceived by the stock market (Hall & Liedtka 2007).
Finally, Gounaris (2005) developed the INDSERV instrument, consisting of
potential quality, hard process quality, soft process quality and output quality.
Output quality, in this context, could be perceived as being conceptually the same
as the outcome quality proposed by Szmigin (1993). Comparison with SERVQUAL
provided favourable results, and further research in the b2b arena confirmed that
the four dimensions constituted
"...a customer's overall perception of the quality o f service." (Gounaris 2005b, 
p430)
Gounaris (2005a, 2005b) extended the INDSERV instrument further to include 
dimensions for trust and commitment. Trust seemed to be an important addition. 
Gefen et al (2008) pointed out that trust means that the parties can rely on each 
other and therefore do not have to rely so much on contract controls to ensure 
their respective outcomes. This, in effect, mirrors the views expressed earlier when 
discussing strategic outsourcing. For example, there is a move away from contract 
driven SLAs as the sole method of monitoring an outsourcing agreement. 
Although this instrument was again found to be applicable within the b2b arena, 
some of the dimensions would not be suitable within the field of IT outsourcing 
relationships. However, Gounaris (2005) suggested that INDSERV could be used 
to measure the service offered by an organisation's IS department, on the grounds 
that
''... the service provided by an IS department is no different from any other kind of 
b2b services." (p819)
Gounaris even suggested that INDSERV could be used in IT outsourcing,
"Hence, practitioners zvho, for instance, consider zuhether to outsource part or 
most of the functions offered may zvish, prior to the finalisation of the decision, to 
assess the quality of the service they receive from their ozvn IS department and 
compare it against industry standards." (Gounaris 2005, p821)
Ladhari (2008), in a review of a number of alternative measures of service quality,
concluded that the INDSERV instrument proposed by Gounaris (2005) empirically
outperformed SERVQUAL. However, there was a caveat,
"It is apparent that rigorous empirical studies are needed to substantiate whether 
alternative scales really are superior to SERVQUAL. In particular, further studies 
are required to validate and refine the alternative scales." (Ladhari 2008, p79)
Nonetheless, INDSERV seemed a suitable instrument to develop in further 
research into client-vendor relationships in the IT field. Going further, could the 
INDSERV instrument, tailored for the IT outsourcing relationship, be used to 
predict the outcome of an IT sourcing decision when a review of an in-house IT or 
an existing vendor takes place? Appendix 7 maps the elements and statements of 
SERVPERF to those of INDSERV and illustrates the similarities between the two 
instruments.
3.2.5 Moving on from INDSERV -  Creating the SERVDYN Instrument
After reviewing SERVQUAL, SERVPERF and INDSERV, a decision was taken to 
adapt INDSERV to the IT sourcing field. The key to measuring a client/ vendor 
relationship seems to be the combination of the perception of service performance, 
quality and relationship -  perception being the important aspect. These three 
aspects could be summarised as defining the dynamics of the outsourcing 
relationship. Using INDSERV as a foundation, four of the dimensions were 
removed as not being relevant to outsourcing relationship and a number were re­
worded to be more relevant. This resulted in the creation of a new instrument to 
measure service dynamics & subsequently referred to as SERVDYN.
The INDSERV instrument had 26 statements - SERVDYN resulted in 22 
statements. Table 3.4 lists the statements removed and the reason for the removal. 
Some statements from the original INDSERV instrument were also changed so that 
the emphasis was on the service provided by the vendor organisation as a whole, 
rather than a judgement on any individual within the vendor organisation.
Element Statement Justification for Removal
Hard
Process
Quality
Uses international and/or local 
network
Location for resources used should be irrelevant, 
it is the technical ability that is being measured
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Element Statement Justification for Removal
Soft
Process
Quality
Pleasant personality
The SERVDYN instrument is being judged at the 
organisational level, this statement applies to an 
individual level
Trust
No checking is necessary
This is considered a duplicate of the statement 
“Important decisions are not taken without us” (the 
recoded TR3 in Table 3.5)
Overall trustworthiness
An overall rating is not taken for any of the other 
Elements; the overall trustworthiness is gauged by 
the combination of all the statements that form the 
Trust element.
Table 3.4 Removed INDSERV Statem ents
Table 3.4 lists the elements and statements of the new instrument, SERVDYN. On 
reflection, it seemed that 'outcome quality' (Szmigin 1993) rather than 'output quality' 
(Gounaris 2005a, 2005b) better encapsulates the element, firstly because it is 
concerned with the overall rating of the quality of the service as perceived by the 
client. Secondly, because the consideration of the client for this element goes 
beyond the output of the vendor and into how that relationship is perceived by 
external stakeholders, it could be perceived as the 'outcome' of the relationship.
Element Description Variable Statement
Potential
Quality
Ability - characteristics that influence 
the provider’s ability to excel in both 
soft and hard qualities
PQ1 Have required personnel
PQ2 Have required facilities
PQ3 Have required management 
philosophy
PQ4 Has a low personnel turnover
Hard
Process
Quality
Technical -  what is beina performed 
during the service process
HPQ1 Stays in budgets
HPQ2 Meets deadlines
HPQ3 Looks at details
HPQ4 Understands our needs
Soft
Process
Quality
Functional -  how the service is 
performed during the service 
process
SPQ1 Accepts tasks enthusiastically
SPQ2 Listens to our problems
SPQ3 Open to suggestions/ideas
SPQ4 Challenges if necessary
SPQ5 Looks after our interests
Outcome
Quality
Contribution - the overall ratina of 
the quality of the service as 
perceived by the client in light of any 
outside influences
OQ1 Reaches objectives
OQ2 Has a notable effect
OQ3 Contributes to our sales/image
OQ4 Is creative
OQ5 Is consistent with our strategy
Trust
Trust -  the client’s evaluation of the 
way the provider acted during the 
performance of the hard and soft
TR1 Have our best interests at heart
TR2 No need to question their 
motives
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Element Description Variable Statement
processes TR3 Important decisions are taken 
without us (Recoded in SPSS)
TR4 Job done right even without our 
input
Table 3.5 The SERVDYN Elements
The elements themselves could be grouped as either objective or subjective in 
nature. Hard Process Quality (HPQ), for example, could be perceived as objective -  
most of the statements are measurable. Generally, these statements could be 
measured by Service Level Agreement or contract clauses. However, the element 
allows some leeway to judge the technical delivery independent of the SLAs, i.e. is 
the vendor delivering 'what is needed' as opposed to 'what is contracted'. This reflects 
findings earlier in the literature that SLAs can make the vendor concentrate on 
delivering to 'the contract' rather than 'client need' (Alborz et al 2003). Soft Process 
Quality (SPQ) falls into a similar category, dealing with functional delivery rather 
than technical delivery. Outcome Quality (OQ) and Trust (TR), in contrast, would 
seem to be subjective measures, based on the perceptions of the respondent of the 
service being received overall.
Finally, Potential Quality (PQ) could be perceived as being similar to the 
'Tangibles' element originally proposed by Parasuraman et al (1988) as part of 
SERVQUAL. Potential Quality, however, can be seen in one of two ways. At the 
Decision phase of the IT Sourcing Cycle, Potential Quality would be a judgement 
on whether a vendor could fulfil the contract requirements. During an agreement, 
the emphasis would change slightly to whether it is believed that the vendor can 
continue to deliver to the contract requirements.
Looking more closely at SERVDYN, could the elements be used as a predictor of 
behaviour when the trigger point is reached and an organisation decides to review 
its IT sourcing arrangements? Gounaris (2005) saw the use of INDSERV as a way 
of assessing an IT department. For this research, this idea of evaluation was 
extended to provide a 'window on outsourcing' by using SERVDYN as a way to 
view the perceptions of the IT service provided by a vendor, where the 
organisation stayed with the vendor, switched vendors or backsourced. The
purpose of using SERVDYN in this way was to investigate whether SERVDYN 
could be used as a predictor of IT sourcing intent, albeit after the sourcing decision 
was taken.
3.2.6 The Survey Hypotheses
The hypotheses for the survey were predominantly based on the SERVDYN 
instrument. The first four sections of the survey served to bring up to date the 
research previously carried out by others (The SERVDYN instrument was 
subsequently used to gauge the views of respondents whether the IT sourcing 
provision was in-house or outsourced and if outsourced, whether a decision was 
taken to stay with the vendor, switch vendors or backsourced. In order to explore 
the possible relationship between SERVDYN and IT sourcing decisions, a number 
of hypotheses were generated to frame the survey research. These were based on 
the four specific dimensions of SERVDYN (Hard Process Quality, Soft Process 
Quality, Outcome Quality and Trust); it is proposed that the IT Sourcing Decision 
Matrix provided a framework with which to review such a decision. Potential 
Quality was perceived as being more influential during the decision phase of the 
IT Sourcing Cycle. This framework is adapted from the findings of Whitten & 
Leidner (2006), Gounaris (2005, 2005a, 2005b) and Szmigin (1993).
The validity of this Decision Matrix was tested via the results of the analysis of 
survey data. However, as was illustrated earlier, "IT as Strategy" depends on the 
"view of the organisation". Rather than complicate the survey further, a decision 
was taken to use the classification of the functions as commodity or strategic 
arrived at in Table 2.13. From the IT Sourcing Decision Matrix the following 
hypotheses were formed.
IT Sourcing Decision Matrix (Vendor Performance)
(/)
£  High 
"o53aoE
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Figure 3.5 The IT Sourcing Decision Matrix
Hypothesis l a 'The overall combined score for in-house sourced IT w ill be higher 
than for those that outsourced/
If an organisation maintains their in-house provision for IT, it is assumed that they 
do so because it meets the organisation's needs (King & Malhotra 2000).
Hypothesis lb  'The overall combined score for in-house sourced IT w ill be higher 
than for those that stayed with the existing vendor, switched vendors or 
backsourced/
Similar to Hypothesis la, in-house IT provision should be rated higher than those 
that outsourced and then either stayed with the existing vendor, switched vendors 
or outsourced. It could be argued that staying with the existing vendor should be 
scored as highly as those that had in-house provision but it is suspected that this is 
not the case.
Hypothesis lc  'The overall combined score for those that stayed with their 
existing vendor w ill be higher than those that switched vendors or backsourced/
If an organisation is happy with their current IT outsourcing vendor, it is
Re-negotiate Stay
Back Switch
Low High
Hard/Soft Process Quality
reasonable to expect a higher rating than for those that switched vendors or 
backsourced.
Hypothesis 2a 'The element scores for in-house IT w ill all be higher than for those 
that outsourced'
Similar to Hypothesis la , the same should apply at the element score level.
Hypothesis 2b 'The element scores for in-house IT w ill all be higher than for those 
that stayed with their existing vendor, switched vendors or backsourced.'
Similar to Hypothesis lb, the same should apply at the element score level.
Hypothesis 2c 'The element scores for those that stayed with their existing vendor 
w ill all be higher than for those that switched vendors or backsourced.'
Similar to Hypothesis lc, the same should apply at the element score level. If an 
organisation is happy with their current IT outsourcing vendor, it is reasonable to 
expect higher ratings for all elements of SERVDYN than for those that switched 
vendors or backsourced.
Hypothesis 3 'Potential Quality w ill be higher for those that stayed with their 
existing vendor than for those that switched vendors or backsourced.'
The client would need to believe that the vendor could continue to do a good job 
in terms service performance and quality in the future -  if they did not it is 
reasonable to assume they would look at alternatives.
Hypothesis 4 'There should be no significant difference in Potential Quality 
between those that switched vendors or backsourced.'
Potential Quality should have no influence on whether a client chooses to switch 
vendors or backsource. Having chosen to take one of the options, the possible 
performance of the vendor in the future becomes irrelevant.
Hypothesis 5 'Hard Process Quality and Soft Process Quality w ill be higher for  
those that switch vendors than for those that backsourced.'
If an organisation has experienced strong vendor service (i.e. they were happy 
with the outsourcing process) but were dissatisfied with the relationship as a 
whole, they would be more likely to switch vendors than backsource (Whitten &
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Leidner 2006).
Hypothesis 6 'Outcome Quality and Trust w ill be lower for those that 
backsourced than those that switched vendors.'
An organisation unhappy with an outsourcing vendor in terms of outcome quality 
and trust are more likely to backsource than switch vendors (Whitten & Leidner 
2006).
All significance testing of these hypotheses will be carried out at the p=0.05 level 
where appropriate. This is commonly selected as being statistically significant to 
reject the null hypothesis (Pallant 2007, Bryman & Cramer 2009).
3.3 Discussion
It would appear that outsourcing and the process of decision/transition/ 
operation can be viewed as cyclical. If an organisation chooses to outsource, at 
some point the outsourcing contract will reviewed, because either the contract 
comes to the end of its term or the client chooses reviews the arrangement for any 
number of reasons. This would move the outsourcing process from 'operation' to 
'decision' and the whole IT Sourcing Cycle start again. It would also seem that a 
move from operation to decision in the IT Sourcing Cycle could be summarised as 
the desire for change, with the trigger having a number of contributors, broadly 
grouped into strategic, organisational and economic factors. An outsourcing 
agreement often starts with the client making cost savings, but the vendor will 
attempt to recoup any initial loss (Kern et al 2002).
Whitten and Leidner (2006) looked at the options available when reviewing an 
existing outsourcing agreement, but limited the study to Applications 
Development. Although this study looked at service quality, performance and 
relationship, the survey carried out asked for perceptions in basic terms, i.e. 
ratings of high medium and low. This contrasts with SERVQUAL and SERVPERF 
that take a more granular approach, predominantly using a 7 point Likert scales 
(Parasuraman et al 1988, Cronin & Taylor 1992). Whitten and Leidner (2006) 
suggested using a Likert scale for this part of the survey was an area for further
research.
Organisational change within a business has often precipitated changes in IT 
sourcing. Mergers and acquisitions are bound to force the newly created 
organisation to look at IT. However, it is where other organisations not driven by 
such events chose to change that the interest lies, particularly when backsourcing 
previously outsourced IT. The reasons for outsourcing and backsourcing appear 
broadly similar, but what else contributes to the decision to backsource rather than 
re-negotiate or switch vendors? If outsourcing is seen as a marriage, backsourcing 
is the divorce, and if the relationship between the client and the vendor breaks 
down completely it could be an acrimonious divorce.
3.4 Summary
It would seem, on initial inspection, that outsourcing and backsourcing are just 
different manifestations of the IT Sourcing Cycle, going through the same phases 
of Decision, Transition and Operation from different starting points. However, the 
lack of empirical research in this area limits any conclusive judgement.
The rest of this thesis concentrates on the empirical research undertaken. Firstly, it 
studies in depth an instance of backsourcing within a large organisation to validate 
the IT Sourcing Cycle. Secondly, research was completed to investigate the 
decision-making factors within UK organisations in terms of their IT sourcing 
decisions. The next chapter details the research methodology and methods used to 
complete the empirical research.
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4 Methodology & Methods
This Chapter describes the methodology and methods used for the empirical research 
phase of the thesis. The ontological and epistemological stance of the researcher is 
discussed, along with the research strategy and structure.
4.1 Objectives and Scope
To understand the findings of the research, it is important to examine the context 
in which it was carried out, including the overall research method, design, 
methodology and the issues anticipated or subsequently encountered during the 
research process.
Setting the objectives and scope of the empirical research was the first major 
action. This was based on the primary research questions that address the areas 
specifically focused on the empirical research.
(3) To identify the key strategic and decision-making factors to backsource IT, and to 
contrast these with the outsourcing process.
(4) To understand the backsourcing process in comparison with the existing frameworks for 
IT outsourcing.
(5) To ascertain the levels of backsourcing activity within the United Kingdom.
(6) To understand the IT Sourcing decision process in terms of the decision makers, 
motives and influences.
Table 4 .1 Empirical Research Objectives
Generating the research questions from the research objectives was the next 
important stage of the research, with the questions generated by the literature 
review carried out in previous chapters.
4.1.1 Setting the Scope -  The Research Framework
The research framework was designed to summarise the areas within scope for the 
research. Using the three stages of the IT Sourcing Cycle proposed in Chapter 3 
had the advantage of separating the activities within outsourcing and 
backsourcing. For example, it is proposed that the business drivers for outsourcing
would be considered during the decision and operation phases, but would not 
play a major role during transition.
The initial literature review concentrated on two specific choices of IT sourcing 
strategies -  outsourcing and backsourcing. This remained the focus for the rest of 
the research, but it became apparent that the other choices, staying in-house or 
switching vendors, could not be ignored. The Backsourcing framework (Figure 
3.4), however, was used during the case study phase of the research.
The literature review carried out in Chapter 2 indicated that the general processes 
of outsourcing and backsourcing, based on the IT Sourcing Cycle, were broadly the 
same. However, the idea of a three-phase approach to IT sourcing required further 
empirical examination. The following sections detail the research strategy, 
methodologies and methods used to carry out the empirical research, along with 
the rationale for research decisions taken and coverage of bias and ethical issues 
presented during the research process.
4.2 Defining the Research Strategy
Understanding and acknowledging the research strategy, ontological and 
epistemological standpoints of the researcher is paramount, as this dictates, to a 
certain extent, the preferred research methodologies (Easterby-Smith et al 2002).
4.2.1 Looking at Research Strategies
Blaikie (2007) proposed four different research strategies - inductive, deductive,
retroductive and abductive. Two of these strategies, inductive and deductive, are
well defined and understood in research literature. Hussey & Hussey (1997) define
inductive research as
". . .a study in which theory is developed from the observation of empirical reality; 
thus general inferences are induced from particular instances." (pl3)
and deductive research as
". . .a study in which a conceptual and theoretical structure is developed and then 
tested by empirical observation; thus particular instances are deduced from general 
references." (pl3)
The difference between the two approaches is the starting point. For deductive
96
research, the researcher creates a hypothesis to be subjected to empirical testing. 
With inductive research, the findings of research lead to the creation of theory 
(Bryman 2008).
For the retroductive and abductive research strategies, the picture painted by
literature is not so clear. Many authors do not discuss these as research strategies
(Bryman 2008, Hussey & Hussey 1997, Robson 2002, Easterby-Smith et al 2002,
Bryman & Bell 2003). More disconcerting is that where abduction and retroduction
are discussed there is an ambiguity of meaning. Many authors see abduction and
retroduction as the same concept (Gummesson 2000). This is not surprising given
the 'father' of abductive thinking, C.S. Peirce, stated
"The first stating of a hypothesis and the entertaining of it, whether as a simple 
interrogation or with any degree of confidence, is an inferential step which I 
propose to call abduction or retroduction." (In Punch et al 1990, p34)
The use of abductive logic was proposed originally as a method for generating
hypotheses in the natural sciences, but was adopted by interpretive social science
as the appropriate method for theory construction (Blaikie 2007). Abduction is
defined as
"... the logic of constructing a hypothesis, or the logic of selecting a hypothesis 
from many possible ones." (Fann 1970, p59)
However, Blaikie (2007) distinguishes between retroductive and abductive
research strategies. Abductive research is seen specifically as
"... constructing theories that are derived from the social actor's language, 
meanings and accounts in the context of everyday activities." (Blaikie 2007, p89)
The starting point for such research is the description of these activities and 
meanings, and then deriving concepts and categories that can form an 
understanding or explanation of the problem (Blaikie 2007). This seems to go 
further than the original definition by Peirce (Fann 1970), in that it emphasises 
constructing theories from the language, meaning and accounts of individuals. 
The abductive research strategy is based on idealist ontology and a 
constructionism epistemology (Blaikie 2007), neither of which aligned with this 
researcher. An abductive research strategy was therefore discounted.
For retroduction, Blaikie (2007) sees the research process as the construction and
testing of structures and mechanisms to explain observable phenomena. Saether 
(1998) seems to concur with this, stating that retroductive research strategy 
represents the combination of the deductive and inductive research strategies to 
make valid representations of social life. Downward & Mearman (2006) go further, 
arguing that retroduction requires the triangulation of research methods and 
advocates the use of mixed-methods triangulation. This aspect of triangulation will 
be examined later in this chapter. As with abduction, retroductivism was seen by 
Blaikie (2007) as having a realist ontology and a neo-realism or constructionism 
epistemology. However, Mingers (2006) sees retroductivism as more aligned with 
a critical realist epistemology, a position with which Patomaki & Wight (2000) and 
Downward & Mearman (2006) concur. Table 4.2 summarizes the research 
strategies.
Inductive To establish descriptions of characteristics and patterns
Deductive To test theories, to eliminate false ones and corroborate the survivor
Retroductive To discover underlying mechanisms to explain observed regularities
Abductive To describe and understand social life in terms of social actors’ motives 
and understanding
Table 4.2 Research Strategies
Finally, making a decision on which research strategy to adopt is also dependant 
on the ontological and epistemological stance of the researcher and the type of 
research to be completed. In order to make a definitive statement on the research 
strategy it is necessary to categorise the type of research carried out, along with the 
ontological and epistemological stances of the researcher.
4.2.2 Categorising the Research
The primary research objectives, as articulated in Chapter 1, are all based around 
the goal of discovery. The research represented a Tact finding' mission, where 
backsourcing was ill defined and understood. This seemed to imply an inductive 
approach to the research. Mintzberg (1979) sees two steps vital to inductive 
research -  'detective work' and 'creative leap'. This second aspect, argues 
Mintzberg, always occurs - even if the 'creative leap' in terms of describing 
something 'new' is only a small one. This 'creative leap' process seemed similar to 
the original definition of abduction, where the idea of theory creation is selection
of the theory that best fits 'the facts' (Fann 1970). Mintzberg (1979) attaches the
label of 'exploratory' to this type of research within organisations, although
Hussey and Hussey (1997) are more concise on exploratory research, stating that it
"... is used in areas where there are few theories or a deficient body of knowledge." 
(p66)
The objectives of the research state that backsourcing process needs to be defined
and compared with other types of sourcing strategies, such as outsourcing. This
goes beyond exploratory research and into the realms of descriptive research when
attempting to refine the backsourcing process (Hussey and Hussey 1997). The
combination of exploratory and descriptive research required is better described
by Robson (2011) as evaluation research,
"The purpose of an evaluation is to assess the effects and effectiveness of something, 
typically some innovation, intervention, policy, practice or service." (pl76)
Robson (2011) goes on to suggest that any evaluation research should meet four
criteria. These were used as an initial 'mile stick' for the research and are
summarised in Table 4.3.
Overall, the goals of the research are a combination of exploratory and descriptive
research and seemed to fit the evaluation research type proposed by Robson (2002)
and additionally, falls within the boundaries set by Mintzberg (1979) for inductive
research within organisations. Going further, Hart (1998) splits evaluation research
into two types, summative and formative. This work would appear to be
summative, in that its purpose is
"To summarize and assess the main benefits of a policy, programme or product in 
order to judge its effectiveness or applicability to a specific situation or in a range of 
contexts." (Hart 1998, p46)
Utility - is it of use to some audience. For this research, the conclusions would be 
useful for any organisation considering 
backsourcing or is in the process of carrying 
out such a process.
Feasibility -  can it be completed in political, 
practical and cost-effective terms?
By limiting scope and gaining backing from the 
organisation selected for the case study and 
identifying a suitable survey delivery 
mechanism, this was achievable.
Propriety -  can it be carried out fairly and 
ethically?
This has to be judged against a backdrop of 
possible bias and general ethical 
considerations.
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Technical adequacy -  given the above, it 
should be carried out with technical skill and 
sensitivity.
Given the level of study for the research, it is 
believed this is the case.
Table 4.3 Evaluation Research Criteria
In summary, this research appears to be summative evaluation research - a 
combination of exploratory and descriptive research. This could be viewed as the 
research 'concept' using Silverman's research schematic (Silverman 2000).
4.2.3 Models, Concepts & Theories
Silverman (2000) proposes a relationship between models, concepts, theories, 
hypotheses, methodologies and methods that was represented schematically. This 
representation provides a guide to carrying out inductive, or qualitative, research. 
This can be contrasted with a similar representation of deductive, or quantitative, 
research proposed by Bryman and Bell (2003) and one from Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie (2004) for mixed-method research. It has already been noted that 
Downward & Mearman (2006) argued for the use of triangulation and mixed 
methods research in retroduction . A more in-depth review of mixed methods 
research is covered in the next section. Looking at Figure 4.1,
"...each concept reflects a lower level of generality and abstraction." (Silverman
2000, p80)
Figure 4.1 highlights one of the key differences between deductive, inductive and 
mixed-methods research. In deductive research, the phenomenon is investigated 
independently of its social environment and the ontological and epistemological 
stance of the researcher. In inductive research, these have to be considered from 
the outset (Robson 2002). Hussey & Hussey (1998) go further, arguing that the 
starting point in any research is essentially the researchers 'view of the world'. It is 
important, therefore, to understand the researcher's personal beliefs and 'view of 
the world' -  what Silverman (2000) categorises as the research 'model' -  an overall 
framework for looking at reality.
Johnson &
Bryman & Bell Onwuegbuzie (2004) Silverman (2001)
(2002)
Deductive Strategy
Findings
Hypothesis
Findings
Theory
Data Collection
Draw Conclusions
Interpret the Data
Legitimate the Data
Collect the Data
Hypotheses 
confirmed 
or rejected
Methods -  specific research 
_______ techniques_______
Analyze the Data
Hypotheses -  theories 
tested in research
Determine Research Questions Models -  how we look at Reality ________(i.e. paradigm)_______
Determine if Mixed Design 
is Appropriate
Select Mixed-Method or 
Mixed-Model Research Design
Concepts -  clearly specified ideas 
derived from a particular model
Methodologies -  how a
phenomenon will be studied
Theories -  sets of concepts to define 
and explain some phenomenon
Mixed-Methods Strategy Inductive Strategy 
Figure 4 .1 Theories. Models & Hypotheses
4.2.4 Towards Triangulation -  Mixed Methods Research
Although the results of the primary data analysis can be compared with the results 
of the analysis of the literature on outsourcing, the body of work for backsourcing 
is limited. Therefore, an attempt was made to increase the validity of the research 
through triangulation. The purpose of triangulation is to use multiple sources of 
data to increase the rigour of the research and reduce threats to validity such as 
researcher or respondent bias. (Robson 2002) Looking at the four types of 
triangulation used by Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (2002) and originally 
proposed by Denzin (1978), Table 4.4 looks at their suitability for this research.
Triangulation of theories looked promising and could be used for comparing the 
findings on relationship quality from the field of Marketing to those in the IT 
client/vendor relationship. It was not appropriate, however, as a basis for 
checking validity within the case study aspect of the research. Methodological 
triangulation was deemed the most appropriate, using quantitative and qualitative 
methods to validate findings, an approach more commonly acknowledged as
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mixed methods research (Denscombe 2007, Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004). More
on the justification for the mixed methods approach shortly.
Data
Triangulation
Collecting data at different times 
from one source or from a number 
of sources
This was feasible as an approach, but 
a research decision not to complete a 
longitudinal study was taken early in 
the research design process.
Investigator
Triangulation
A number of investigators used to 
collect data from the same or a 
number of sources
Resource restrictions, i.e. only one 
researcher, made this approach 
unusable
Triangulation of 
Theories
Taking a theory from another 
discipline and applying it to this 
research
This is an approach that was followed, 
to a certain extent, for part of the 
survey stage of the research, using an 
approach similar to that used in 
Marketing
Methodological
Triangulation
Uses qualitative and quantitative 
data collection to validate data 
accuracy
The most appropriate triangulation 
method given resource constraints 
This was possible for some, but not 
all, of the empirical data collected.
Table 4.4 Research Triangulation Methods
Triangulation as a method is not without its issues. Mathison (1988) perceived that
when a triangulation strategy is used the assumption is that the resultant findings 
from the data analysis would be convergent. However, findings from research are 
sometimes not so neatly packaged. Mathison (1988) goes on to state that although 
triangulation provides a rich, and sometimes complex, picture of the area being 
studied, the picture itself may not be clear. In this instance, the resultant findings 
can be classified as inconsistent (Mathison 1988),
..the evidence presents alternative propositions containing inconsistencies and 
ambiguities. With this outcome it is not clear what the valid claim or proposition 
about something is." (pl5)
The third possibility is where the findings are contradictory. Here, the 
contradictions should be explored by the researcher for possible reasons, in both 
the research approach and questions and the findings themselves (Mathison 1988).
A distinction needs to be made, however, between two types of research design 
that use multiple primary data sources - multi-method and mixed-method 
research. Multi-method research uses research designs that use two qualitative 
methods or two quantitative methods together (Morse 2003). Mixed-method 
involves using qualitative and quantitative methods, either serially or 
simultaneously (Denscombe 2007). A multi method approach to the research was
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discounted early in the process when it was apparent that an in-depth, 
exploratory, study of backsourcing in an organisational setting was required, 
along with research into the wider trends in United Kingdom sourcing trends.
Looking at mixed-methods research, Johnson et al (2007) defined mixed mode 
research as
"Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or team of 
researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches 
(e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, 
inference techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding 
and corroboration." (pl23)
Denscombe (2007) proposed three characteristic features that set the mixed 
methods research from other strategies (Table 4.5).
1. The use of qualitative and quantitative approaches within a single research 
project
2. Explicit focus on the link between approaches
3. Emphasis on practical approaches to research problems (pragmatism)
Table 4.5 Characteristic Features of Mixed-Method Research
This pragmatic approach to research resonated with the researcher. The aspiration 
was to carry out research that required a practical research process to investigate 
the practical issues within the IT sourcing domain. Greene et al (1989) considered 
mixed-method research as being for a number of general purposes: triangulation, 
complementary, development, intuition and expansion. For this research, it would 
seem that the purposes were triangulation (discussed previously), complimentary 
and expansion -  using different methods to expand the breadth and range by 
using different methods for different inquiry components. However, this emphasis 
shifted after the completion of the Case Study. It became evident that a shift in 
research emphasis was required (explained more fully in section 7.1), when it 
became apparent that the purpose the mixed-methods approach was more of 
triangulation and intuition, the latter being the desire to investigate the paradoxes 
found in the first phase of the research.
4.2.5 Ontology and Epistemology
Fleetwood (2005) summarizes the importance of the ontological and
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epistemological standpoints selected for any research
"The way we think the world is (ontology) influences: what we think can be known 
about it (epistemology); how we think it can be investigated (methodology and 
research techniques); the kinds of theories we think can be constructed about it; and 
the political and policy stances we are prepared to take." (pl97)
Ontology developed as a branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature of 
what exists (Blaikie 2007). The ontological view of the research process is 
concerned with the assumptions the researcher makes about the nature of reality 
(Easterby-Smith et al 2002). For ontology, the main point is the question of whether 
social entities can be considered to have a reality external to social actors, known 
as objectivism, or are built up by the perceptions and actions of the social actors 
themselves, known as constructivism (Bryman & Bell 2003). Robson (2011) noted 
that for constructivism, the emphasis is on how individuals construct and make 
sense of their world, and that the world is constantly changing.
The ontological standpoint for this research and researcher appears to be 
constructivist in nature; it seems counter-intuitive to see a social entity, such as an 
organisation, being anything other than being built up by its social actors.
Epistemology represents the general set of assumptions about the best ways of 
inquiring into the nature of the world (Easterby-Smith et al 2002). Its main premise 
is whether the social world can and should be studied the same as natural science 
(Bryman 2008). Bryman (2008) believes that epistemological views can be divided 
into three broad groups - Positivism, Realism and Interpretivism.
Bryman (2008) stated that positivism advocates the application of methods of 
natural science to the study of social reality. One of the key principles of positivism 
is that any research must be conducted objectively. For this researcher and the 
research, it is clear that the phenomenon under investigation cannot be 
investigated isolated from its organisational setting - IT sourcing acts at an 
organisational level and, like any organisational change, affects all those in scope 
of the change within the organisation (Ericson 2001). This essentially rules out a 
positivist paradigm, where the emphasis is on 'reality as a concrete structure', i.e. 
there is only one version of reality that can be understood and it is independent of
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any social aspects (Hussey & Hussey 1997). The phenomenological or social 
constructionist paradigm, where knowledge is deemed to be socially constructed 
(Bryman 2008), does not seem to be appropriate either. Although the research is 
concerned with generating theories - a phenomenological concept, it is also 
attempting to test a hypothesis - a positivistic concept. The paradigm for this 
research and researcher appeared to lie somewhere in the middle of these two 
extremes (Robson 2002).
Post-positivism accepts that the values of the researcher can influence what is 
being observed, but still maintains that there is one reality known imperfectly 
because of the researcher's limitations (Robson 2002). This seems inadequate when 
looking at the complexities of organisations, the question that can be posed is 
'reality in the eyes of whom?' -  the board of directors, senior managers, 
shareholders, employees, the researcher?
Relativism compromises between positivistic and phenomenological paradigms -  
it proposes that 'facts' depend on the viewpoint of the observer and that the 'truth ' 
requires consensus between different viewpoints (Easterby-Smith et al 2002). 
Critical realism is seen as a variant of relativism by Easterby-Smith et al (2002), but 
as a third way between positivism and relativism by Robson, all three of which are 
seen as part of the post-positivist paradigm (Robson 2002).
Critical realism, as an approach, has been used within Information Systems and
business research (Mingers 2006, Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991, Sedmak & Longhurst
2010) for some time. The researcher has a preference for the critical realist
approach, agreeing with Sayer (1992), who 'signposts' eight characteristics of
critical realism. Two of these characteristics are that
"... the world exists independently of our knowledge of it." and ".. .our knowledge 
of the world is fallible and theory-laden." (Sayer 1992, p5)
Bryman (2008) defines critical realism as
"A realist epistemology that asserts that the study of the social world should be 
concerned with the identification of the structures that generate that world." 
(p 6 9 2 )
The 'critical' tag is important as practitioners aspire to identify structures in order
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to change them (Bryman 2008).
However, it could be argued that the ontological and epistemological stance of the
researcher is dictated by a 'higher' level. In systems thinking terms, the
Weltanschauung, or 'worldview', of the researcher represents
"An individual (or collective) viewpoint, which is conditioned by environment, 
background, belief, upbringing, etc. It is not itself a set o f beliefs, but a framework 
zvhich underlies one's beliefs." (Open Systems Group 1981, pl8)
Therefore, it would appear that it is the researcher's Weltanschauung that tilts the 
balance to a specific ontological stance. The researcher sees 'reality as a contextual 
field of information', preferring to look at a 'problem' holistically with a view to 
understanding patterns of systemic relationships (Morgan and Smircich 1980).
4.2.6 Summary
The research appears to be predominantly inductive in nature, it moves from the 
'plane' of observation of the real world to the construction of theories to explain 
what has been observed (Gill & Johnson 2002). However, if Saether (1998) were 
used as a guide, the research strategy would be more aligned to a retroductive 
research strategy, using a mixed-methods approach of qualitative and quantitative 
data collection. Perlesz & Lindsay (2003) raised issues around the use of 
methodological triangulation, arguing that triangulation used as an analogy is 
misleading because it only requires two datasets and not three. However, Perlesz 
& Lindsay (2003) are ignoring one of the key characteristics of any research project. 
Taking this research project as a whole, there are three data sources -  quantitative 
and qualitative data and the literature review findings.
Given the researcher's desire for methodological triangulation, a mixed-method
research design using qualitative research followed by quantitative research
became the preferable research strategy. However, the use of mixed-methods
research is not without issues. Sale et al (2002) maintains that
".. .quantitative and qualitative researchers do not, in fact, study the same 
phenomena." (p50)
They go on to suggest that multiple research methods can be combined in a single 
study if done for complimentary purposes (Sale et al 2002). Morse (2003) stated
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that
"This design is most often used to develop a model or theory and then test the 
theory. Note that while testing is the second quantitative component (and forms a 
deductive phase), the overall theoretical thrust is inductive." (Morse 2003, p203)
In terms of methodology, each research study is considered distinct with its own 
assumptions (Morse 2003).
The researcher comes from a Systems background, having studied the Soft 
Systems Methodology proposed by Checkland & Scholes (1990). This 
Weltanschauung or "worldview" seems to be important. Easterby-Smith et al (2002) 
seem to concur
"The worldview held by an individual researcher or institute is clearly an 
important factor which affects the choice of research method." (p57) 
Consequently, it is this Weltanschauung of the researcher that appears to be a 
major influence on the researcher's ontological and epistemological views, and 
goes some way towards why the researcher sees things in terms of systems and 
processes.
Therefore, it would appear that it is the researcher's Weltanschauung that tilts the 
balance to a specific ontological stance. The researcher sees 'reality as a contextual 
field of information', preferring to look at a 'problem' holistically with a view to 
understanding patterns of systemic relationships (Morgan and Smircich 1980).
4.3 Bias and Ethical Issues
The completion of any programme of research is never without issues, specifically
those concerned with bias and ethics. Every researcher starts the research with
their own views, as has been discussed earlier in this chapter. The important facet
is to acknowledge this bias and build in safeguards to ensure the research is not
invalidated by these. The consideration of ethical issues needs to be at the centre of
the research strategy, as it
".. .relates directly to the integrity of a piece of research and of the disciplines that 
are involved." (Bryman & Bell 2003, p535)
Robson (2002) goes further, considering it as vital that serious thought is put into 
the ethical aspects of a proposed piece of research at an early stage. The research
107
strategy, mixed-methods, led to a mix of 'insider' and 'outsider' research for 
reasons that will become clear later. This gave rise to different ethical issues at the 
different stages of the research. During the qualitative phase, the research was 
carried out as 'insider' research, i.e. within the organisation the researcher was an 
employee (Brannick & Coghlan 2007). The second, quantitative, phase of the 
research was completed as 'outsider' research. The following sections will 
therefore look at these aspects in more detail and address the area of research 
ethics in general.
4.3.1 Personal Value System s
The researcher's ontological and epistemological standpoints have been covered in 
an earlier section. The researcher comes from a 'systems' background, and 
therefore prefers to look at issues holistically in order to understand them, 
working through problems methodically in order to reach a solution. An 
employment background of nearly 30 years in IT in predominantly technical areas 
provides the background for this.
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Figure 4.2 Johari Window
Self-reflection plays an important part in assessing personal value systems (Robson 
2002). Metrics, such as Myers-Briggs type indicator (Myers & McCaully 1985) and 
Belbin team roles (Broucek & Randell 1996) can provide an insight. These were
completed as part of another course, so the researcher was aware of categorisation 
using these metrics. However, results from these types of metrics have to be 
treated with caution. They are a tool to be used to gauge performance in various 
situations and in reflecting on 'w hat makes you tick'. However,
"If all you do is look at the surface of a lake, you will miss the remarkable life underneath". 
(Pearman & Albritton 1997 p i 73)
An alternative to the metrics approach was considered. Haynes (1999) discusses 
the use of the Johari Window technique as a way of carrying out self-reflection and 
receiving feedback from others. The Johari Window, originally devised by Luft 
and Ingham (Haynes 1999), consists of four quadrants that describe 'views of self'. 
In order to extend the 'knowledge of self' beyond open and hidden self, a feedback 
process could be carried out with, for example, work colleagues. This was 
considered but discarded, firstly because others in the researchers domain could 
not be trusted to give honest 'non-agenda' driven feedback, and secondly because 
the researcher was not willing to risk existing relationships if the feedback was 
thought to be unfair or too judgemental. As a result, the focus changed to the 
'type' of researcher, 'insider' or 'outsider' required in each of the stages of the 
empirical research. This concentrated on the specific issues and problems faced by 
the researcher in each of these different roles.
4.3.2 Role Conflicts & ‘Insider’ Research
A potential role conflict arose because of the research also being an employee of 
ClientCo. For the case study, the question of 'identity' during the qualitative phase 
of the research had to be considered (Robson 2002). As an employee, the researcher 
was involved in everyday conversations about VendorCo and ClientCo. As a 
researcher, these thoughts and beliefs needed to be, to a certain extent, separated 
from the research process. Having taken an 'active role' in the outsourcing process, 
it is clear the researcher will have perceptions of the overall success of the 
agreement. These had to be acknowledged and 'compartmentalised', checking 
throughout the research that these perceptions had not biased any data analysis 
(Robson 2002). However, Gummesson (2000) perceives this experience of the
organisation as an advantage, terming it 'pre-understanding'. This 'pre­
understanding' adds to the richness of the data collected by the research because 
the language used by the actors is understood in the context of the organisation 
and its cultural norms (Gummesson 2000).
For the Case Study itself, the circumstances were unique -  the researcher was an
employee of ClientCo and gained access through this relationship. The added
advantage of this 'insider research', besides providing a depth and richness that
may not otherwise have been available (Hewitt-Taylor 2002), is what Gummesson
(2000) terms as pre-understanding
"Pre-understanding refers to such things as people's knowledge, insights and 
experience before they engage in a research programme." (Gummesson 2000 p57)
It is the knowledge of the organisation's day-to-day operation and culture that
allows an insider researcher to gain a richness of data. Coghlan & Casey (2001)
when discussing nurses as insider researchers, stated,
"When they are inquiring they can use the internal jargon and draw on their own 
experience in asking questions and interviewing, and are able to follow up on replies 
and so obtain richer data" (p676)
However, the disadvantages can be seen as substantial (Robson 2011), including
the duality of role (as researcher and employee) and interviewing work colleagues.
The consideration for the latter was the potential power imbalance between the
researcher and those interviewed and that of possible 'employer pressure' during
the course of the research (Easterby-Smith et al 2003). Although the research was
not carried out as 'Research as Employee' i.e. employee participation, some of the
same potential problems had to be acknowledged (Easterby-Smith et al 2003).
Issues around content have been detailed in the sections detailing the case study
method.
4.4 Method: The Case Study
After the literature review, it was clear that there were a number of gaps in the 
current literature on backsourcing. The qualitative phase of the mixed-methods 
research strategy followed a case study approach; the reasoning for this has to be 
expanded upon.
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4.4.1 Why a Case Study
The aim of the case study was to gain an insight into the backsourcing process, 
from the perspective of those that had been heavily involved in an organisation 
that had backsourced its IT. The case study phase of the research was used 
specifically to investigate and answer the following research objectives. To focus 
this stage of the research, it was necessary to look at the overall objectives of the 
research and the initial conceptual framework, and devise objectives for the Case 
Study phase of the research.
(3) To identify the key strategic and 
decision-making factors to 
backsource IT, and to contrast these 
with the outsourcing process.
To explore the importance and drivers of the decision 
stage in backsourcing.
(4) To understand the backsourcing 
process in comparison with the
To understand the decision-making process and the 
options explored.
existing frameworks for IT 
outsourcing. To discover the ‘mechanics’ of the transition stage and the problems or barriers, that become apparent in 
backsourcing.
Exploration of the importance of knowledge 
management and the retention of key personnel in the 
backsourcing process.
To determine the differences in the operation stage for 
backsourcing.
Table 4.6 Case Study Objectives
The case study approach provides an opportunity to gain an insight into the effect 
of IT sourcing change on the wider organisation. The case study phase of the 
research was of an exploratory nature. Robson (2002) categorizes this type of 
research by stating that it is
"To find out what is happening, particularly in little-understood situations." (p59) 
The purpose of exploratory research is to look for new insights and generate 
hypotheses for future research. This seems to confirm the discussion around the 
type of research made in an earlier section.
4.4.2 Background and Method
For backsourcing, a single case study was carried out within an organisation that 
has just 'completed' a backsourcing process. The case study phase of this research 
was of an exploratory nature.
With open access granted to a specific organisation, as will be discussed shortly, a
case study appeared to be the most promising research approach. Robson (2002)
argues that all enquires are case studies. Robson (2002) also advocates a succinct
definition of case study research
"Case study is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical 
investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context 
using multiple sources of evidence." (pl78)
Given the access negotiated for this research, the study is at an organisational level 
with a focus on decision-making and the process of change (Robson 2002).
Yin (2003) sees the case study approach as a research strategy that includes single
and multiple case studies, this research is clearly a single case study. Yin (2003)
states that the single case study approach is particularly appropriate when
"... the investigator has access to a situation previously inaccessible to scientific 
observation. The case study is therefore worth conducting because the descriptive 
information alone will be revelatory." (p43)
In such a situation, Yin (2003) further categorizes this type of case study as a
'revelatory case'.
4.4.3 Data Collection Method
Making the decision on how to collect the qualitative data required within the 
target organisation had to be balanced against the practical implications of each 
approach. Hussey & Hussey (1997) identified seven main data collection methods 
of which four, critical incident technique, diaries, observation and protocol 
analysis, were dismissed as inappropriate for research within an organisation 
where the views of individuals were being sought. This effectively left interviews, 
questionnaires and focus groups. Given the exploratory nature of this phase of the 
research, questionnaires were discounted, as they do not lend themselves to this 
type of inquiry (Robson 2002). Finally, focus groups, a combination of interviewing 
and observation (Hussey & Hussey 1997) were considered but rejected. The 
purpose of this stage of the research was to extract the views of senior managers 
within the organisation, but not all were at the same level within the organisation. 
When such hierarchical relationships exist, it is suggested that individual 
interviews are more appropriate (Bryman 2008). Of the original seven data
collection methods identified by Hussey & Hussey (1997), only interviews, as a 
data collection method seemed appropriate for this stage of the research.
Silverman (2006) highlighted four possible interview strategies, and included focus 
groups within the four. With focus groups already discounted, that left structured, 
semi-structured or open (unstructured) interviews as data collection methods to be 
reviewed (Silverman 2006). Structured interviews are synonymous with 
questionnaires and are designed to ensure the respondent's replies can be 
aggregated, thus lending itself more towards quantitative data collection (Bryman 
& Bell 2003). This would not allow the ability to ask follow-up questions 
depending on the replies from respondents (Denscombe 2007).
Unstructured interviews are where there may be just one question and the 
interviewer has a brief set of prompts to deal with a certain range of topics 
(Bryman & Bell 2003). Yin (2009) terms this an in-depth interview. The framework 
for the interviews was based on the IT Sourcing Cycle (Figure 3.2), so such an open 
interview process would not have provided sufficient focus in terms of the data 
collection process.
Semi-structured interviews were therefore selected as the most appropriate 
method for the interviewing phase of the research because of the setting for the 
research,
"If the researcher is beginning the investigation with a fairly clear focus, rather 
than a very general notion of wanting to do research on a topic, it is likely that the 
interviews will be semi-structured ones, so that more specific issues can be 
addressed." (Bryman & Bell 2003, p346)
There are specific questions for which data were sought, with the interviews
themselves focused in a number of ways to ensure that the interviewee was aware
of the content and context of the research to improve consistency and the quality
of data collected. (Bryman & Bell 2003)
Making a decision on how many to interview is a 'subjective matter' in the eyes of 
the researcher (Bryman 2008). Kvale (1996) had a simple solution,
"Interview as many subjects as necessary to find out what you need to know." (plOl)
Resource constraints limit this to 'how many interviews can be completed within a 
specific timescale to find out what you need to know'. The time restriction was 
because of the 'tolerance' of the organisation in terms of time spent, for both the 
researcher and the interviewees, and availability of certain interviewees coming to 
the end of their contract with the organisation. Interviewees were identified and 
selected for the knowledge they were perceived as having in the backsourcing 
process because of being actively involved in it.
The importance of interviews is emphasised by Yin (2003) within case study 
research,
"Overall, interviews are an essential source of case study evidence because most 
case studies are about human affairs. These human affairs should be reported and 
interpreted through the eyes of specific interviewees, and well-informed 
respondents can provide important insights into a situation." (p92)
It is for the final point about 'well-informed respondents' that those chosen for the 
interview phase were selected for their knowledge of the research area within the 
outsourced organisation. This was categorized by Robson (2002) as purposive 
sampling. As this stage of the research is exploratory in nature, this approach was 
affirmed as appropriate by Johnson and Gill (2002). The first stage of the research 
process was to create a semi-structured interview guide or plan (Appendix 3) and 
make decisions on sample size (Bryman 2008).
As a result, the primary source of data consisted of a series of six semi-structured 
interviews with key personnel (within ClientCo) involved in the backsourcing 
process. These interviews took place approximately one year after the completion 
of the backsourcing process had been completed. The interviewees were three 
senior managers who had been part of ClientCo prior to the backsourcing process 
and part of the backsourcing project steering group (referred to as the ClientCo 
Project Group or CPG). The other three were senior managers who had been part 
of the original outsourcing process and had then transitioned from VendorCo to 
ClientCo (referred to as the VendorCo Senior Management Group or VSMG). A 
number of senior personnel within VendorCo were also approached but declined 
to participate in the research.
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Each of the perspective interviewees were approached personally to explain the 
research and to request their participation, all agreed. A Research Briefing 
(Appendix 2) was sent one week prior to the interview, when the interview was 
scheduled in their diaries. A meeting room was booked to ensure privacy, and all 
interviewees were asked for permission to digitally record the interview at that 
time. This broadly followed interview protocol recommended by Robson (2002) 
and Bryman & Bell (2003).
In addition to the interviews, secondary data, in the form of supporting 
documentation, was made available, specifically newsletters issued during the 
transition by ClientCo, minutes from Employee Consultation Forum meetings and 
communications from VendorCo. It also included several documents pertaining to 
the original outsourcing launch. These were also subjected to data analysis.
4.4.4 Constructing and Validating the Semi-Structured Interview Plan
The semi structured interview questions were based on the case study objectives 
and divided into four main sections using the IT Sourcing cycle as a framework; 
three sections covering each of Decision, Transition and Operation, and a section 
designed to gauge the respondents views on the backsourcing process overall. The 
issue of knowledge management was addressed during the Transition section.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the Case Study Research Domain, with the definitions and 
trends in backsourcing having already been addressed in the literature review in 
Chapter 2.
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Figure 4.3 Case Study Research Domain
Robson (2011) stated that a pilot study within case study research is often difficult 
to set up and not as important as for survey instruments. Bryman & Bell (2003), for 
example, state that it is always desirable to complete a pilot study prior to 
administering a self-completion questionnaire. However, a pilot interview was 
carried out with an individual within the organisation aware of the research and 
the possible interviewees (in terms of management level, not the individuals 
themselves). This pilot of the semi-structured interview plan was also discussed 
with the individual at the end of the interview itself to enhance the feedback 
process. This resulted in a few changes in question wording and order. Within the 
interview plan, the question "What were the real reasons for backsourcing" was 
also added as a result.
Taylor & Bogdan (1984) highlighted that
"... qualitative researchers emphasise validity, quantitative researchers emphasise 
reliability." (p7)
They go on to state that there has been an over emphasis on reliability in social 
research (Taylor & Bogdan 1984). Creswell & Plano Clark (2011) agree that there is
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more of a focus on validity, underlining the importance of the analysis procedures 
of the researcher
"... to determine whether the account provided by the researcher and the 
participants is accurate, can be trusted and is credible." (Creswell & Plano Clark
2011, p211)
The importance of reliability was seen as only minor, relating to the reliability of 
multiple coders (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011). This was not relevant for this 
research.
For the case study, the completion of the pilot for the semi-structured interview 
plan was deemed as important. The researcher was interviewing people within his 
own senior management and the validity of the research and the research process 
was seen as vital. The resulting semi-structured interview plan can be found in 
Appendix 3.
4.4.5 Data Analysis Methods
The analysis of the interviews was designed to serve two purposes; create a 
framework of understanding and provide input to the survey stage of the research. 
The main issue was to condense the complex information collected in a format that 
can be used to draw conclusions on the research area. Denscombe (2007) stated 
that there were four guiding principles to data analysis; that the analysis and the 
conclusions drawn are firmly rooted in the data, that the researchers' explanation 
of the data should emerge from the data, that the researcher should avoid 
introducing personal bias into the data and that the data analysis process should 
be iterative.
All interviewees were asked for permission to record the interview and were 
provided with an overview of the purpose of the research prior to the event. 
Bryman & Bell (2003) advise caution on the latter point for fear of skewing 
interview responses. The researcher felt, however, that it was a positive way of 
introducing the research.
Silverman (2000) advocated that data analysis should not start once data gathering
has been completed, believing that starting the data analysis process as soon as 
possible can provide early insights into the research process. Bryman (2008) stated 
that the researcher transcribing the recorded interviews allows a more thorough 
examination of what interviewees articulated and aid familiarisation with the data. 
Corbin & Strauss (2008) also recommend that the coding process be started as soon 
as the first interview is completed, as the first data serves as a foundation for 
further collection and analysis. For this reason, the first interview was completed, 
transcribed and a rudimentary analysis completed prior to subsequent interviews. 
The interviews were carried over a period of three weeks (due to individual diary 
restrictions). This allowed further time for transcription and data analysis as the 
interview schedule was completed.
Miles & Huberman (1994) provide a three-step process: data reduction, data 
display and conclusion drawing and verification, in one of the seminal textbooks 
dealing with qualitative data analysis. Robson (2011) advocated three different 
approaches to qualitative data analysis: quasi-statistical, thematic coding and 
grounded theory. All, though, seemed to follow the three-step approach proposed 
by Miles & Huberman (1994).
For the initial data analysis and production of a coding frame, summative content 
analysis was adopted (Hsieh & Shannon 2005). Data analysis started with searches 
for identified words and then extending the range of the search by identifying 
alternative terms for the original selection (Hsieh & Shannon 2005). Those words 
identified were treated as the start of the coding frame, within each of the research 
categories (treated as "master codes") of "decision", "transition", "operation" and 
"general" then used as codes to carry out further analysis (Miles & Huberman 
1994). These codes were then used to create a coding frame in the CAQDAS 
software package NVIVO 8 in order to explore the data in more detail (Bazeley 
2007, Gibbs 2002).
Finally, the research undertaken was set within a commercially sensitive area. 
Anonymity and confidentiality were of paramount importance, both at an 
individual and organisational level. All references to the organisations have been
removed and none of the respondents has been mentioned by name.
4.5 Method: The Survey
Having completed the case study research, it was clear that there were substantial 
gaps in the research domain. A wider study was required to collect data on the 
volume of the different IT sourcing activities. A number of possible approaches 
were considered but a survey appeared to be the most appropriate, why?
4.5.1 Why a Survey?
McLaughlin & Peppard (2006) carried out exploratory secondary research to get an 
indication of the extent to which organisations backsourced previously outsourced 
IT function. However, they acknowledged that their study only covered those 
organisations that backsourced where the information was in the public domain. 
Wong & Jay a (2008) and Veltri et al (2008) reviewed the drivers for the 
backsourcing decision but, like McLaughlin & Peppard (2006), relied on the 
analysis of existing press reports to compile a list of organisations that had 
backsourced. It was clear from the lack of literature on backsourcing and indeed 
even the extent to which backsourcing is being practiced, that primary research 
was required to shed light in this area.
4.5.2 Survey Objectives
In order to set the scope for further research it was necessary to clarify the research 
areas where primary data collection and analysis might further shed light on the 
research domain. Firstly, the activity within the area of backsourcing seemed to be 
limited to a number of large, high profile deals (Veltri et al 2006). While a great 
deal is known about the outsourcing decision making process, the same cannot be 
said for backsourcing. It is also not clear what Triggers' the desire of an 
organisation to look again at some or all of their IT outsourcing arrangements 
(McLaughlin & Peppard (2006). Within the IT Sourcing Cycle proposed in an 
earlier chapter, the organisation would have moved from Operation to Decision - 
but why? When an outsourcing contract had not reached its contractual end, what 
were the reasons for this review process?
The final area of interest revolves around the stakeholders within the organisation 
involved in the decision making process and what was considered the drivers for 
the subsequent decision. For example, was the process merely contained within the 
area monitoring and reporting on IT performance, or was it a review process that 
took place at the organisational level? For outsourcing, substantial research has 
been completed in this area, the same could not be said to be the case for 
backsourcing.
Identifying links between the reasons for the re-evaluation and the drivers for the 
subsequent decision could be very illuminating. For example, is an organisation 
unhappy with their incumbent outsourcing provider more likely to switch vendors 
or backsource than renegotiate? In summary, Table 4.7 maps the survey objectives 
to the overall research objectives, with the survey section (Figure 4.4) indicating 
the part of the survey in which the survey objective is addressed.
(5) To ascertain the levels of 
backsourcing activity within 
the United Kingdom.
Ascertain, from the survey population, the number 
of organisations that have outsourced, switched 
vendors or backsourced some or all of their IT
2
Discover the areas of IT that have been the subject 
of sourcing activity
2
(6) To understand the IT 
Sourcing decision process in 
terms of the decision
For those that have outsourced, have they ever 
reached a ‘re-evaluation point’ and if so, what action 
was taken
3
makers, motives and 
influences. Determine at what level within the organisation the ‘re-evaluation point’ decision was taken
3
Ascertain the importance of specific economic, 
strategic and social/ organisational drivers for IT 
sourcing decisions.
4
Gain an understanding of satisfaction with the 
outsourcing vendor, be it the incumbent or former 
vendor
5
Determine whether there is a relationship between 
perceived vendor satisfaction and the actions taken 
at the ‘re-evaluation point’.
5
Through the use of a constructed instrument, 
SERVDYN, review the service relationship from the 
clients perspective to discover whether it can be 
used as a predictor of IT Sourcing decisions
5
Table 4.7 Survey Objectives
To be a meaningful study, it was necessary to collect information from a number of
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organisations. One of the most efficient methods of collecting data from a large 
number of organisations is with a survey (Gable 1994). Surveys are generally not 
considered suitable for exploratory research, as most surveys are carried out for 
descriptive purposes (Robson 2002, Gill & Johnson 2002). This research takes the 
form of summative evaluation research, a combination of exploratory and 
descriptive, as has been discussed previously. Surveys are generally carried out for 
descriptive purposes (Robson 2002, Gill & Johnson 2002). The purpose of the 
survey approach at this stage in the research was to try to shed light on why 
organisations took a specific route when considering their IT sourcing strategy.
4.5.3 Survey Sampling
Given the research domain, an assessment was made that non-probability 
sampling, in the guise of purposive sampling, would be an appropriate sample 
method for the research in hand. In purposive sampling, the researcher can build a 
sample that meets the specific needs of the project (Robson 2011).
The issues of survey sample and delivery selection are almost symbiotic in nature; 
the sample size can negate a number of delivery options and the delivery options 
can limit the size of the sample. The sample size, however, can also be dictated by 
the aims and objectives of the research. For this research, the aim was to sample a 
UK wide population; as a result, the survey sample is the leading factor. Targeting 
the correct organisations for the survey to be meaningful was considered carefully. 
A search criterion for suitable organisations was therefore created based on the 
following criteria:
• Turnover had to be over £100 million -  studies have shown that IT 
expenditure is around 2.2% of an organisation's revenue (Kang & Bradley 
2002)
• More than 500 employees -  this avoids the selection of Holding Companies 
who may not have their own IT organisation
• Organisations classified as government, local authority or public sector 
agency was excluded
• Only UK organisations were considered as 'in-scope' for the survey
The next issue to address was to identify to whom the survey should be 
distributed. Given the nature of the questions within the survey, the respondent
had to have sufficient knowledge of the IT sourcing arrangements and decisions to
make the responses meaningful. The targeted sample group, therefore, consisted of
senior IT personnel within each organisation. Benamati & Rajkumar (2008) noted
an issue with low response within their survey when the target group were senior
within an organisation
"A limitation of this study is the low response rate, 5.33% of the executive decision 
makers surveyed. Response rates in surveys of executive level individuals are often 
low due to the numerous demands on their time." (p95)
Targeting the appropriate respondent within an organisation therefore became 
important. This aspect is an essential facet of the survey delivery mechanism.
4.5.4 Survey Delivery
The size and geography of the sample to a certain extent dictates the feasible 
survey methods. It would not be possible, for example, to visit a thousand 
organisations to complete the survey as a structured interview. As the aim of the 
survey research was to 'to gain an insight into IT sourcing activity within the United 
Kingdom' an appropriate delivery mechanism, need to be selected.
Many authors discuss the various survey distribution methods along with their 
advantages and disadvantages. Table 4.8 represents a combined view, along with
an assessment of the appropriateness of each method to this research.
Paper based survey -  
self-completion
• Surveys can be 
posted or hand 
delivered
• Relies on 
respondents 
returning the 
completed survey or 
on them being 
collected.
• Possible -  method 
may be considered 
‘old fashioned’ given 
the audience of IT 
professionals
Email response 
survey -  self­
completion
• Wide potential 
audience
• Possible non-delivery 
of email because of 
‘spam filters’
• Target audience is 
at organisation level 
-  more likely for 
emails to be 
‘spammed’
Web based survey -  
self-completion
• Easier to collate 
results as these 
could be put 
directly into a 
database
• Time and resource 
required to develop 
site and database 
design & 
administration
• Invites would need to 
be sent to targeted 
participants
• Easier to distribute 
but has to go to the 
right target 
audience
Table 4.8 A ssessm ent of Survey Delivery Mechanisms
(Adapted from Robson 2002, Hussey & Hussey 1997, Bryman & Bell 2003 and Gill & Johnson 2002)
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The decision was taken to carry out a web-based, self-completion survey. This 
method, although it seemed an appropriate method for a survey about IT being 
sent to IT professionals, was not without its strengths and potential weaknesses. 
Evans & Mathur (2005) provided a comprehensive summary of the strengths and 
potential weaknesses of online surveys, many of which were used as a guide when 
constructing the survey instrument. Granello & Wheaton (2004) also stated that 
although the idea of an online survey can be attractive in terms of reduced costs 
and ease of data entry, they could still suffer from measurement errors and low 
response rates like any other survey delivery mechanism.
All methods of distribution suffer the same problem of 'non-response' (Hussey &
Hussey 1998). Self-completion questionnaires can suffer from being incomplete,
something that can be avoided in a structured interview. (Gill & Johnson 2002)
However, Evans & Mathur (2005) stated that
"Online surveys can be constructed so that the respondent must answer a question 
before advancing to the next question or completing the survey." (p200)
This offset the problem of item non-response highlighted by Hussey & Hussey 
(1997).
Given the possibility of low response (Benamati & Rajkumar 2008), it was 
important to get the most appropriate person within the organisation to complete 
the survey. Targeting an individual leads to problems obtaining that individual's 
email address and then motivating the individual to complete the survey and not 
just delete the email. This approach also assumes that the individual targeted is the 
most appropriate person to complete the survey. Studies have shown that 
contacting a named individual resulted in a higher response rate than where the 
invitation to participate is sent to a generic contact or department (Lacity & 
Willcocks 2000).
Because surveys distributed to senior executives in organisations suffer from low 
response rates (Dillman 2007), a decision was taken by the researcher early on to 
ensure that the survey invitations where distributed to the most appropriate 
person. The size of the sample, however, provided a problem - one of the best
ways to maximise response was to target a particular individual within the 
organisation, the issue was how to target the right, named, individual. Various 
strategies were investigated to obtain email addresses, such as looking at annual 
reports, marketing databases etc., but it became clear that the fluid nature of the 
employment market meant that data on such sources became out of date very 
quickly for the size of survey sample proposed. With a sample size of around 1000, 
sending emails to a general organisation email address risked the email being 
treated as spam by an organisation's email filtering system or treated as spam by 
the recipient. Evans & Mathur (2005) noted that 76% of scanned email messages 
sent to US organisations were screened as spam by software provided by an 
internet security firm. The use of email to distribute invitations was therefore 
discounted.
Having discounted the use of email invitations, the only viable alternative was to
send the invitation by post. On this basis, a strategy proposed by Dillman (2007)
was adopted. As noted by Dillman (2007), specific tasks within an organisation are
often assigned to people with different job titles. Limiting the selection criteria to
'Head of IT', for example, may miss a number of potential respondents with
similar responsibilities but a different job title. A decision was taken to send a
personal invitation by post to the most senior IT person within the organisation,
and asked them to pass the invitation to the appropriate respondent if it was not
themselves. This strategy had the advantage of a respondent identification process
built into it (Dillman 2007). The issue at this stage was still to identify the most
senior possible IT respondent. In order to provide the most up to date list of
potential respondents, a decision was taken to purchase a list of IT users from
Computing using the Computing mi Users database.
"mi IT users data provides key named contacts (MD, FD, Head o f IT etc.) from 
major UK end-users of IT products and services. It is designed specifically for 
precision sales and marketing of IT products and services to end users. Company 
sites are profiled in great detail from the softzoare type used to the number of IT  
staff." (Computing MI, 2010a)
The individual records within the database are updated at least once a year, so the
data kept on an individual and organisation is only up to a year old. Given the
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fluidity of most organisations, this could be perceived as a risk in targeting the 
right person. However, this was accepted as the best compromise given time and 
cost constraints.
Other measures were taken to enhance the 'stature' of the survey request. Access 
to the survey was arranged via the Sheffield Hallam University website in order to 
increase legitimacy (Dillman 2007); the main issue was how to notify the 
respondent of the website address, along with a unique identifier (designed to 
avoid duplicate completions). This gave rise to a number of practical problems that 
needed to be resolved. The survey was hosted using a university account on 
Survey Monkey (www.surveymonkey.com). This had the significant advantage of 
being able to download the survey results in various forms, including as a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The invitation letter identified the link to the survey 
website at Sheffield Hallam University and explained that the survey was hosted 
on Survey Monkey. The web survey was password protected, with the password 
also included in the letter, along with a unique respondent key.
Finally, the use of the Computing mi data came with conditions of use. The 
purchase of the data allows the viewing of the records selected online. However, if 
the records need to be downloaded into an Excel spreadsheet for manipulation, it 
is necessary to purchase additional 'credits', i.e.
1 contact name, with job title 1 contact name, with job title
+ company name + company name
+ address + address
OR telephone number AND telephone number
Table 4.9 Computing mi Credits
Additionally,
"All doztmloads are for one time use only i.e. you may contact the person once by 
phone and once by mail only. All non-respondents from a campaign must be deleted 
from your database immediately." (Computing MI, 2010b)
Sufficient credit units were purchased to extract up to 1500 records under Option 
1. The limitation to note here was that potential respondents could only be
125
contacted once by mail, so there would be no opportunity to follow up non­
response.
Having set the selection criteria for suitable organisations to survey, the following 
criteria were used to select records from the Computing mi database;
• turnover > £100 million
• employees > 500
• organisations /  public sector
• organisations = UK
The extracted data from the Computing mi database was then scanned to remove 
duplicate entries for organisations, including those that had two or more
recipients, along with group companies and their subsidiaries. Those entries that 
did not have a contact name were also removed. From an original extract of 1137, 
794 survey invites were sent.
4.5.5 Survey Instrument Construction
Making decisions on the data to collect with the survey instrument was based on 
the objectives set for the survey phase of the research and revolved around five 
main areas; IT Sourcing activity, the decision making process, reasons for the 
decision, the service relationship with the vendor or in-house IT department and 
selected demographic data. These were then broken down into their constituent 
parts to form the basis for the questions themselves. Figure 4.4 represents the 
elements considered in scope for the survey.
Hussey & Hussey (1997), Robson (2002) and Sue & Ritter (2007) proposed a 
number of guidelines to be considered when constructing questions for a survey 
instrument, summarized in Table 4.10. These were referred to throughout the 
question creation process.
The survey used a number of approaches for obtaining data to answer the 
questions, keeping the completion of the questionnaire as simple as possible. Open 
and closed questions were used to facilitate responses, open questions particularly 
to extract a more personal response or opinion in specific areas (Hussey & Hussey 
1997). Bryman & Bell (2003) provide a useful classification of question types that
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can be applied within a self-completion questionnaire. For this survey, most of the 
question types highlighted were relevant, although most of the questions fell into 
the areas of informant factual questions and questions about attitudes and beliefs.
S  Keep questions simple 
C Do not use jargon or specialist language 
S  Phrase each question so that only one meaning is possible 
S  Avoid vague descriptive words such as ‘large’ or ‘small’
A Avoid asking negative questions 
A Only ask one question at a time 
S  Avoid leading questions
C Ask questions only where the respondent is likely to have the knowledge to answer 
S  When asking the frequency of an event, make sure the time frame is clear 
Table 4.10 Constructing Survey Questions - Guidelines
Interestingly, Bryman & Bell (2003) suggest that different formats for questions
about attitudes and beliefs, one the grounds that they sound similar. One of the
important issues about question types and the way questions are formed is that
poor question wording can lead to measurement error. Dillman et al (1999) defined
measurement error as,
"The result of inaccurate answers to questions that stem from poor question 
wording, poor interviewing, survey mode effects, and/or the answering behaviour 
of the respondent." (p2)
Changing the response format can benefit measurement validity, as this would
affect the answering behaviour of the respondent by differentiating between
questions about attitudes and beliefs.
One type of response used a rating scale to gauge opinion,
"The purpose of a rating scale is to allow respondents to express both the direction 
and strength of their opinion about a topic." (Garland 1991, pi)
One of the more frequently used rating scales is the Likert scale, an approach to 
attitude measurement, where labels are attached to each point on the scale 
(Bryman & Bell 2003). An alternative to a Likert scale is a scale where labels are not 
attached to each point, what Hussey & Hussey (1997) term as a "Rating scale using a 
continuum" (pl71). Hartley & Betts (2010) looked at the effects of changes in the
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order of verbal labels and numerical values on Likert-type scales and found that 
different labels and numeric orders led to different mean scores. Higher means 
scores were attributed to scales where the verbal labels and numeric values were 
related, i.e. clear=10, unclear=0 (Hartley & Betts 2010), noting that having the 
labels and values opposite to each other (i.e. clear=0) led to some confusion in 
respondents. These scales were used specifically for the SERVDYN instrument, 
where respondents were asked to select a value on an equidistant 7-point scale.
Multiple-choice answers were also used, albeit in a limited fashion. Although 
suitable when there are clear premeditated responses, the difficulty was to arrive 
at responses that mean something to the respondents and were unambiguous 
(Hussey & Hussey 1997).
The first section, the demographic data, was based on the selection criteria for the 
data from the Computing mi database. The scale groupings for each of the 
elements were the same as that used by Computing mi in order to maintain 
consistency.
Organisation Turnover 
IT Budget 
Total Employees 
IT Employees
2) IT Sourcing  Activity %  of IT subject to activity Functions in Scope
3) D ecision M aking P ro cess
Volume of Contract Review 
Idea to Review 
Final Decision
4) R e aso n s  for D ecision Im portance of Reasons Other Reasons
5) Serv ice  D ynam ics (SERVDYN)
Potential Quality 
Hard Process Quality 
Soft Process Quality 
Outcome Quality 
Trust
Figure 4.4 Survey Sections
For the second survey section, IT Sourcing Activity, the important data to collect
concerned the amount of IT that was subject to sourcing activity, and the areas that 
were in-scope. Lacity & Willcocks (1998) defined outsourcing activity as;
• Minimal (less than 20% of annual budget for IT)
• Selective (20 -  80% of annual budget for IT)
• Total (over 80% of IT annual budget)
This was used to classify the level of IT activity for outsourcing, switching vendors 
and backsourcing, and was adopted in subsequent research by Lee et al (2004).
The third survey section, covering the decision making process, looked at;
• Contract review -  did respondents review their outsourcing agreements & 
what action was taken as a result
• If there was an idea to review the organisation's IT sourcing arrangement, 
who was responsible for triggering the review process and who was 
responsible for the final decision.
The fourth survey section, looking at the reasons for a decision (be it stay, switch 
or back) concentrating on a number of statements given to the respondents, asking 
how strongly they rated the importance of the statement, ranging from not 
relevant to very important. These statements were taken from those identified as 
part of the literature review and have been summarised in the following tables;
• Reasons for outsourcing - Table 2.5
• Reasons for staying in-house -  Table 2.6
• Reasons for backsourcing -  Table 2.9
• Backsourcing risks -  Table 2.11
• Reasons for switching vendors -  Table 3.3
4.5.6 Investigating the Service Relationship
The final section of the survey was an instrument that was used in a number of 
places throughout the survey to gauge a respondent's view of their IT sourcing 
vendor. This was based on the INDSERV instrument framed by Gounaris (2005a) 
with a few modifications so that it was more appropriate to determine the 
effectiveness of an outsourcing relationship. Table 4.10 represents the elements and
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statements of the SERVDYN instrument.
Your outsourcing v en d o r ... Low — |— High
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Potential Quality Have required personnel □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Have required facilities □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Has required management philosophy □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Has a low personnel turnover □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Hard Process 
Quality
Stays in budgets □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Meets deadlines □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Looks at details □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Understands our needs □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Soft Process 
Quality
Accepts tasks enthusiastically □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Listens to our problems □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Open to suggestions/ideas □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Challenges if necessary □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Looks after our interests □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Outcome Quality Reaches objectives □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Has a notable effect □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Contributes to our sales/image □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Is creative □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Is consistent with our strategy □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Trust Have our best interests at heart □ □ □ □ □ □ □
No need to question their motives □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Important decisions are taken without us □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Job done right even without our input □ □ □ □ □ □ □
Table 4 .1 I The SERVDYN Instrument
It should be noted that some of the attributes had to be reworded slightly to 
remain in context with the area of the survey (in-house, outsourced etc.) they were 
embedded.
4.5.7 Data Analysis Methods
The survey instrument (Appendix 5) contained a mixture of question types that 
required analysis via different techniques. All data analysis was carried out using 
the spreadsheet software Microsoft Excel (Versions 2007 and 2010) and the 
statistical package SPSS (versions 18 and 19). Once the data had been entered, 
various types of analysis were completed to look for trends, relationships, variance 
between respondent groups, etc. However, a decision had to be made at the start
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of the data analysis; how to analyse the Likert scale data that played a prominent 
part of the data collection within the survey instrument.
When looking at the wide variety of statistical techniques available, techniques are 
classified into two main groups -  parametric and non-parametric (Pallant 2007). 
Parametric data analysis is generally considered appropriate when the data fulfils 
four assumptions; normally distributed data, homogeneity of variance, interval 
data and independence (Field 2005). Parametric testing is considered more 
powerful (Pallant 2007). It would therefore be the preference for parts of the 
survey data analysis where rating scales were used, specifically for SERVDYN. 
However, data from rating scales is generally considered as ordinal, non- 
parametric data and therefore limited to non-parametric statistical analysis (Field 
2005). Bryman & Cramer (2009) stated that rating scales could be treated as 
interval values where there are a number of alternatives, arguing that the points 
on the scale could be viewed as being equidistant. Thus, the data from rating scales 
can be subjected to parametric statistical analysis should they meet the other 
generally recognised conditions for parametric data (Bryman & Cramer 2009).
Two types of rating scale were used within the survey, a five-point scale and a 
seven-point scale. The five-point scale was used, where required, for all the 
questions in sections two, three and four of the survey. For some of these 
statements a 'not applicable7 response was appropriate. As such, the replies could 
be considered ordinal but were not equidistant (Bryman & Cramer 2009). The 
seven-point scale was used for the SERVDYN instrument. SERVDYN was used to 
gauge opinion on the service quality and relationship with the IT service provider, 
be it in-house, outsourced or backsourced. The SERVDYN Likert scales used in the 
survey were 7 point and labelled '1 -  Strongly Disagree' to 7 7 -  Strongly Agree' with 
numbers only labelling the outer points on the scale. This scale could be viewed as 
equidistant, interval data that could be rank ordered and was most likely to be 
suitable for parametric statistical analysis (Bryman & Cramer 2009). However, for 
the use of parametric statistics to be deemed as suitable, the four assumptions 
asserted by Field (2005) need to be tested for validity. This will be discussed
further in Chapter 6 - The Survey.
Section 1:
Section 2:
No Outsourcing Thank youBacksourcing Systems
Organisation
Outsourcing
Extent o f outsourcingExtent o f outsourcing 
Areas outsourced
□ Reasons for outsourcing
□ Changed any 
agreements___________
□ Extent of backsourcing
□ Areas backsourced 
Reasons for backsourcingReasons for outsourcing Changed any 
agreements
(on inhouse 
service)
SERVDYN 
(on the old 
Vendor)
(on existing 
vendor)
(on the old 
Vendor)
Switched
Figure 4.5 Survey Instrument Question Flow
Finally, the survey flow is depicted in Figure 4.5. This details the flow through the 
survey hosted on the website and was designed so that the sections completed by 
respondents were dictated by their responses. For example, if the response was 
that there had not been any outsourcing, the respondent was asked to complete 
Section 2 and was then taken to Section 6. 'Flow' questions were also used at the 
end of each section so that the next page was the most appropriate. For example, if 
the response was that they had not switched vendors this section was bypassed.
4.5.8 Determining Validity & Reliability - Piloting the Survey
The survey validity was verified in a number of ways. Firstly, the demographics 
were taken directly from the classifications used by the data providers (Computing 
mi). The reasons for staying in-house, with a vendor, switching vendors or 
backsourcing were all extracted from literature and the tables and sources are 
highlighted in Section 4.5.5.
The final, completed, survey (including the SERVDYN instrument) was created on
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the SurveyMonkey website and eight individuals were asked to complete the 
survey as they wished and provide feedback. Five of the individuals worked for 
the same organisation as the researcher and three worked for a third party. All 
were asked to provide feedback on:
• Question phrasing and logic
• Flow and general ease of use
• Length of time to complete
Having received feedback and made alterations, the same individuals were asked 
to complete the survey again to ensure the changes made had not adversely 
affected the survey instrument.
A review of the survey validity and reliability is documented in Section 7.6.3/7.6.4.
4.6 Summary
Given the research objectives set at the start of this chapter, the research needs to 
be conducted in two phases - a combination of exploratory and descriptive 
research. Ericson (2001) and Jarrett (1996) both used semi-structured interviews as 
the basis for the exploratory stage of their research. The same approach was 
adopted for this research. A survey was designed around the information gained 
during the semi-structured interviews. This was a descriptive survey, as defined 
by Gill & Johnson (2002), designed to ascertain attitudes towards the subject 
matter.
The idea of semi-structured interviews followed by a survey, used by Jarrett 
(1996), allowed the information gathered in the interviews to be analysed for 
emergent themes and used together with the literature review to design a survey 
questionnaire to quantify the findings. The following two chapters detail the 
results of the empirical research; firstly the Case Study in Chapter 5 and the Survey 
in Chapter 6.
5 The Case Study
This Chapter analysis and presents the findings of the data collected during the Case 
Study phase of the research in light of the literature review, to build up the body of 
knowledge. The purpose of the case study was to build a "working definition" of IT 
Backsourcing from the point of view of the case study organisation
5.1 Case Study Objectives
The case study formed the first primary research phase of the overall research 
strategy. What became clear from the literature is that the lack of coverage of 
backsourcing within academic work leaves a number of unanswered questions, 
such as why take IT back in-house, what are the benefits and risks and so on. It 
appeared that primary research in the area of backsourcing was the only way to 
advance knowledge in terms of the key strategic and decision-making factors. To 
facilitate this, a case study was carried out in the area of IT Backsourcing.
For the purpose of the case study, specific objectives were proposed as a result of 
the original research objectives and the gaps in literature apparent for 
backsourcing. These can be found in Table 2.12.
5.1.1 Case Study Analysis - Setting the Scene
Van Maanen (1979) argues that the understanding of a phenomenon is enhanced 
by a description of the context in which the research took place; it is therefore 
prudent to outline the historical context of the organisation in which the research 
was undertaken. ClientCo is a large UK based organisation employing more than 
150,000 people in UK wide locations. ClientCo, in the late 1990's, perceived a 
problem with business performance and believed that IT services was acting as a 
drag on the rest of the business and had to be addressed for the organisation to 
move forward. An agreement was made with VendorCo to address this perceived 
weakness in what was later to be described as a Transformational Outsourcing
agreement. The IT services of ClientCo were outsourced to VendorCo in 
November 2000. The initial contract was for seven years, extended in August 2004 
for a further three years, ten years in total. The whole IT function was handed over 
in what is considered a Total outsourcing' contract i.e. greater that 80% of the total 
IT budget (Lacity & Willcocks 1998). In October 2005, ClientCo announced that it 
was going to terminate the outsourcing contract with VendorCo, and would bring 
the IT function back in-house. The parties, at an individual and organizational 
level, cannot be identified. Pseudonyms will therefore be used. This is justified on 
commercial grounds, as any research results, be the outcome positive or negative, 
could affect the organisations concerned. The topic is therefore deemed 
controversial (Yin 2003).
This research was carried out as a single case study within the research domain 
described above. This stage of the research could be seen as a cross-sectional study 
-  it was a snapshot of an on-going situation taken over a short period of time 
(Hussey & Hussey 1997) and completed around one year after IT had been 
transitioned back in-house.
Easterby-Smith et al (2002) argue for an opportunistic approach when considering 
gaining access to organisation for research purposes. This approach was taken as 
the researcher worked within ClientCo and had worked for VendorCo prior to the 
backsourcing decision. Formal access had been granted within the IT Division of 
ClientCo by the Head of IT. Co-operation had been guaranteed through this 
authority, although the practicalities of such a 'guarantee' have to be seen in terms 
of any perceived advantage gained by the granting organisation. Negotiated 
access to the organisation simply involved contacting the right people for 
authorisation (Hussey & Hussey 1997). Easterby-Smith et al (2002) talk of the 
principle of reciprocity - where the organisation giving access may want 
something in return. In this case, the main sponsor in the organisation asked for a 
copy of the work generated from the research.
Permission for the study within the organisation was sought from the IT Director 
and the Head of IT Operations. This took the form of an initial discussion followed
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by the publication of a PhD Executive Guide (Appendix 2) to both. After 
discussions over anonymity and the way the data could be used, permission was 
given to commence with the research and publish findings, provided the 
organisation could not be identified.
The analysis of the results from the primary research had to be completed in light 
of the four research questions proposed earlier. Before these questions can be 
reviewed, the responses in the areas covered by the case study research need to be 
evaluated in detail. The Interview Guide (Appendix 3) broke the semi-structured 
interview into four areas - decision, transition, operation and a final general 
section.
Before commencing with the interview plan, introductory questions were asked 
about their role within the organisation and whether they had read the Research 
Briefing (Appendix 2). This had been sent as part of the official email invitation. 
The latter was deemed important, as it dictated whether the researcher needed to 
summarize the purpose of the research at the start of the interview. All but one 
had read the Research Briefing. Before starting the recording device, all 
interviewees were asked for permission to do so, explaining that it enhanced the 
listening process (i.e. not having to concentrate on taking notes while they were 
speaking). At the time of the interview, the researcher felt it improved the data 
collection process by making the interview process more 'natural7. In the following 
analysis, specific comments made by a particular interviewee are notified by the 
abbreviation IN TI, INT2 etc. Additionally, the minutes of the Employee 
Consultation Forum have been referred to, with 13 meetings in total. These are 
notified by the abbreviation ECFM1, ECFM2 etc., but cannot be fully referenced in 
the References section due to the confidential nature of the material.
As indicated in a previous chapter, the interviewees represented the views of two 
groups within ClientCo. The first group was part of the backsourcing team in 
ClientCo (referred to as the ClientCo Project Group or CPG), with the second 
group being those that had been part of the original outsourcing process and had 
then transitioned from VendorCo to ClientCo (referred to as the VendorCo Senior
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Management Group or VSMG).
5.2 The Decision
The first part of the interview specifically focused on the rationale for reviewing 
the outsourcing agreement, the decision making process and the options 
considered as a part of the process.
5.2.1 Reasons and Benefits
Interviewees were asked what they thought were the reasons for backsourcing. 
Three reasons in particular came through very clearly; strategic change cost and 
control.
5.2.1.1 Strategic Change
Firstly, strategy seemed to be one of the main drivers for change and the 
backsourcing decision, on a number of levels. The theme here was that the 
business was going through a significant business change in the shape of a 
recovery programme (INTI, INT2). It was seen that the organisation had 'Tost its 
way" and that IT had too (INT2). This was associated with a change in the 
perception of IT; it was seen as strategic and crucial to improving the 
organisation's performance (INTI, INT2, INT5). This seems to concur with the 
findings of others (Whitten & Leidner, 2006 and McLaughlin & Peppard, 2006) that 
IT had shifted in perception from commodity to strategic. It may also explain why, 
when looking at alternatives (discussed in more detail shortly), switching vendors 
was dismissed as being too similar.
The decision to backsource IT was seen as the right decision by the business 
(INT6), probably in part due to the backing it received from the CEO (INT5). The 
driver for strategic change seemed to be a 'reconstruction' as defined by Scholes et 
al (2011), often associated with a 'turnaround' situation where there are major 
structural changes or a major cost-cutting programme. This seemed to encapsulate 
the recovery programme undertaken by ClientCo initially, but the extent of the 
strategic change goes beyond this, additionally involving a cultural change. This 
made the strategic change required 'revolutionary', with the requirement to reverse
a relative decline in the market (Scholes et al 2011). Such a situation is ironic, given 
that IT was seen as one of the reasons for a decline and given as a justification for 
outsourcing originally (INT2).
5.2.1.2 Control
Control was also seen as a key issue, typified by the statement
"The ability to own the picture, as opposed to anyone else deciding what the picture looked 
like, in terms of how IT was run, executed and operated." (INTI)
The issue was perceived as being whether VendorCo was making the best 
decisions, in terms of IT, on behalf of ClientCo. Because the agreement was total 
outsourcing, VendorCo negotiated all third party contracts for IT on ClientCo's 
behalf. It was suggested by (INTI) that ClientCo could not make a judgement on 
the appropriateness of those decisions because there was no information from 
VendorCo on such matters and, as a result, ClientCo were unable to set the 
direction for IT. Effectively ClientCo requested a solution to a business problem 
and VendorCo provided the IT solution (INT2, INT6). It was argued that 
VendorCo operated a complex model (INT4, INT5), much of which could not be 
seen by ClientCo (INTI, INT2, INT3).
Shepherd (1999) found that strategic control for the client was important when 
considering changes in IT. Without this control, it was maintained that the vendor 
might make decisions that could inhibit the future ability of the Client to 
accommodate future business and technology change (Shepherd 1999). Shepherd 
(1999) believed that the balance between strategic control and stopping the vendor 
from introducing IT change that forced business change was a delicate one. For 
ClientCo, it was clear that the necessary controls were not put in place from the 
beginning of the agreement, but was introduced around 3 years into the agreement 
(INT6). Barthelemy (2003) stated that
..it is crucial to retain a small group of managers to manage the vendor." (p92) 
It would seem for ClientCo that the necessary strategic control was introduced a 
little late, because
"What you get is a set of IT professionals (i.e. VendorCo) making judgements on 
the business. And you can have conflicting objectives there, like what a fantastic 
opportunity to test out new technologies, new ideas, because "Hey, it's not our risk,
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it's their risk". I'm  not saying VendorCo set out to do this, but what a fantastic 
opportunity." (INT2)
An interviewee (INT2) made an interesting point when talking about the origins of 
the relationship between ClientCo and VendorCo. The view was that executives 
within ClientCo essentially abdicated responsibility to VendorCo. Bandyopadhyay 
& Pathak (2007)
"The analysis shows that when the degree of complementarity o f knowledge 
between the employees is high enough, better payoffs can be achieved if  the top 
management enforces cooperation between the employees. In these situations, the 
involvement of the top management extends far beyond negotiating the contract to 
make the outsourcing successful." (p349)
In contrast to Bandyopadhyay & Pathak (2007), the lack of involvement from the
top management in ClientCo after the outsourcing process was completed led to a
lack of control of the outsourcing contract itself (INT2).
A lack of control and the frustration this caused within ClientCo could also be 
illustrated by the way the performance of VendorCo was monitored and 
measured. This revolved around the perception of service quality -  driven by 
SLAs that were not relevant for the business. A service availability of 98%, as laid 
down in the contract, may have been met, but 2% unavailability could mean major 
operational problems within the business (INTI). The perception was that 
VendorCo was 'hiding7 behind the SLAs even when it may have been possible to 
improve service quality overall. INT4, for example, expressed the view that 
ClientCo were frustrated that there was little in the way of performance 
information over and above those required within the Service Level Agreement.
This idea of measurement of the agreement can be extended further, and goes 
some way to explaining the frustrations of ClientCo. Tiernan & Peppard (2004) 
make a valid point when reviewing business benefits and IT spend. They 
maintained that a benefits plan should be created so that a link is made between 
the IT spend, the business spend, and the business benefit predicted at the 
beginning of the project. They go on to argue that the benefits only accrue after the 
IT implementation and once these new levels of sales and costs become business as 
usual. The costs of the new IT system would not register as bringing the business
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benefits but would just be seen as an IT cost to be attacked. More importantly, 
there is often a disconnect with the business if the business benefit did not 
materialise. The key here, that Tiernan & Peppard (2004) advocate, is the business 
function should be accountable for the IT expenditure made on their behalf, 
specifically for the business benefit (also known as the Value add') that should 
accrue. For ClientCo, during outsourcing, there were two figures to consider in 
terms of IT spend; a fixed annual fee for systems support and maintenance 
(operations expenditure) and costs for each project undertaken. Because the annual 
cost & the cost of implementing each project could not be easily reconciled year on 
year by ClientCo (INT2), it was not possible to work out the Value add' to 
compare against the business benefit. This lack of transparency in terms of vendor 
pricing and cost structure is not uncommon (Deloitte 2005). Did this lack of 
transparency mean that ClientCo saw 'one big figure' and perceived it as a cost to 
be attacked? Perhaps, as the CEO's perception was that IT using VendorCo was 
not providing value for money (INTI, INT2).
The structure of the outsourcing agreement and the charging model led to another 
cause of frustration. A number of interviewees (INTI, INT2, INT4) stated that the 
original outsourcing agreement was not a typical one. IT was handed in its entirety 
to VendorCo to manage and improve service and quality. IN TI went further, 
stating that it was not a true outsourcing agreement because of this, but that a 
complication had been introduced with infrastructure assets owned jointly by 
ClientCo and VendorCo. Generally, with many different types of outsourcing 
agreement, such assets are owed by either party, not usually both. According to 
Gurbaxani (2005), the vendor often owns the necessary infrastructure on which to 
provide the outsourcing service, in many cases incurring considerable cost in 
advance to do so. Such an investment leads to transaction costs that have to be 
recouped over the life of the outsourcing contract (Aubert et al 2004, Lee et al 
2004). In this case, however, VendorCo did not have to purchase infrastructure in 
advance, it was already in existence and was handed over to VendorCo to manage.
5.2.1.3 Cost Savings
Finally, looking at cost issues, the mantra that came across from the interviewees 
that were part of the ClientCo Project Group was "Fit for purpose, value for money." 
(INTI) Cost savings were seen as the main driver for the decision to backsource IT 
(INTI, TNT2, INT4, INT5, INT6).
The cost savings articulated by the interviewees can be broadly divided into two 
distinct groups; those attributed to the cost of doing business with VendorCo and 
those savings that were anticipated as a result of re-negotiating contracts held by 
VendorCo as part of the outsourcing agreement, i.e. economies of scale that 
ClientCo alone could not achieve. However, the cost of doing business with 
VendorCo through the outsourcing agreement was perceived as being excessive. 
This had shown itself in a number of ways. One of the original objectives of the 
agreement was for VendorCo to replace existing legacy systems (INTI, INT6), for 
this service ClientCo were paying what was seen as a premium rate (INT3). This 
lead to a number of issues that built up as the agreement progressed over time. For 
example, the original contract laid out a number or systems to be replatformed in 
the first two years at an agreed cost (INTI, INT2).
New projects after the agreed two years of work were seen as expensive (INT4) 
and, as a result, ClientCo as a business could not do everything that was planned 
(INT6). This resulted in VendorCo not being asked to do something because of the 
cost involved, leading requests building up that held back business change and 
innovation (INT4, INT6). Where a vendor is seen as expensive, the client 
sometimes has the option to seek an alternate supplier. This was not an option for 
ClientCo, as an exclusivity clause had been built into the outsourcing agreement 
that meant that VendorCo had to be used for all IT requirements (INT2, INT4).
Finally, the outsourcing contract had been drafted in such a way that VendorCo 
could apply their margin (an agreed fixed percentage) on top of whatever a third 
party changed for services, this increased the cost for everything that VendorCo 
supplied to ClientCo (INT4). Given that VendorCo negotiated these third party 
contracts (for such things as telecoms, equipment, software purchase &
maintenance costs etc.) and then applied a fixed margin in addition, a potential 
conflict of interest is palpable. It was not in VendorCo's best interests to reduce 
these third party costs as this would also reduce their own income (INT2, INT4). 
Thus, the decision to backsource immediately produced cost savings by removing 
the VendorCo margin (INT2, INT4).
ClientCo believed that savings could be made post transition by re-negotiating 
third party contracts directly, based on the suspicion that VendorCo did not make 
any real attempt to reduce these costs (INTI, INT2). This desire to re-negotiate 
these contracts was driven by the fact that ClientCo became aware that a number 
of these contracts were due for renewal (INT5).
Whitten & Leidner (2006) found that those that switched vendors or backsourced 
perceived the costs of doing so were roughly the same. They went on to speculate 
that the lower cost expectations of those that backsourced for set-up costs may be 
due to a lower product and service expectation on the part of users. The 
implication is that organisations backsource because of poor product and service 
quality (Whitten & Leidner 2006), a perception that will be discussed further in the 
Survey chapter. However, poor service quality provision from VendorCo was not 
an issue for ClientCo (INT4, INT5). As service continuity, and service quality by 
association, was considered as one of the critical success factors, it would seem that 
the higher switching costs associated with maintaining a higher service quality did 
not deter the backsourcing decision.
The net result of the decision to backsource was that ClientCo calculated that the 
payback period (PBP) for the backsourcing project was 2 years (INT2). Verhoef 
(2005a) defined the payback period as
"...the time it takes for an investment to become cashflozv positive." (p330) 
Payback periods vary from project to project and the acceptability of the PBP is a 
judgement of the organisation. Scholes et al (2011) stated that PBP is a simple 
measurement often used when it is difficult to forecast accurately, implying that 
the risk of the project is also high. A payback period of 2 years was acceptable to 
ClientCo (INTI), seeming to implicitly acknowledge that the risk of the project was
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high by using the payback period as the measure of success.
"There are not many projects you do where you can realise the benefits within two 
years. The cost savings we could achieve by bringing IT in-house, cutting out the 
VendorCo margin, then go directly with the third parties we were ivorking with 
VendorCo with the mark-up on etc. etc. and paying VendorCo all the exit costs, we 
could write off in two years. So, that was pretty much a no brainer." (INT2)
Finally, the cost of backsourcing was reduced because of the way the original 
outsourcing agreement was structured. The ownership and control of specific 
assets has already been discussed, what reduced the costs of backsourcing for 
ClientCo was the fact that VendorCo kept the ClientCo's IT as an autonomous unit 
(INT5, INT6). No attempt was made by VendorCo to amalgamate ClientCo's IT 
into the rest of its business. However, the structure of asset ownership discussed 
earlier, where ClientCo half-owned and then fully owned the IT infrastructure; 
offset a number of the disadvantages associated with outsourcing. The first of 
these is often when the vendor obtains control of the IT assets they can be used for 
the benefit of other vendor clients (DiRomualdo & Gurbaxani 1998) or data centre 
consolidation is carried out (Lacity et al 1996). These represent two ways in which 
a vendor can obtain economies of scale to reduce transaction costs. Moreover, such 
commercial leveraging includes people, systems and technology. The difficulty for 
an organisation wishing to backsource after a vendor has carried out such an 
exercise is working out what assets are in scope for the move back to the client. 
One example could be a specialist worker on a client's systems would not be in 
scope to transfer back to the client unless they are 'assigned' to ClientCo under the 
'Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006', where an 
employee
".. .is 'assigned' i f  they are part of the organisational framework of the transferring 
service." (TUPE 2011)
Although there have been a number of UK Employment Tribunal decisions that 
tighten this definition, the distinction between who is and is not in scope for 
transfer is an area covered in greater detail in a following section.
Putting aside until later in this chapter the complications of the issues around 
employees 'in scope' of transfer, the perception of ClientCo was that it was . .easy 
to bring it back" (INTI).
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"You could still describe the ClientCo entity, so actually, given the culture o f the 
company, and the fact that we had a very defined model, the simple way was just to 
take it back, just take control of it." (INT2)
5.2.2 The Decision Makers
The trigger for the review of the outsourcing agreement appears to have been 
provided by the new Chief Executive Officer (CEO). A management consultancy 
were engaged by the CEO to look at the outsourcing agreement, with the final 
report being delivered some 15 months before the outsourcing agreement was 
terminated (INT2). The engagement of a consultancy to review IT was completed 
as part of a wider review of the whole organisation, such a review of IT can often 
being associated with a change of CEO, leading to a decision to reconsider the 
value of the outsourcing contract (McLaughlin & Peppard 2006).
The view from that report, from the CEO's perspective, was that the outsourcing 
agreement with VendorCo was not in the best interests of ClientCo during the 
recovery programme. The recovery programme was a result of strategic change 
introduced throughout the organisation (INT2) and it was therefore deemed 
"culturally right" to take the decision to backsource as part of a desire to take 
control at all levels within the organisation (INT6).
It was felt by VendorCo that the decision to backsource had been made by the 
CEO prior to the commencement of re-negotiations with VendorCo (INT5) with 
the impression that the decision was made and that the discussion was "for 
politeness" (INT5). Fan (2000) looked at the decision process for outsourcing and 
found that the decision was often made early in the process and that the business 
case was made to endorse the decision. It would seem that what applies for 
outsourcing also applied for backsourcing. In the case of ClientCo, the CEO made 
the decision early, the rest, as they say, is history.
One outcome of the management consultancy report was that, having decided to 
take action, the CEO replaced the IT Director, who was seen as being "too close" 
(INT6) to the outsourcing agreement and required a "new face" (INT6) if the 
relationship with VendorCo was to change. Earl & Feeny (1994) noted a similar
situation where
"Faced with the need to make radical changes in the company's culture, business 
processes, and cost structure, the CEO recognised IT's enabling potential. He 
recruited a CIO who accepted responsibility to rapidly deliver a new set of systems 
to underpin a new way of doing business." (pl2)
The replacement IT Director was seen as someone with a history of backsourcing, 
so it seemed clear the path chosen by the CEO from the outset (INT4).
So, were any other courses of action considered? The interviewees indicated that 
other than bringing IT back in-house a number of other courses were considered, 
such as re-negotiating the deal (INTI, INT3). Renegotiation did take place over a 
period of three months prior to the decision to backsource, with the possibility of 
offshoring some of the IT function to reduce costs (INT2) proposed by VendorCo. 
Offshoring was discounted because it would have left ClientCo in the same 
position from a strategic perspective (INTI, INT2).
Moving to another supplier (INT2) was another option looked at briefly (INT2). 
This was discounted as being "more of the same" (INT2), as was the idea to break the 
outsourcing agreement into smaller pieces (INT2, INT5). This did not fit with the 
overarching strategic change within the organisation and the primacy of regaining 
control in all areas of the organisation (INT6).
One of the major considerations during the decision process was driven by the 
nature of the agreement between ClientCo & VendorCo. The view of this was that 
it did not represent a standard outsourcing agreement. VendorCo had actually 
been contracted to manage the whole of ClientCo's IT services as a complete unit 
(INT2, INT6) and it was therefore easier to consider bringing the whole IT division 
back in-house.
"VendorCo made no attempt to make any synergies by combining ClientCo's 
operations with other VendorCo owned operations." (INT6)
In fact, it was stated that backsourcing was only considered possible because the 
VendorCo IT for ClientCo was a self-contained, well-defined unit (INTI). This 
comes back to the issues of ownership and control of assets mentioned earlier, 
along with the idea of extending the organisational boundary (Quelin & Duhamel
2003). However, because the IT organisational boundary was clearly defined, the 
entity to backsource was clear (.INT2).
As an illustration of how seriously other alternatives were considered, INTI stated 
that ClientCo had "never got to a benchmarking exercise" for any option other than 
backsourcing
5.2.3 Considering and Mitigating Risk
ClientCo recognised three critical success factors for the backsourcing project from 
its inception; continuity of service, maximise staff retention and successful contract 
novation. The first two, continuity of service and staff retention, are inexorably 
linked
"...backsourcing can be problematic, especially when a firm transfers highly 
customized IT equipment, personnel, or functions to outsourcing vendors. In such 
cases, the firm may be unable to quickly replace the unique resources and thus may 
become completely dependent upon its vendors." (Hall & Leidtka 2005, p99)
The main risk identified by all interviewees revolved around continuity of service 
to the business. The main objective that became apparent was the desire for the 
business not to see any change between the outsourced and backsourced IT 
service, that the service provided to the business after transition was the same as, 
or better than, the service provided under the outsourcing agreement (INT4). This 
was measured by the number of critical problems encountered during the period 
after the transition (INT2). Terminating the contract part way through was seen as 
a major risk, so the transfer from VendorCo with no service impact to the business 
was seen as one of the critical success factors (INTI, INT2, INT4, INT5).
One of the main contributing factors to the risk of disruption to the service was 
identified as possible loss of staff and technical expertise because of backsourcing. 
One interviewee stated that
"... we didn't know how many staff would turn up for work on Day 1." (INTI) 
The reason for this is that although the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations mentioned earlier protects the rights of employees, 
employees can terminate their employment by not attending work on the first day
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of being transferred to the new organisation. The difficulty for the new 
organisation is that they do not have to be informed in advance; non-transfer is 
considered a termination (Lewis 2005).
Brooks (2006), when looking at the factors influencing staff attitude, concluded
that outsourcing can have a negative influence on turnover intention. Brooks
(2006) talked about a concept of 'job embeddedness', the idea that an individual
perceives the way they and their job fits within an organisation. Any change in this
perception increases the likelihood of that individual voluntarily moving to
another job, i.e. their turnover intention (Brooks 2006). Outsourcing was seen as
one aspect that could lead to an individual increase their turnover intention,
depending on how the outsourcing process was managed. In the case of
backsourcing, it would seem this also applies. Gaertner & Nollen (1989) were more
specific, finding that an employee's psychological commitment to an organisation
".. .is higher among employees who believe they are being treated as resources to be 
developed rather than commodities to buy and sell." (p987)
It would seem that in the case of both outsourcing and backsourcing, an
employee's psychological commitment could be influenced. For outsourcing, the
influence could be perceived as negative, concurring with Brooks (2006) assertion
that outsourcing increases turnover intention. For backsourcing, however, it
would seem that the influence is not so clear. Within the case study, the efforts of
ClientCo to encourage staff to transfer back to the organisation could be perceived
as a desire to retain and develop staff.
Knowledge management and the retention of essential knowledge workers was 
identified as a key risk of backsourcing, given that the majority of those moving 
back in-house had been outsourced by ClientCo previously. One interviewee 
stated
"The other risks around that were that the people, the expertise, would not wish to 
backsource again. They'd been outsourced and were now being backsourced again 
and would want to stay with VendorCo or not come back to ClientCo or lost faith 
or trust with ClientCo, so there was a big issue around the colleagues retaining 
their good will because we had to keep the operations running so had to keep the 
faith of the existing teams." (INT6)
The idea that staff might suffer from sort of fatigue as a result of being outsourced
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and then backsourced, with a reluctance to return to the original organisation was 
termed as the 'Whiplash effect' by Overby (2005). This 'Whiplash effect' further 
complicates any attempt made to retain staff, illustrated by INT4 who stated that a 
number of staff were "cheesed off" with the prospect of being backsourced to 
ClientCo.
Another area that was considered a risk as part of the process was that of
unexpected costs during the process. For example, because of lack of expertise
with backsourcing. Bahli & Rivard (2003) highlighted this issue for outsourcing
and it was certainly a consideration for ClientCo, although this was mitigated by
the engagement of a consultancy,
"A third -party consultancy who were specialists that had done backsourcing before 
and who's advice was sought on the direction to go in." (.INT6)
The final critical success factor was seen as the contract negotiations with third 
party suppliers. The transfer of these contracts from VendorCo to ClientCo was 
perceived as a key activity - unsuccessful contract novation could lead to ClientCo 
being the subject of legal action by suppliers (INT5, INT6).
Risk mitigation was seen as a key concept throughout the backsourcing process 
and, specifically, during the Transition phase. Plans were put in place to mitigate 
the risks identified as part of the decision process although, as became clear, the 
extent of some of the risks were not apparent at the start of the process and only 
became visible during the transition (INT2).
5.3 The Backsourcing Transition
This section of the interview process dealt with the transition phase of the 
backsourcing process and concentrated on the activities carried out and the 
resultant issues - anticipated and unforeseen.
The backsourcing transition was highlighted by three key elements: the 
ClientCo/VendorCo relationship, staff transition and on-going activities that had 
to continue regardless of the transition. Before these elements can be explored in 
more detail, it is important to look at the setting in which the transition process
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was played out.
5.3.1 Setting the Scene
The transition process for ClientCo was driven by the critical success factors 
identified and articulated in an earlier section, and acted as a focus for the 
activities carried out by ClientCo's backsourcing project team (INTI, INT6). It was 
necessary to carry out adaptations and changes in approach during the transition 
because of the issues that arose during the transition itself (INT3, INT4, INT5).
From the point of the decision announcement, ClientCo stipulated a strict 
timetable for the transition, setting a fixed handover date (INTI). The transition 
itself did not get off to the best of starts due to the way the agreement termination 
was handled (INT2). Throughout the re-negotiation process VendorCo did not 
believe that ClientCo would terminate the agreement (INT5) and judged that 
ClientCo were not capable of backsourcing (INT2, INT5). Observations were made 
by the interviewees that VendorCo were complacent (INT4, INT5, INT6), to the 
extent that they were shocked when ClientCo announced the decision to 
backsource IT, and maintained that the decision would be reversed when the size 
of the task eventually 'hit home' (INT2). Even during the transition VendorCo 
believed that ClientCo were not capable of completing the backsourcing process, 
with INT2 stating that VendorCo appeared arrogant, believing that only they 
could operate ClientCo's IT. Perhaps this is a manifestation of what VendorCo 
believed was their level of power over ClientCo. However, it was also stated that 
VendorCo ultimately did not want the backsourcing process to fail, simply because 
such a situation could potentially damage their brand image (INT5).
The deterioration of the relationship led to a number of issues that were to shape 
events for the first three of the six-month transition period, the main one of which 
was the complete collapse of the relationship between ClientCo and VendorCo.
5.3.2 The Failed Relationship
Once the decision to backsource had been announced, the first order of business 
was to agree an exit plan between the two parties, built from the exit strategy
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outlined in the contract agreement. Such an exit strategy is considered important 
when an outsourcing contract is drawn up (Barthelemy 2003, Juras 2007, 
Gottschalk & Solli-Saether 2005). Lewis and Welterveden (2003) state that any 
outsourcing agreement should contain exit provisions with an obligation on the 
part of the supplier to ensure that there is a smooth transition of the services, either 
back in house to the client or to a third party provider, with minimum disruption 
to the business. This was discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. During a survey by 
Deloitte (2005), one of the respondents stated
"Now that we are bringing the function back in-house, we are dependent on vendor 
cooperation to transfer the knowledge." (plO)
This suggestion that the client is dependent on vendor cooperation was a major 
issue throughout the transition. Although an exit strategy was built into the 
original outsourcing contract, negotiations were complicated by two factors - the 
ambiguity of the exit strategy clauses and the reason for termination, i.e. Tor 
convenience' (INT2). The latter meant that a protracted period of time (3 months) 
was spent on negotiating termination conditions including compensation to 
VendorCo (INT2) and the Transition Plan was signed off by both sides only a 
month or so prior to the completion of transition (ECFM11). It was noted that these 
negotiations became somewhat heated, to the point where all meetings between 
the two parties included lawyers (INT2) and that the relations between the parties 
were at their lowest ever during transition (INTI). The fallout from this was 
articulated as problems in a number of areas, with VendorCo exhibiting 
opportunistic behaviour. Clemons & Hitt (2004) identified three types of 
opportunistic behaviour, the most notable exhibited by VendorCo being an abuse 
of power. This was demonstrated during transition by VendorCo denying access 
to IT staff (INT3). After negotiation, VendorCo allowed ClientCo to carry out 
Technical interviews' but only with a senior manager from VendorCo present 
(INT2, INT3).
Amid the animosity within the relationship, ClientCo drew up contingency plans
"We had a contingency plan that basically said that we'll do it next week... just do 
it, cut and run. That way you stop VendorCo from being able to put obstacles in 
place. So basically as long as we have gone through the right notice period as set by
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TUPE so we had the date set and we could essentially say, well we are going to do 
it. Cut the crap, cut the conversations." (INT2)
This statement alone seems to summarize the extent to which the relationship had 
broken down.
5.3.3 Staff Transition
Staff transition consumed a major amount of effort during the transition phase 
(INT3) and concentrated on one of the critical success factors identified earlier, that 
of maximising staff retention. The objective for ClientCo was to transfer as many 
staff as was possible. It also proved to be one of the major areas of conflict between 
ClientCo and VendorCo.
VendorCo refused to grant ClientCo access to the employment records of current 
staff, stating that it was their job to manage those staff until handover (INT2, 
INT3).
"We couldn't go and engage with colleagues directly because VendorCo said that 
until the day they came over they are ours so keep your hands off." (INT2)
This stance differs significantly from an outsourcing transition. In this case, the 
client wishes to maximise staff transfer to the vendor to ensure a smooth service 
transition. Gottschalk & Solli-Saether (2005) stated that the exit strategy should 
contain a section on the access allowed to staff. It is not known if such a section 
existed but if absent, may explain a number of the problems faced by ClientCo 
during transition. As a compromise, VendorCo did agree to provide a list of names 
and job titles on a regular basis (INTI). However, these lists were provided in 
different formats and layouts each time they were supplied making it difficult for 
ClientCo to make accurate comparisons to gauge changes (INT3).
It also became clear that VendorCo were, as one interviewee put it (INT6), playing
'fast and loose7 with staff supposedly covered by TUPE regulations, with those
that should have been covered by TUPE provision changing on a weekly basis
(INT3). It is important, at this stage, to clarify the meaning of TUPE within United
Kingdom legislation,
"The purpose of TUPE is to protect employees if  the business in which they are 
employed changes hands. Its effect is to move employees and any liabilities
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associated with them from the old employer to the new employer by operation of 
law." (OUTLAW.COM 2011)
An employee is considered in scope of TUPE if they are assigned to the service
being transferred,
"An employee is 'assigned' i f  they are part of the organisational framework of the 
transferring service. It is not sufficient that the employee works part of the time for 
the service." (TUPE 2011)
However, VendorCo reserved the right to 'poach7 whoever they wanted (INTI), 
even when it was agreed that certain individuals would transfer (INT2). There was 
nothing ClientCo felt they could do to stop this predatory behaviour (INT2), 
eventually taking the view that if individuals wished to stay with VendorCo they 
could not be forced to transfer whether or not they were in scope as far as TUPE 
was concerned (INT3).
Action was taken to minimise the risk of losing staff, the main one of which was to
offer ClientCo Terms & Conditions of Employment from the date of transfer.
TUPE requires that any transferee be subject to the same Terms & Conditions in
the new organisation as they had in the old. This can lead to difficulties when
trying to harmonise these Terms & Conditions (TUPE 2011). ClientCo therefore
proposed a Compromise Agreement to be signed by transferees (INT3)
"A Compromise Agreement is a legally binding agreement following the 
termination of your employment. It usually provides for a severance payment by 
your employer, in return for which you warrant not to pursue any claim you may 
have to an employment tribunal." (Compromise Agreements 2011)
Why did ClientCo take this action? Firstly, TUPE (2006) states that the Terms &
Conditions under which a transfer takes place cannot be varied for a year, so the
Compromise Agreement was a way of 'terminating7 the old Terms and
transferring staff on 'better7 terms aligned to ClientCo's own Terms & Conditions
of Employment (INT3). Secondly, it was perceived by ClientCo as a way of
showing the potential transferees that they were deemed important
"And because we felt that we were potentially at risk with all the flak that was 
going on that what we would do is go out o f our way to show our commitment, you 
know, that we were serious about the thing. So we offered ClientCo's terms and 
conditions and that took a hell of a lot of effort because TUPE is quite well laid out, 
i.e. this is what you can have." (INT2)
This could be considered as a measure to minimise the turnover intention of staff
(Brooks 2006). However, the individual Compromise Agreements were not made 
available until three weeks before the transition was due to complete (ECFM13), 
although the general terms and employee grade mappings were available around 
six weeks prior to transition completion (ECFM12) when they were shared with 
Employee Consultation Forum Representatives. Around 95% of those that 
transferred signed the Compromise Agreement. It must be borne in mind that this 
may have been due in part to a guaranteed bonus worth 15% of the annual salary 
payable some three months later (ECFM12). This bonus was part of the profit 
sharing agreement already in place within ClientCo, built into the Compromise 
Agreement. The difference was that the level of bonus for IT staff transferring to 
ClientCo was guaranteed.
One comment by an interviewee sums up the situation in terms of staff transfer,
"When outsourcing, ClientCo had to declare the number of people transferring, 
along with their job details. When backsourcing, VendorCo did not have to agree 
the number of people going back." (INT4)
5.3.4 On-going Activities
Whilst the transition was in progress it was clear that the day-to-day activities still 
had to be completed - the service provided to ClientCo had to be maintained. To 
facilitate this VendorCo brought in a senior manager from another division of 
VendorCo to manage and oversee the transition process, allowing the existing 
senior management to continue to oversee the service provision (ECFM1). 
ClientCo requested that the VendorCo Head of IT stay until the end of transition to 
ensure that service continuity was maintained (INTI) and paid VendorCo for his 
services and for those of other senior managers seen as key to service provision 
(INT4). ClientCo also took other steps to ensure the service ran smoothly during 
the transition. There was
"A lot of work with VendorCo on the continuity of service during the transition 
period. A  lot of due diligence, and a lot of interim management brought in." (INTI) 
It was not clear if the additional work completed with VendorCo around 
maintaining service provision at the outset of the Transition phase had been
factored into the original backsourcing project costs. It is clear that ClientCo paid 
for additional VendorCo senior management to ensure the backsourcing work was 
kept separate from the service provision. Over a six-month period, this may have 
amounted to a considerable sum and represented a cost that other organisations 
considering backsourcing would need to include in any backsourcing cost 
calculations.
It was acknowledged at this stage that there would be a shortage of development 
resource because VendorCo tended to staff development projects with VendorCo 
employees seconded from outside the ClientCo dedicated unit (INT3); this was 
mitigated by various methods discussed in more detail in the Operation section of 
this chapter.
5.3.5 Knowledge Management
Next to staff retention, knowledge transfer and management were seen as key 
areas. Loss of knowledge was addressed through the efforts on staff retention, the 
risk there was losing members of staff with important local knowledge (INTI, 
INT3) that could never be recovered (INTI). It was recognized that staff with more 
transferable skills were lost during the transition process (INT4), those that 
decided they wished to work for an specialist IT company rather than within IT in 
a company in another line of business (INT3, INT6).
Bloodgood & Salisbury (2001) categorise knowledge as explicit or tacit; explicit 
knowledge is easily expressed and codified, tacit knowledge is
"... that which is difficult to articulate and express to others." (Bloodgood & 
Salisbury 2001, p56)
The importance of the categories of knowledge depends on the change strategy 
being undertaken within the organisation (Bloodgood & Salisbury 2001). If the 
change strategy was that of 'Reconfigure with new resources' (Bloodgood and 
Salisbury 2001), then explicit knowledge becomes more important, as an 
organisation is more likely to use explicit knowledge related to the new resources 
(i.e. IT). The importance of explicit knowledge is highlighted further when the 
change is to acquire resources but not reconfigure them (Bloodgood & Salisbury
2001). This was the case for backsourcing, where the purpose was to bring IT back 
in-house, stabilise the service and then move forward (INT5). This, however, relies 
on the explicit knowledge required being codified or recorded in some way.
The issue of knowledge management for backsourcing becomes more difficult 
when trying to categorise the knowledge to be transferred in terms of IT technical 
staff. This can be split into two general classifications; the knowledge and skills to 
carry out a specific job function or role, (i.e. analyst programmer, network systems 
administrator, etc.) and knowledge of the specific systems used by an organisation. 
For the latter, this knowledge could be as simple as where documentation is 
stored, or as tacit as workarounds for 'undocumented features' i.e. known bugs. It 
was the knowledge of specific systems that made the transfer of staff from one 
organisation to another during outsourcing or backsourcing so important to the 
smooth running of the IT service. For ClientCo, not having access to existing IT 
staff meant that they did not know what job roles needed filing during the 
transition process (INT2, INT3), an issue that could not be rectified until post- 
Transition.
However, because the IT system and application documentation were poor (INT4, 
INT5), it was the knowledge of the existing employees that became important, 
along with the retention of those employees -  thus the use of the Compromise 
Agreement mentioned earlier.
Lei & Hitt (1995) highlighted a danger in outsourcing
".. .an over reliance on outsourcing may trap the firm into growing dependence in 
which it loses its knowledge and skill base to the outsourcing partner." (p853)
As was noted in Chapter 3, Gottschalk (2006) maintained that knowledge 
management was key in the transfer of operations between the two parties taking 
part in an outsourcing relationship; it is not unreasonable to expect this to apply to 
backsourcing. Retention of staff, discussed earlier, was seen as a key contributor to 
maintaining explicit knowledge, as system documentation handed over by 
VendorCo was not seen as totally reliable or comprehensive (INT2, INT6). It was 
important, therefore, that key knowledge workers were targeted for interview
during the transition process. It was not possible to identify key individuals 
(INT3), so technical interviews were carried out with those in key positions within 
VendorCo (INT2). It was these interviews in which a senior manager from 
VendorCo had to be present (INTI, INT3).
Table 5.1 is a summary of the critical success factors, issues, action taken and the 
stage of the process at which the issue was identified.
Critical
Success
Factor
Issue Action Taken StageIdentified
Continuity 
of service
Loss of senior 
management
• Interim managers recruited to cover short 
term loss of senior management
• Retain VendorCo professionals as 
secondees for three month period after 
transition
Decision
Lack of knowledge of 
backsourcing process
• Engagement of third party consultancy 
with backsourcing experience to guide 
ClientCo through the required processes
Decision
Deterioration of 
relationship with 
VendorCo
• Contingency plan to speed transition if 
relationship broke down completely
Decision
Loss of IT technical 
knowledge
• Technical interviews with key personnel 
during transition period
Transition
Maintain 
ability to 
manage IT 
and IT 
systems
ClientCo 
management 
knowledge focused 
on monitoring an IT 
outsourcing 
agreement rather 
than managing an IT 
Division
• None identified by interviewees Decision
Incomplete system 
documentation (INT2)
• VendorCo asked to complete 
documentation as part of transition 
activities
Transition
Maximise
staff
retention
VendorCo “cherry- 
picking” staff
• Offer of ClientCo Terms and Conditions 
above those available under TUPE prior 
to end of transition period
• Regular lists of those in and out of scope 
provided by VendorCo to try and track 
exposure
• Acknowledgement that such action could 
not be stopped
Transition
Loss of essential 
knowledge workers
• Employment Agency engaged (operating 
within the HR team) to “recruit at speed”
• Formation of an elected Employee 
Consultative Forum to represent the 
views of all those in scope of TUPE
Transition
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Critical
Success
Factor
Issue Action Taken StageIdentified
Lack of development 
capability
• All development activities put on-hold
• Three year contract with VendorCo for 
fixed rates on development work that 
VendorCo can choose to bid for
Decision
Successful
Contract
Novation
Third party contracts 
not transferred 
(novated) from 
VendorCo to ClientCo
• Specialist contract consultant engaged to 
ensure all contracts are novated from 
VendorCo to ClientCo
Decision
Open to legal action if 
contracts not novated 
correctly
No support from third 
party vendors due to 
lack of contract
Table 5.1 Transition Risks and Issues
This table shows that although a number of issues were identified during the 
Decision phase, there were a number that did not become apparent until the 
Transition phase itself.
Is the issue of knowledge transfer and management more important for 
backsourcing? With outsourcing, it is in the best interests of both parties for 
knowledge transfer and knowledge management to be a focus of attention. Any 
gaps in knowledge can be addressed as the outsourcing agreement progresses 
because there is an on-going relationship. For backsourcing, once the transition has 
been completed the vendor is no longer tied to the client unless there is a post­
termination contract in place for such activities. As such all knowledge 
management and knowledge transfer activities have to be completed as part of the 
decision and transition phases.
5.4 Operation
With IT having been backsourced a year previously, the research offered an 
opportunity to look at how an organisation had adapted after bringing the whole 
of IT back in-house. Again, three themes seemed to emerge from the interviews: 
resource issues, the business relationship with IT and the future direction of IT 
within the organisation. Each is covered in turn.
5.4.1 Resource Issues
It was acknowledged by all interviewees that there were resources issues after the 
transfer was completed, but it was not seen as a major issue by most, as there was 
no impact on the service to the business. Staff attrition in the first year after the 
backsourcing was 5%, less than the other departments within the Head Office of 
ClientCo (INT5).
However, the lack of management experience in specific areas was seen as an issue 
post-transition, along with gaps in technical knowledge in key areas (INT3). 
Although attempts were made to mitigate this as a risk during Transition, a large 
recruitment campaign was needed to correct the shortfall after the handover from 
VendorCo (INT5). Interim appointments were made to bridge the backsourcing 
process (INTI) and a number of VendorCo professionals were retained for a fixed 
period to bridge the period between transition and operation (INTI, INT3). It was 
also recognized that there were skills shortages in some areas (INTI). Staff had left 
during the transition period and were not replaced by VendorCo. This was seen as 
opportunistic behaviour on behalf of VendorCo, carried out to maximise revenue, 
as the agreement was for a fixed price for support services and the subsequent 
savings on labour costs
"...went straight to VendorCo's bottom line." (INT2)
This opportunistic behaviour by VendorCo should have been identified during 
transition (INTI) but should not have been allowed to happen by VendorCo 
(INTI).
It was also recognised that VendorCo provided the development resourcing from 
secondees within its organisation (INT5), a process that ClientCo could not 
replicate. ClientCo therefore engaged VendorCo under a three-year agreement for 
development work at an agreed rate (INT2). An agreement was also reached with 
the ClientCo business community to downscale activity during and post transition, 
with activity back up to the required levels within the first year (INTI, INT2). It 
was also seen that the lack of resource and a lower budget meant that requests 
from the business had to be the subject of strict evaluation and control (INTI). A
process was created where business units bid for IT resource based on the business
benefit. The IT Board, consisting of senior management from IT and the business
who, in the words on one of the interviewees,
''. ..sit in judgement over where we should spend the money." (INT2)
The framework set up by ClientCo was broadly comparable with that proposed by
King and Malhotra (2000) to create an internal market for IT resources. One of the
propositions put forward by King and Malhotra (2000) was
"Organizations using the internal markets approach can better develop their core 
competencies than organizations that use outsourcing". (p331)
As discussed earlier, one of the reasons given for backsourcing was that greater 
control of IT was required for the business recovery programme initiated by 
ClientCo (INTI), an illustration of the desire to develop core competencies.
5.4.2 The Business Relationship with IT
The issue stated by a number of interviewees was that the backsourcing process 
brought together an IT organisation that was part of a larger IT oriented 
organisation, with a business that, although the IT was specifically for it, was in a 
very different business sector. As stated by an interviewee (INT6), the business 
saw IT as a 'black box', the same could be said for the IT view of the business. As a 
result, it would seem that, in organisational terms, backsourcing goes beyond just 
'bringing IT back in'; it could be perceived that the backsourcing process is 
reminiscent of a merger or acquisition. This aspect of the backsourcing process is 
something that could be the subject of further research.
Looking at responses from the interviewees, the perception is that the newly
integrated IT Division is still seen as separate, comments made included,
"I think we've alivays been seen as a cost, a necessary evil by the organisation. I don't 
see a great deal o f evidence that it's seen as anything different." (INT5)
and
"It's important to see IT as part of the business and not separate from it. We are part of 
the business. The culture change for IT to be seen this way hasn't quite happened yet." 
(INTI)
and
"What I zvitness now is that because the client-customer relationship has disappeared, 
you know, people here have a completely different expectation ofhoiv the IT Division
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will function. And it isn't around the function of service levels and so on. It's around 
'that means that if  I shout, you jump'." (INT2)
It is this last comment that illustrates a change in power between IT and the
business. The change in the relationship dynamics between IT and the business
was also acknowledged by all the interviewees. Under the outsourcing agreement,
the business had a good day-to-day relationship with VendorCo. One interviewee
commented
"The relationship between the business and VendorCo was pretty good, because they 
felt they were dealing zvith a lot of IT professionals and they had all this money put 
aside and they could basically have zvhat they zvanted." (INT2)
It is this change in relationship dynamic that set the agenda for the IT/business 
relationship moving forward. The perception was that IT was blamed for failures 
that VendorCo would not have been held accountable for (INTI) and that there 
was increased pressure on IT performance delivery during key business periods,
"You are only as good as your last failure." (INTI)
And
"The business likes to forget IT exists... it should just work." (INTI)
Is this any different from the pressure that would have been applied to VendorCo 
by ClientCo before backsourcing? The suspicion is that it is not.
Finally, the consensus was that it would take another year, two years from when 
backsourcing was complete, before IT was seen as truly being part of the business 
as a whole.
5.4.3 The Future Direction of IT.
Once IT had moved into the Operation stage there appeared to be more of a 
challenge from IT when requirements came through from the business
"It's quite interesting in that you've got this sort of, I would call it, help intention 
that zee are much more challenging nozv about zohether or not zve should or 
shouldn't do that." (INTI)
In response to the shortage of resource for development projects, senior 
management elected to what could be perceived as a selective sourcing approach, 
choosing vendors for smaller IT projects and using VendorCo for larger projects
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(INTI). The budget for IT new development was also reduced to reflect the higher 
costs and overhead that no longer had to be paid to VendorCo (INT4). This 
challenge on IT spend led to tensions between IT and the business that needed 
resolution at Board of Directors level. It was perceived that it was middle 
management within the business that were the issue because 
"We took away their train set." (INT4)
The consensus was that VendorCo agreed to any requests for new systems or 
changes to existing ones; it was extra revenue (INTI). Governance structures had 
to be created within ClientCo, including an IT Board with IT and business senior 
management sitting in judgement over requests for IT projects to be completed 
(INTI, INT2).
5.5 General
The final part of the interview process was designed to be reflective in nature, 
asking the participants to judge the success of the backsourcing project and look at 
how things could have been improved.
5.5.1 Communication, Problems & Doing Things Differently
A number of general comments were made by the interviewees that seem to
resonate within the process. When reflecting on the backsourcing process as a
whole the one issue that cropped repeatedly revolved around the collapse of the
relationship with VendorCo and the subsequent consequences. One of the
interviewees commented
"That was typical of what we suffered from, a lot of mis communication. It was like 
being in a war scenario and we had not anticipated a war scenario." (INT2)
This view seems to coincide with those voiced by a majority of the interviewees. 
Communication was seen as a major issue, with both VendorCo and the staff 
transitioning to ClientCo because of the stance taken by VendorCo. With 
VendorCo, communication was difficult in what was seen as a 'war scenario' 
(INTI). One positive was seen as the Employee Consultation Forum set up just 
over a month after the decision was announced (INT3). A  weekly briefing was also 
issued to all staff, but the contents had to be vetted by VendorCo (INTI). Although 
it was perceived that the communication restrictions eased over time (INTI), it was
accepted that the communications allowed should have been agreed and signed 
off at the start of the transition process (INT3).
It was seen that ClientCo needed a better understanding of the technical aspects of 
the IT service being transferred through technical interviews (INTI). The 
consultancy engaged to advise on and aid the transition carried these out, but it 
was seen that they were not as informative as they should have been (INT3). These 
had been carried out by the consultancy engaged by ClientCo to advise on the 
backsourcing process and the view was that these interviews had not been as 
comprehensive as they should have been (INT3, INT5). In fact, it was suggested 
that this consultancy was more of a hindrance, and would not have been used 
given hindsight (INT2). There also needed to be more analysis of the systems being 
transitioned (INTI).
Overall, the backsourcing model was seen as simple, it was behaviours that made 
it difficult (INTI).
5.5.2 Judging the Success of the Backsourcing Process
The consensus of the interviewees was the backsourcing process went well overall
"Generally it went to plan in terms of what we looked to do and where we got to. 
Actually, i f  you've got the people, got the commercials and you can run the service, 
you've got everything you really need." (INTI)
Although the transition was successful, the general view that it could have been
better. When asked to grade the transition out of ten, the average was between
seven and eight. The deadline for the handover was achieved and any system
issues were resolved as efficiently as would have been the case under VendorCo.
Although 462 personnel out of 495 transferred back to ClientCo, the majority of
those lost represented senior management and the most experienced technical
staff.
The main reason given for a lower score from some was the lack of staff 
engagement in the early stages of transition. The effects on staff morale were 
mitigated a little by the formation of the Employee Consultative Forum, but the 
breakdown in the relationship between VendorCo and ClientCo during transition
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hindered efforts by ClientCo to engage with staff directly, VendorCo insisted on a 
senior management representative being present whenever ClientCo engaged with 
VendorCo staff.
5.5.3 Final Impressions
Backsourcing IT after a length of time with an outsourcing vendor requires a 
change in mind-set
"It's like moving from using a taxi to driving your own car." (INT5)
It also requires the co-operation and assistance of the outsourcing vendor to 
complete the process. It seems that ClientCo completed the backsourcing process 
in spite of the actions taken by VendorCo, who even tried to delay the fixed 
transition date on the grounds that ClientCo were 'not ready' (INT2).
“It wasn’t his (the 
CEO) deal”
“Business
restructuring”
“Fixed exit date”
“Relationship
breakdown”
DECISION
IT was a black 
box”______ J TRANSITION
“Regain
control”
“Self-contained unit”
“People and 
commercials”
“Use of consultancy
“Cherry-picking . n . n n n  '
by VendorCo” The P]n3"Pon9effect”
KNOWLEDGE
MANAGEMENTK
[ “Backfill not 
carried out’
“Less of key 
staff”
“Staff scope changed 
regiiarly”
“Constraint on 
business”‘Resource
shortages”
OPERATION
“Loss of development 
capability”
“Integrating IT back into 
the business”
Figure 5 .1 Snapshot of Interviewee Com m ents
McLaughlin & Peppard (2006) stated that
"While cost savings are clearly part of the decision, it appears that the main reasons 
for backsourcing in this sample have more to do with a desire to regain control and 
flexibility, a new recognition of the role of information systems, or strategy change 
following a change of management." (McLaughlin & Peppard 2006, p l l)
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It was clear from the case study that the backsourcing decision was driven by the 
CEO who had no tie-in because the agreement had been made by the previous 
CEO. It was also apparent that the reasons for backsourcing, such as cost reduction 
and regaining control, were a result of the new business strategy. Figure 5.1 
provides a snapshot of the summary of some of the key comments made by 
interviewees that seems to encapsulate the whole process.
Lacity et al (1996), when looking at a number of instances of total outsourcing,
noted that only two out of fourteen were happy with the agreement, for the rest,
"After the initial honeymoon, these companies complained of a loss of alignment 
between business strategy and IT, failed promises to access new technologies, and 
contractual costs that are significantly greater than current market prices." (pl5)
For VendorCo it seems that the honeymoon lasted until the new CEO was 
appointed and initiated a review.
5.6 Research Questions - A Review
At this stage of the research, it was difficult to reach concrete conclusions on the 
research questions proposed earlier in Chapter 4. However, a number of indicative 
proposals can be made.
Research Question 1
Is the decision stage more risky for outsourcing than backsourcing?
From the case study, it would seem the results make the judgement on this 
research question inconclusive. The decision to backsource appears to have been 
driven by the CEO, politics and business strategy, and a 'feeling' that the 
outsourcing agreement did not provide 'value for money'. It would appear, at face 
value, that the decision no more risky for outsourcing or backsourcing. It is the 
implications of the decision that are more significant when backsourcing, given the 
people and knowledge management issues identified within the case study.
Research Question 2
Is the transition stage, in terms of 'mechanics', more problematic for backsourcing 
than outsourcing?
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It is apparent from the research that the 'mechanics' of the backsourcing process 
were challenging for ClientCo. Adjustments in personnel had to be made in order 
to change focus from monitoring an outsourcing agreement to managing an IT 
Division. Specialist staff had to be engaged to deal with the movement of third 
party contracts from VendorCo to ClientCo, and a consultancy used to guide 
ClientCo through the process. In all these cases, an outsourcing supplier would 
have their own staff to carry out this work.
Research Question 3
Are knowledge management and the retention of key personnel more important in 
the backsourcing transition process than in outsourcing?
This would appear to be the one research question seen as correct from the case 
study, specifically for ClientCo. When outsourcing, for example, it is in the best 
interests of the outsourcing organisation to pass as many staff to the vendor as are 
required in order to maintain continuity of the service. However, the motivation 
for outsourcing in the first instance is often to "...leverage the supplier's superior 
technical know-how", so the importance of staff being transferred to the vendor is 
diminished to an extent (Gottschalk 2006).
From the perspective of ClientCo, starting from a very low base of technical know­
how, the number and calibre of staff transferred from VendorCo with the required 
levels of explicit and implicit knowledge and technical expertise became vital to 
the success of the backsourcing process and their ability to maintain continuity of 
IT service to the business.
Research Question 4
Is the Operation stage for outsourcing and backsourcing different?
It is difficult to judge this research question on the strength of the case study 
research. For both backsourcing and outsourcing, it would appear that the first 
priority post-transition is to maintain the stability of the IT service. For 
outsourcing, the requirements of the agreement are laid out in the contract and
enforced via SLAs. For backsourcing, the objectives and priorities are not so clear. 
Further research in this area, perhaps in the form of a study of a backsourcing over 
a longer period of time, is indicated.
McLaughlin & Peppard (2006) commented on the options available when 
reviewing an outsourcing decision. From the case study, it would appear that 
ClientCo looked at renegotiating the existing agreement and, fleetingly, at 
switching vendors before both options were discarded in favour of backsourcing. 
This would seem to confirm the options available as proposed by McLaughlin & 
Peppard (2006).
5.7 Summary
This case study seems to be a specific instance where backsourcing could almost be 
predicted, given the desire for strategic change and the predilection of the CEO 
and IT Director towards bringing IT back in-house. Szmigin (1993) proposed the 
Experience Cycle, where the vendor can make the mistake of believing that the 
benefits offered to their client on day one have an equal benefit on day one 
hundred. One of the interviewees stated that VendorCo believed that only they 
could provide ClientCo's IT. It seems that VendorCo did not react to ClientCo's 
change in business strategy and suffered the consequences. For ClientCo, it was 
the lack of flexibility within the provision of IT while going through major 
strategic change that contributed to the decision to backsource.
The question, at this point was, were the circumstances unique? To explore this 
further, a survey of UK organisations was carried out. This is detailed in the next 
chapter.
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6 The Survey
This Chapter presents the analysis and results of the survey distributed to 794 UK 
organisations and evaluate the findings in light of the research hypotheses proposed in 
Chapter 2.
6.1 Survey Objectives
The survey was designed to look at the gaps in research identified in the earlier
stages of the research process. The literature review highlighted a number of high
profile instances of backsourcing, but the reasons for the decisions taken were only
those that entered the public domain (McLaughlin & Peppard 2006, Veltri et al
2008). Whitten & Leidner (2006) stated, as part of their conclusion, that
"... little empirical research exists that helps elucidate and understand the 
backsourcing decision." (p617)
It is this lack of understanding of the backsourcing decision, and the prevalence of
backsourcing activity, that formed the main drivers for the survey stage of the
research. Having reviewed current literature and carried out the case study, it was
clear that research was required to gain some clarity in a number of areas.
Evidence from the Case Study seemed to confirm that the service relationship 
between the client and the vendor could be seen as one of the key aspects of a 
successful outsourcing relationship. This has been identified from the literature 
review in Chapter 3 and in the case study. The breakdown of the relationship and 
perception that the agreement was not 'in  the best interests' of ClientCo 
contributed to the termination of the outsourcing agreement. As a result, the aim 
of the survey was to gain an insight into IT sourcing activity within the United 
Kingdom in a number of areas, and sheds light on why those organisations may 
have taken specific IT sourcing decisions. The survey represents a 'snapshot' of IT 
sourcing activity in November/ December 2009, this being the period in which 
responses were made.
6.1.1 Reviewing the Survey Instrument
Referring back to the Survey Sections in Figure 4.4, the survey instrument was 
separated into five sections, covering demographic data, IT sourcing activity, the 
decision making process, the reasons for the decision and the service relationship.
Before looking at the survey findings in detail, it is important to clarify a couple of 
issues that became apparent once the data collection phase had been completed. 
Having made the decision to use the Computing mi database as a source, the 
weaknesses in the extracted data needed to be addressed. The selection of the data, 
downloaded into an Excel spreadsheet, made apparent a specific problem in terms 
of the demographic data. Although all the entries in the extracted data file had a 
value for the turnover of the organisation, the number of total staff and the 
number of IT staff, 49.5% had stated their IT spend as 'Confidential7 or 'Not 
Specified'. It was therefore desirable to collect data on IT spend to be able to get an 
idea of the value of any changes to sourcing activity. The other three areas were 
also subject to questions on the survey so that the accuracy of the Computing mi 
data did not have to be relied upon.
It was also clear that the data collected had to be examined to ensure the 
appropriate data analysis techniques were being employed. In Chapter 4, the 
concept of parametric or non-parametric data for data analysis was discussed 
specifically in the light of rating scale data. Field (2005) stated that parametric data 
analysis is generally considered appropriate when the data fulfils four 
assumptions; normally distributed data, homogeneity of variance, interval data 
and independence. Each of these will be tested in turn for the responses to the 
SERVDYN instrument.
Looking first at whether the data exhibits normal distribution, the skewness value 
should be zero or nearly zero. As Table 6.1 illustrates, the skewness value for each 
of the SERVDYN variables ranges from a negative skew of -1.497 to a positive 
skew of 1.248. It is reasonable to assume that the data is not normally distributed.
Pallant (2007) stated that with reasonably large samples the skewness would not
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make a substantive difference in the analysis. With 'reasonable large samples' 
defined as over 200, the number of responses to the survey (n=69) would seem to
indicate that the level of skewness would have an unpredictable effect on a 
parametric analysis (Pallant 2007).
IT Provision SERVDYN Variable No. of values Std. Deviation Skewness
In-house IT Potential Quality 17 1.20508 -1.497
Hard Process Quality 17 1.1388 -1.65
Soft Process Quality 17 1.3519 -1.843
Outcome Quality 17 1.26503 -1.248
Trust 17 0.87079 -0.945
Outsourced IT Potential Quality 52 1.13664 -1.362
Hard Process Quality 52 1.31389 -0.823
Soft Process Quality 52 1.17954 -1.134
Outcome Quality 52 1.14412 -0.48
Trust 52 0.96638 -0.274
Switched Vendors Potential Quality 28 0.9534 0.408
Hard Process Quality 28 1.22366 0.002
Soft Process Quality 28 1.1366 -0.095
Outcome Quality 28 0.94826 -0.044
Trust 28 0.99382 -0.23
Backsourced IT Potential Quality 13 1.12944 1.248
Hard Process Quality 13 1.63936 0.163
Soft Process Quality 13 1.39853 0.271
Outcome Quality 13 1.63221 0.306
Trust 13 0.80712 0.292 !
Table 6.1 SERVDYN Variable Distribution
In summary, the size of the response dataset and the lack of normal distribution
displayed by the data lead to the decision being taken to carry out non-parametric 
analysis for all of the survey data collected using rating scales.
6.1.1 Making Decisions on Data Analysis
With 44 variables from the survey instrument to review, it was important to 
provide some structure in terms of the types of variable and the method used to 
present the findings. Table 6.2 summarises the questions within the survey 
instrument, the data types and method of result presentation.
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General Question Variables Data Type
Non-response bias -  total population vs. 
response population
41_OrgEmp Ordinal
Total responses by job title 2_JobTitle Nominal
How many responses for each of the following -  
in-house, outsourced, switch vendors and 
backsourced
3_Outsourced?
18_SwitchVendors?
19_Backsourced?
29_Backsourced
Dichotomo
us
Reasons -  in, out, switch & back -  split by 
economic, social/organisational & strategic
4_lnreason1-7 
5_lnResOther1-3 
10_OutReason1-11 
11_OutReasonOther1-3 
25_SwitchReason1-6 
26_SwitchReasonOther1-3 
37_BackReason1-8 
38_BackReasonOther1 -3
Ordinal
Degrees -  degree of outsourcing, switch 
vendors & backsourcing - <20%, 20-80% & 
>80%
8_OutDegree 
20_Switch Degree 
30_BackDegree
Nominal
SERVDYN -  totals by in, out, switch & back for 
PQ, HQ, SQ, O Q & T R
I n - 6 / 7  
O u t - 16/17 
Switch -  27/28 
Back -  39/40
Interval
What areas were most subject to 
out/switch/back -  is there a bias for area to 
switch/back rather than stay?
9_Outarea1-8 
9_OutAreaOther 
23_Switch Area 1-8 
23_SwitchAreaOther 
33_BackArea1-8
33_BackAreaOther
Nominal
Of those that outsourced, who reviewed? What 
option was taken?
12_OutReview1-4 Nominal
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General Question Variables Data Type
W ho’s idea/decision to review sourcing 
requirements
13_Outldea1-6
13_OutldeaOther
14_OutDecision1-6
14_OutDecision Other
21_Swtichldea1-6
21 _Switch I deaOther
22_SwitchDecision1-6
22_SwitchDecisionOther
31_Backldea1-6
31_BackldeaOther
32_BackDecision 1 -6
32_BackDecisionOther
Nominal
Exit strategy prevalence -  of those with one (or 
not) who did switch/back. Does a lack of exit 
strategy contribute to decision?
15_ExitStrategy Nominal
For switch/back, what alternatives were 
considered
24_SwitchAlternative1 -3 
24_SwitchAlternativeOther 
34_BackAlternative1 -3 
34_BackAlternativeOther
Nominal
Risks of backsourcing -  what were considered 
the biggest?
35_BackRisk1-7
36_BackRiskOther
Ordinal
Demographic Information 41_OrgEmp 
42_OrgTu mover 
43_ITEmp 
44_ITTurnover
Ordinal
Table 6.2 Survey Data Variables
6.2 Survey Response Data
Of the 796 survey invites dispatched, 81 started the web-based survey with 12 
exiting before completion. This left 69 usable responses, an overall response rate of 
8.69%.
6.2.1 Response Bias
Testing for non-response bias was only possible with one of the original 
independent variables within the survey instrument. The original data sourcing 
from Computing mi contained information on the organisation's turnover and IT 
budget, along with the number of organisation and IT employees. However, there 
were entries in the original Computing mi data where the organisation's turnover
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and IT budget were not specified or was recorded as classified. The number of IT 
employees was also not specified on a number of entries, although the number of 
organisational employees was the only field consistently completed. This was 
therefore used as the independent variable for looking at non-response bias.
Item N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
NON_RESP_Total_Staff 727 3 6 5.08 1.075
RESP_T otal_Staff 69 3 6 5.01 1.007
Table 6.3 Non-Response Bias by Organisation Turnover
The figures above seem to indicate that there is no discernible difference between 
responses and non-responses as the means and standard deviations are very close. 
As a result, there does not appear to be any non-response bias in terms of 
responses based on the number of employees within the organisations.
6.3 Dealing with Demographics
Looking at the demographic information provided by respondents seemed to 
illustrate a number of anomalies. It seemed the survey responses did not tally with 
the selection criteria used for the purposive sample selected from the Computing 
mi database. The selection criteria were for organisations whose turnover was in 
excess of £100 million. As illustrated by Figure 6.1, just under 19% (n=13) of the 
responses were from organisation with a turnover less than this figure.
Less than £51- £101- £251- £501- Greater Not
£50 £100 £250 £500 £1000 than known
million million million million million £1001
million
Figure 6 .1 Responses by Organisation Turnover
More disconcerting was the effect that may have had on the size of IT budgets.
Kang & Bradley (2002) maintained that IT budgets were found to be around 2.2% 
of an organisation's annual revenue. Figure 6.2 shows that just over half of the 
responses (n=37) came from organisations where the IT budget was less than £10 
million. This seems to be in proportion with the number of IT employees within 
the organisation, with over half of the organisations having less than a hundred IT 
employees.
Under £1 £1-10  £11-20 £21-50 £51-100 Greater Not
million million million million million than known
£100
million
Figure 6.2 Responses by IT Budget
As previously stated in Chapter 4, Kang & Bradley (2002) found that an 
organisation tended to spend around 2.2% of their organisational turnover on IT. 
With 37% (n=26) of respondents having an organisational turnover greater than 
£500m, this would equate to an IT budget in excess of £ llm  per annum. From the 
responses, 35% (n=24) declared an IT budget of equal to, or greater than, £ llm . 
With 6%(n=4) stating that they did not know the Organisational or IT turnover it 
would seem reasonable to suppose that the Kang & Bradley (2002) findings on IT 
budget as a proportion of overall organisational turnover applied to the responses 
to this survey.
The discrepancies with the data originally provided by Computing mi given the 
organisation profile targeted and the responses received shows a mismatch that 
has to be considered when looking at the findings. There could be two possible 
explanations; the Computing mi data is either not as accurate as was first believed 
or respondents did not accurately state the demographic data requested as part of
the survey.
1-50 51-100 101-250 251-500 501-1000 >1000 Not
Known
Figure 6.3 Responses by number of IT Employees
Of the total respondents, over 60% (n=43) were from IT Directors or Heads of IT, 
with a further 16% (n=ll) of responses from IT Senior Managers. This would seem 
to indicate that the targeted nature of the survey invite was successful. However, 
the targeting may also have contributed to the low response rate. Previous surveys 
targeted at senior managers within an organisation have found that response rates 
were significantly lower for this sample population than for other individuals 
lower in the organisation, such as managers, professionals or employees (Baruch 
1999).
6.4 IT Sourcing Activity
Having reviewed the demographic data, the next area of the survey to analyse was 
the IT outsourcing activity, looking specifically at the different IT sourcing 
strategies being used UK organisations, the degree of the IT budget subject to this 
activity and the functions and systems in scope.
6.4.1 IT Sourcing Strategies
Looking at IT sourcing activities, the first area to be reviewed was that of the 
current IT sourcing strategy. Respondents were asked if their organisation had 
outsourced some or all of their IT in the last five years and if they had, whether 
any of it had been the subject to a switch of vendors or was brought back in-house.
Table 6.4 represents a summary of the sourcing decisions taken by the 
respondents' organisation and, as such, the areas of the survey completed by 
respondents. The percentage is of the total respondents, i.e. 40.6% (n=28 of 69) 
completed the section pertaining to a switch of vendors.
Sourcing Decision Total Percentage of 
total respondents 
(n=69)
In-house (no outsourcing) 17 24.6
Outsourced 52 75.4
Switched Vendors 28 40.6
Backsourced 13 18.8
Table 6.4 IT Sourcing Strategy
It is interesting to note that of those that outsourced, over half switched vendors at 
some point, either terminating early or switching vendors at the end of the 
agreement. Whitten & Leidner (2006), when looking at Application Development 
outsourcing, found that around 22% of respondents chose to switch vendors and 
nearly 34% backsourced. One question that should have been asked in hindsight 
was whether the decision to switch or backsource occurred before the end of the 
outsourcing agreement.
The breakdown of the degree of outsourcing practiced by the respondent's 
organisations seemed to indicate that the degree of outsourcing activity was not 
significantly high. Of those that had outsourced some or all of their IT, half stated 
that the amount of outsourcing was less than 20% (n=26) of the IT budget and only 
three of the respondents stated that their organisation had totally outsourced (i.e. 
more than 80% of their IT budget).
Lacity & Willcocks (1998) define less than 20% of the IT budget as being little or no 
outsourcing. However, with half (n=26) of the respondents that outsourced stating 
that it was less than 20% of the overall IT budget, what needs to be taken into 
account here is the perception of outsourcing -  the fact that it is occurring and not 
necessarily the value of the outsourced IT. However, with 72% (n=52) of the 
respondents stating an IT spend in excess of £1 million per annum, even 10% of 
spending represents a significant amount of outsourcing. It would also seem that
outsourcing is 'in the eye of the beholder'. The respondents that completed this 
part of the survey had already confirmed that they had an outsourcing contract in 
the last five years.
Degree of Outsourcing
□ 6%
□ 0<20% 
■ 20-80% 
□ >80%
Figure 6.4 Degrees of Outsourcing
In addition, of the three respondents that stated over 80% of their IT had been 
outsourced, one had stayed with their current vendor, the other two had switched 
some of their outsourced IT to another vendor.
What became clear from the above analysis is that the categories of no, selective 
and total outsourcing was not sufficiently granular to judge accurately the degree 
of outsourcing within organizations. A clarification of what was meant by 
outsourcing on the survey instrument may also have aided respondents.
6.4.2 IT Functions and Sourcing
Moving on to the areas or functions subject to outsourcing, the 
Telecommunications/LAN function was the most popular to outsource, followed 
by support operations (i.e. equipment maintenance and service). Is this an 
indication that these areas were treated as a 'commodity' that could best be 
provided by a number of different third parties? The least popular area was that of 
IT Help Desk (14.5%). This is in contrast with a similar study by Lacity & Willcocks 
(2000) who found that 32% of UK respondents had outsourced part or all of their
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IT Help Desk. What might account for the difference? It is difficult to draw any 
conclusions without further research.
When categorising the functions outsourced as either infrastructure or systems, 
along the lines of discussion in Chapter 2, it would seem that infrastructure is most 
likely to be outsourced, simply because Applications Development was the only 
area that could be classified as transformational/competitive in the IT Strategic 
Diamond (Figure 2.4).
IT Function (Strategic Diamond 
Classification)
No. of Responses
Outsourced
Total
Stayed with 
Vendor/s 
(as a % of 
total)
Switched 
Vendor/s 
(as a % 
of total)
Backsourced 
(as a % of 
total)
Applications Development 
(Transformational/Competitive) 22 11 (50%) 9(41% ) 2 (9%)
Application Support & 
Maintenance
(Qualifying/Competitive)
21 10(48%) 7 (33%) 4(19% )
Data Centre Operations & Support 
(Qualifying) 17 8 (47%) 9 (53%) 0
Desktop Support (PC support & 
software maintenance) 
(Underpinning)
11 4 (36%) 4 (36%) 3 (28%)
IT Help Desk (Underpinning) 10 4 (40%) 4 (40%) 2 (20%)
Support operations (equipment
maintenance/service)
(Underpinning)
27 19(71%) 6 (22%) 2 (7%)
Systems Support & Maintenance 
(Qualifying) 15 8 (53%) 6 (40%) 1 (7%)
Telecommunications/LAN
(Qualifying) 36 19(53%) 16 (44%) 1 (3%)
TOTALS 159 79.02 (52%) 57.91(38%) 8.35 (10%)
Table 6.5 IT Areas Subject to Sourcing Activity
Although Applications Development was not one of the most popular areas to 
outsource, it was interesting that only two of the respondent organisations 
backsourced Applications Development, although one of them had switched 
vendors before backsourcing. It would have been interesting to ask whether each 
of these areas was considered as a commodity or as strategic by the organisation, 
but a move to bring the area back into the organisation's control may be an 
indication of a shift in perception of the area's importance similar to that of
ClientCo in the Case Study.
Finally, it seemed that selective sourcing was the order of the day. Only two of the 
respondents had outsourced all eight functions listed in the survey, although nine 
respondents stated that six or more of the functions had been outsourced. Twenty- 
six (37%) of the respondents had outsourced less than two functions and the 
Telecommunications/LAN function was included in over half of these (54%). It 
would seem to be reasonable to categorise Telecommunications/LAN as a utility 
and therefore a commodity.
6.5 Decision Making Process
Once the IT sourcing strategy had been reviewed, the next area under scrutiny was 
that of the decision making process, including the review process, the decision 
makers and the inclusion (or otherwise) of contract exit strategies.
6.5.1 Reviewing Sourcing Decisions
For those that kept their IT in-house, questions were only asked about why they 
did so. These are covered in the next section. Looking at those that outsourced, 
respondents were asked if they had reviewed, renegotiated or renewed their 
outsourcing arrangements. All respondents stated they had reviewed their 
outsourcing contracts in the last 5 years, seeming to confirm that outsourcing 
agreements were being monitored and reviewed. In hindsight, a follow-up 
question missing was how often the reviews took place.
A quarter of the respondents stated that they had carried out a review (Figure 6.5) 
but made no changes, while half confirmed that they had re-negotiated the 
agreement during the term of the contract. McLaughlin & Peppard (2006) put the 
figure for re-negotiation during the lifespan of a contract at over 80%. Why the 
apparent difference? This is difficult to assert. McLaughlin & Peppard (2006) did 
not state the source of their figures, so no direct comparison can be made with the 
findings of this research.
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Not reviewed Reviewed, no Re-negotiated Renewed 
changes during term
Figure 6.5 Outsourcing Review
Looking at the breakdown of the subsequent decisions made by organisations that 
had outsourced some or all of their IT in the last five years, makes for interesting 
reading. In terms of those that outsourced, Table 6.6 shows the actions taken 
subsequent to the outsourcing agreement, either as part of a review process or at 
the end of the outsourcing agreement.
This illustrates the apparently dynamic nature of IT sourcing decisions (Lacity & 
Willcocks 2000); only just over a third (36.5%) stayed with their original 
outsourcing vendor and nearly a sixth (15.4%) of organisations that switched 
vendors subsequently backsourced.
Review Decision
Total (n=52)
(of those 
that 
outsourced)
Percentage
(of those that 
outsourced)
Stayed with Original Vendor 19 36.5
Switch Vendors 20 38.5
Switched Vendors & Backsourced 8 15.4
Backsourced 5 9.6
Table 6.6 Outsourcing Review Decision
With a quarter of organisations eventually bringing back in-house a previously 
outsourced IT area, it would seem that backsourcing is more prevalent that other 
sources (Dreyfuss & Scardino 2006) would have you believe. Again, finding out if
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the action taken was during an agreement, or at the end of it, would have been 
insightful.
6.5.2 The Decision Makers
So, the decisions were made, but by who? Respondents were asked to state whom 
they thought had the initial idea to explore outsourcing and who made the final 
decision. Looking at the responses in terms of who, within the organisation, had 
the idea to explore the possibility of outsourcing, the Head of IT was involved in 
75% (n=40) of the responses, and for 57% (n=30) was solely responsible. The Head 
of IT being solely responsible, in the view of the respondent, is not to say that the 
'steer' did not come from higher up in the organisation. However, nine of those 
responses did actually come from the Head of IT! Interestingly, in 30% (n=16) of 
the responses it was articulated that the suggestion to look at outsourcing came 
from Board level, is this indicative of a more strategic outlook to outsourcing?
Of all of the responses whose organisation made the decision to outsource, the
Head of IT was involved in all but 19% (n=10) of the responses. In these cases, the
decision was made at Board level. However, in over half of the decisions to
outsource (53%, n=30), the Head of IT was the sole arbiter. This seems to agree
with a study by Apte et al (1997), who concluded that
"Contrary to the commonly held belief that CEOs initiate and drive outsourcing 
decisions, IS executives are observed to play a dominant role as initiators and 
decision makers." (p298)
This trend was believed to be driven, in part, by the move from total outsourcing 
to selective outsourcing (Apte et al 1997). A factor here may have been the 
monetary value of the agreement; a selective sourcing agreement may have been in 
the financial discretion of the CIO or Head of IT.
For switching vendors, the idea again predominantly came from the Head of IT, 
with 69% (n=19) making the suggestion and 75% (n=22) making it along with 
others. In contrast to the idea to outsource, the idea to switch vendors seemed to 
come from lower down the organisation. Only one of the respondents stated that 
the CEO had the idea to switch vendors, with none being made by the Board of
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Directors, but 25% (n=7) came from IT Middle Management. IT Middle 
Management only represented only 6% (n=3) for the outsourcing idea. The 
decision to switch vendors was actually taken, for three of the respondents, by IT 
Middle Management only. This contrasts sharply with the decision to outsource 
where this was not the case for any responses. This seems to indicate that although 
IT Middle Management was involved in the decision to switch vendors or 
backsource, they had no involvement in the original outsourcing decision. Could 
this be because the original outsourcing decision was perceived as strategic & 
therefore made at a higher level within the organisation? Alternatively, is this 
again down to the value of the outsourcing agreement being within the manager's 
discretion?
Finally, for backsourcing, the Head of IT seemed to be heavily involved proposing 
the idea and making the decision (n= ll of 13 or 85%), although there was slightly 
more involvement at a CEO/Board level (n=3 of 13 or 23%) for both the idea and 
the decision.
Some interesting observations can be made as a result of these findings. Firstly, 
what cannot be determined is whether the decision was seen by the organisation as 
'strategic7 or 'commodity7. Secondly, did the Head of IT suggest outsourcing 
because of a business directive to cut costs? Finally, although the Head of IT was 
predominantly involved in all of the ideas and decisions to outsource, switch 
vendors and backsource, the CEO and Board of Directors were more involved in 
the original outsourcing idea and decision than in switching vendors or 
backsourcing. This finding seemed to run contrary to the Case Study, where the 
CEO drove the decision process.
Having illustrated that the majority of organisations exit their existing outsourcing 
agreement at some stage, the issue of an exit strategy being built into the 
outsourcing contract becomes more important (Barthelemy 2003, Juras 2007, 
Gottschalk & Solli-Saether 2005). The importance of a clear and comprehensive exit 
strategy was illustrated in the Case Study, the reason why the question on exit 
strategy was included in the survey.
6.5.3 Outsourcing Exit Strategies
Respondents were asked if they had an exit strategy and whether it was reviewed
at regular intervals. Of those that outsourced, 77% (n=40) had an exit strategy and
nearly 60% (n=31) reviewed the exit strategy at regular intervals. A number of
respondents (n=6 or 11.5%) did not know if an exit strategy existed in the
outsourcing agreement, but more disturbingly 11.5% (n=6) stated that an exit
strategy did not exist. Juras (2007) states that the purpose of the exit strategy is
"...to help ensure the relationship will end with minimal damage to the company." 
(p44)
It would seem that those organisations that do not have an exit strategy are
exposing their organisation to unnecessary risk. Gottschalk & Solli-Saether (2005)
seemed to indicate there was another advantage for an exit strategy,
"When contracts expire there is a need to have an exit strategy focusing not only on 
the economic success o f the IT outsourcing, but also to question issues such as core 
competence management, access to resources, and the maturity o f the relationship." 
(p700)
Such an exit strategy would provide a good basis for progression and may well set 
the tone for the decision phase. If outsourcing with a particular vendor was 
viewed positively, it may increase the likelihood of the client renewing with the 
incumbent vendor (Whitten & Leidner 2006).
6.6 Reasons for IT Sourcing Decisions
The next section of the survey looked at the reasons for making a particular 
sourcing decision, with the reasons compiled as part of the literature review, along 
with the final part of this section covering the backsourcing risks.
6.6.1 Looking at the Reasons for Sourcing Decisions
Respondents were presented with a number of possible reasons for their sourcing 
decisions, and asked to rate their importance on a 5-point rating scale. These 
reasons were adjudged to be the most appropriate for the area under investigation, 
be it in-house, outsourcing, switching vendors or backsourcing. The three top 
reasons for each sourcing decision were based on the number of replies that 
responded with the reason being important or very important.
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The reasons for staying in-house were compiled via the literature review, 
primarily from the risks associated with outsourcing (Kremic et al 2006) and the 
rationale identified by Currie & Willcocks for maintaining IT as an in-house 
service. These are detailed in Table 2.6 with the full results in Appendix 8.
Reason Not
relevant
Unimportant Neutral Important Very
Important
High level of in-house 
technical expertise 0 1 1 7 8
Synergy between business 
and IT 1 0 3 4 9
In-house IT seen as cost 
efficient 1 0 4 5 7
Table 6.7 Top reasons for staying In-house
What were seen as the most important reasons for keeping IT in-house were 'high 
level o f in-house technical expertise’ and the 'synergy between business and IT', the least 
important was 'in-house IT seen as cost efficient. The key messages here appear to be 
that IT was seen as an important part of the business with the expertise required to 
fulfil business requirements. Another reason for keeping IT in-house also emerged 
from the survey, that of agility. Here, a number of respondents commented that 
maintaining IT in-house allowed for a quicker reaction to a change in business 
conditions. Two of the three factors appear to be strategic in nature, leaning more 
towards the transformation/competitive IT functions within the Strategic 
Diamond (Figure 2.4).
Moving on to the reasons for outsourcing, eleven statements were given and the 
respondents were asked to rate the importance of each statement in the decision to 
outsource. These statements were adapted from literature (Earl 1991, Benko 1993, 
Lonsdale & Cox 2000, Kremic et al 2006) and were grouped as six strategic and five 
as operational efficiencies using Porter (1996). These are detailed in Table 2.5.
Reason Not
relevant
Unimportant Neutral Important Very
Important
Access to skills/expertise 2 2 5 19 24
Focus on core capabilities 4 1 6 28 13
Cost reduction 3 0 13 23 13
Table 6.8 Top reasons for outsourcing
The main reasons for outsourcing some or all of an organisation's IT do not come 
as a surprise; 'access to skills/expertise', 'focus or core capabilities' and 'cost reduction'.
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The first two were 'strategic', the last 'operational efficiency' using Porter (1996). 
The surprise appears to be that cost reduction was not rated the most important 
reason and, as a result, implies that the 'strategic' element was more important. 
This differs slightly from the survey carried out by Fan (2000), where cost 
reduction was the clear favourite, with focusing on core competencies the second 
most popular.
For switching vendors, respondents were asked to rate the importance of six 
statements when taking the decision. These statements were adapted from the 
risks associated with outsourcing identified in literature (Kremic et al 2006, Quelin 
& Duhamel 2003, Antonucci et al 1998) and were grouped as three as strategic and 
three as operational efficiencies using Porter (1996). These are detailed in Table 
2 .11.
It appeared that 'changes within the organisation/acquisition or merger' was the most 
important reason to switch, closely followed by 'contractual issues with the vendor'. 
The former seems to illustrate one of the issues with outsourcing previously 
identified in Chapter 2. Shepherd (1999) advocated that long outsourcing contracts 
could lack the flexibility required to adapt to changing business conditions. Even 
with the possibility of high switching costs (Whitten & Leidner 2006), some 
respondents' organisations still chose to switch vendors.
Reason Not
relevant
Unimportant Neutral Important Very
Important
Changes within 
organisation (merger or 
acquisition)
7 3 4 12 2
Contractual issues with 
vendor 5 2 8 10 3
Cost savings did not 
materialise 9 0 9 5 5
Table 6.9 Top reasons for switching vendors
Interestingly, the strategic reasons for switching vendors did not appear to be as 
important, with eleven of the 28 respondents stating that 'Change in organisational 
strategy' was not relevant. Is it that the respondents, predominantly within IT, 
were not aware of a change in business strategy? Also, a number of respondents
quoted "cost savings7 as an additional reason for switching vendors when stating 
that cost savings not materialising was not relevant. Was this an indication that 
these organisations switched vendors to reduce costs further or was something 
else influencing the decision? Could the latter be that the client was not happy 
with the vendor service performance, quality or relationship? This is investigated 
later in this chapter.
For backsourcing, respondents were asked to rate the importance of eight 
statements when the decision was taken. These statements were adapted from the 
reasons associated with backsourcing identified in literature (McLaughlin & 
Peppard 2006, Wong & Jaya 2008, Veltri et al 2008) and were grouped as five 
strategic and three as operational efficiencies using Porter (1996). The full list of 
reasons used in the Survey can be found in Table 2.9.
Reason Notrelevant Unimportant Neutral Important
Very
Important
Cost savings did not 
materialise 2 1 2 5 3
Lack of visibility of IT -  desire 
to regain control 2 0 4 7 0
Change in role -  IT now seen 
as strategic to the 
organisation
4 0 3 4 2
Table 6.10 Top reasons for backsourcing
An operational efficiency reason came out with the highest ranking, 'cost savings 
did not materialise'. One of the survey respondents commented
"Why pay someone for something you can do yourself cheaper."
However, strategic reasons were ranked second and third. These appeared to 
coincide with the reasons given most importance for outsourcing and match the 
findings of the Case Study.
8.6.2 Reviewing Backsourcing Risks
Finally, respondents that had backsourced were asked what were seen as the 
biggest risks when making the decision to backsource. These risks were gathered 
from those stated in literature and as part of the Case Study. Table 2.11 contains 
the full list of backsourcing risks.
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Risks for Backsourcing Notrelevant Unimportant Neutral Important
Very
Important
Disruption to business 
operations 3 0 2 5 3
Loss of IT technical 
knowledge 4 0 3 5 1
Lack of knowledge of the 
process to bring IT back in- 
house
3 3 1 5 1
Deterioration of relationship 
with the vendor 2 0 7 3 1
Loss of senior management 
and/or key staff 4 3 3 3 0
Lack of in-house IT 
management experience 4 3 3 2 1
Transference of Vendor 
contracts with third parties 6 0 5 2 0
Table 6.1 I Backsourcing Risks
The biggest risk was seen as 'disruption to business operations', with 'lack ofknowledge 
of the backsourcing process' and 'lack of IT technical knowledge' following close behind. 
This could be seen to mirror the situation often encountered by organisations 
when initially outsourcing, that lack of knowledge and experience can be used by a 
vendor to their own advantage (Gorla & Lau 2010). This finding mirrors the risks 
identified in the Case Study. The opportunistic behaviour of a vendor in this 
situation has been discussed in Chapters 2 and 5 and will considered further in 
Chapter 7.
6.7 Service Dynamics - SERVDYN
The final instrument in each section of the survey for those that had in-house IT, 
had outsourced, switched vendors or backsourced was SERVDYN -  a set of 22 
statements grouped in five elements, designed to gauge the relationship with their 
IT vendor. The purpose of SERVDYN was to provide an instrument capable of 
comparing the views of respondents in terms of the service received (service 
performance, quality & relationship) from their in-house IT provision or from the 
outsourcing vendor.
The results of each sourcing option were then compared for similarities and 
differences that could act as a predictor of the subsequent sourcing decision taken.
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6.7.1 SERVDYN -  a Refresher
The construction of the SERVDYN instrument was discussed as part of the 
Methods (Chapter 3). The five elements of SERVDYN were:
- Potential Quality: Ability - characteristics that influence the provider's 
ability to excel in both soft and hard qualities
- Hard Process Quality: Technical - what is being performed during the 
service process
Soft Process Quality: Functional - how the service is performed during 
the service process
Outcome Quality: Contribution - the overall rating of the quality of the 
service as perceived by the client in light of any outside influences
Trust: Trust - the client's evaluation of the way the provider acted during 
the performance of the hard and soft processes
The full list of SERVDYN elements and statements are documented in Table 3.5.
One element in the SERVDYN instrument had to be recoded, the third statement 
in the Trust group (TR3). The original statement was 'Important decisions are taken 
without us', where a high value would indicate dissatisfaction, a view contrary to 
the direction of all the other statements in SERVDYN. The values for this statement 
were reversed using the recode function in SPSS, a technique discussed by Bryman 
& Cramer (2009), to deal with situations where an answer is contrary to others in 
the dataset. This statement has now effectively become 'Important decisions are not 
taken ivithout us', and will be referred to as such throughout the rest of the analysis 
to avoid confusion.
Sourcing Category Purpose of SERVDYN
In-house Views of respondents on in-house IT service provision
Outsourcing Views of respondents on current outsourcing vendor
Stayed with the Vendor Views of respondents on vendor where the decision was to stay after a review
Switched Vendors Views of respondents on vendor the client chose to switch from
Backsourced Views of respondents on vendor the client chose to backsource from
Table 6 .12 SERVDYN & the Sourcing Category
For the sake of clarity, the SERVDYN instrument was completed by respondents at
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a number of stages throughout the survey process (Figure 4.5) for collecting the 
views on a particular vendor within a specific sourcing category. Table 6.13 
expands on this.
6.7.2 SERVDYN Reliability
The reliability of a measure, specifically SERVDYN, refers to its consistency 
(Hussey & Hussey 1997). Reliability is generally split into two types, internal and 
external (Bryman & Cramer 2009). The first test of the SERVDYN instrument 
concerned the internal reliability of the scale used for the five elements (PQ, HPQ, 
SPQ, OQ & TR) and their statements, with internal validity tested using 
Cronbach's Alpha. Cronbach's Alpha is a commonly used test for internal 
reliability, i.e. whether the indicators that make up a scale are consistent. Values 
above .70 are considered "acceptable" (DeVillis 2003), although others (Bryman & 
Cramer 2009) consider values over .80 as more appropriate. Responses were 
grouped as either in-house or outsourced to gain an initial perspective. A value of 
.969 for the 22 in-house SERVDYN elements and .951 for the outsourced 
SERVDYN elements suggests that the items have a high internal consistency. Each 
of the elements for in-house and outsourced SERVDYN elements was then 
examined.
The impact of removing each item from the scale is illustrated in Table 6.13. 
Comparing these values with the overall Cronbach's Alpha highlights any 
individual elements that stand out as inconsistent. In this case, only the third trust 
element (InTR3 and OutTR3) appear slightly high. However, removing this item 
would only be appropriate if the overall Cronbach's Alpha was below .7 (Pallant 
2007). With an overall value above .95 on both scales, this does not seem apt. It 
would seem, therefore, that there are no issues with the SERVDYN internal 
validity.
Verifying the external reliability is a little more difficult. Generally, external 
reliability is verified through test-retest or replication (Hussey & Hussey 1997), 
and revolves around whether the results can be generalised beyond the specific 
research context (Bryman & Bell 2003). The low rate of response indicates that the
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r e s u lt s  o f  th e  s u r v e y  a re  n o t  g e n e r a l iz a b le ,  a  w a r n in g  th a t  fu r th e r  r e s e a r c h  is
indicated. A discussion on the validity of SERVDYN is completed in Chapter 7.
SERVDYN
Element In-house
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted Outsourced
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Potential
Quality
InPQI .967 OutPQI .948
lnPQ2 .966 i OutPQ2 .950
lnPQ3 .967 OutPQ3 .949
lnPQ4 .968 OutPQ4 .950
Hard Process 
Quality
InHPQI .968 | OutHPQI .949
lnHPQ2 .968 OutHPQ2 .950
lnHPQ3 .966 OutHPQ3 .948
lnHPQ4 .967 OutHPQ4 .948
Soft Process 
Quality
InSPQI .966 OutSPQI .948
lnSPQ2 .966 1 OutSPQ2 .948
lnSPQ3 .966 OutSPQ3 .948
lnSPQ4 .966 ; OutSPQ4 .949
lnSPQ5 .966 OutSPQ5 .947 1
Outcome
Quality
InOQI .966 OutOQI .947
lnOQ2 .966 OutOQ2 .948
lnOQ3 .969 OutOQ3 .951
lnOQ4 .968 OutOQ4 .948
lnOQ5 .967 OutOQ5 .949
Trust
InTRI .966 OutTRI .948
lnTR2 .967 OutTR2 .948
lnTR3 .979 OutTR3 .960
lnTR4 .970 OutTR4 .949
Table 6 .13 Cronbach’s Alpha -  SERVDYN Elements
It has been established that the data collected via the survey is non-parametric in 
nature; this applies to the data for the SERVDYN instrument also. As a result, the 
following analysis revolved around the median of the values (rather than the 
mean) and the use of such statistical tests as the Mann-Whitney U test for two 
independent samples and the Kruskal-Wallis test for three or more independent 
samples (Field 2005).
6.8 SERVDYN - Multilevel Analysis
The responses for SERVDYN were broken down into their sourcing strategies; in- 
house, outsourcing, stayed with existing vendor, switched vendors and 
backsourcing and subjected to descriptive analysis using Mann Witney and 
Kruskal-Wallis tests for each of the survey elements. Gounaris (2005) argues that
the INDSERV (from which SERVDYN has been adapted) can be considered as a 
unidimensional and a multidimensional construct. A unidimensional construct 
provides the ability to "... capture the underlying meaning of sendee quality." 
(Gounaris 2005, p810)
Gounaris (2005a) suggested that INDSERV could be analysed at different levels of 
abstraction, as a high-level indication that combines all statements, at a second 
level separating out the different elements, and the lowest level looking at the 
statements themselves. Figure 6.6 illustrates the levels of analysis that were 
undertaken as part of the data analysis.
SERVDYN
Potential Hard Process Soft Process Outcome TrustQuality | Quality Quality Quality
2nd Level
1st Level 
Analysis 
- Instrument
-Elem ent
Figure 6.6 SERVDYN - Levels of Analysis
In order to investigate the elements of SERVDYN for each of the IT sourcing 
options, a good graphic illustration is provided through the application of 
boxplots. These are useful when comparing the distribution of variables (Pallant 
2007), with the box representing the inter-quartile range and the line in the box 
being the median. The lines extending from the box illustrate the variable's 
smallest and largest values. Boxplots have been used to provide a visual 
representation of the SERVDYN elements in the following analysis.
SERVDYN was inserted within each set of questions for those that IT sourcing 
provision in-house and had outsourced, switched vendors or backsourced. Due to 
the order of the survey presentation all respondents that had outsourced, 
regardless of subsequent sourcing decisions, completed the outsourcing 
SERVDYN first. In order to evaluate if SERVDYN can act as a predictor of the 
sourcing decision, it was also administered to those that had stayed with their 
existing vendor to explore any potential differences between those that stayed, 
switched or backsourced.
6.8.1 First Level Analysis
The first level analysis consisted of two phases; firstly comparing the combined 
SERVDYN scores for in-house and outsourcing and secondly, comparing the 
combined scores for in-house with those that stayed with the vendor, switched 
vendors or backsourced.
For the first phase, a Mann-Whitney test (with two independent variables; in- 
house and outsourcing) was run to determine if there were differences in the 
SERVDYN score between those that remained in-house and those that outsourced. 
There was a statistically significant difference in SERVDYN scores between in- 
house (Median = 6, Mean Rank 1,016.7) and outsourced IT (Median = 5, Mean 
Rank=675.42), U = 117,736, z = -13.325, p < .001.
The significant difference between the scores for those with in-house IT sourcing 
provision and those that had outsourced is illustrated by the boxplot and 
histogram in Figure 6.7. This appeared to illustrate that in-house IT provision was 
consistently ranked higher than those that outsourced. However, the SERVDYN 
score for in-house has to be treated with caution. It may be that the perception of 
service quality & service relationship is higher for in-house services, or is simply 
down to the fact that the respondents are those working for the in-house IT, a 
phenomenon labelled by Barthelemy & Geyer (2005) as "self-justifying answers" 
(p538). This could only be verified by issuing the SERVDYN instrument to a 
number of users within the organisation external to the IT area.
Sourcing Option
I n h o u s * Outsource
Inhouse Outcome
Sourcing Option Frequency Frequency
Figure 6.7 SERVDYN -  In-house and Outsourcing Combined Statem ents
If the overall score for in-house IT sourcing is to be taken at face value, it would 
seem that the mean rank for in-house sourcing is higher than for outsourcing. 
Therefore, Hypothesis la  'The overall combined score for in-house sourced IT zoill be 
higher than for those that outsourced' is supported.
For the second phase, the analysis started with looking at the overall medians by 
sourcing activity (Table 6.14). At first glance, the highest median of in-house 
sourcing comes as no surprise, along with the highest median after outsourcing 
being for those that stayed with vendor. If an organisation is content, enough to 
take the decision to stay with the existing vendor, the SERVDYN median should 
be higher than those that decided to switch vendors or backsource. This also seem 
to be confirmed by the lower median values for those that switched vendors or 
backsourced. In reality, the medians for the sourcing options are not very 
informative (Field 2005), so a Kruskal-Wallis test was executed. This produces a 
mean rank statistic that is more representative of the sample (Field 2005), the 
results are found in Table 6.14.
Sourcing Option Median Mean Rank
SERVDYN
Inhouse 6 2043.54
Outsourced 5 1439.45
Stayed 5 1477.64
Switched 4 1050.45
Backsourced 4 1233.55
Table 6.14 SERVDYN -  Median & Total Mean Rank by Sourcing Activity
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The Mean Rank seems to illustrate a difference between the SERVDYN scores 
across the sourcing options, with in-house ranked highest, and followed by those 
that stayed with the existing vendor. Again, this was not a surprise, if an 
organisation is satisfied with their existing IT sourcing arrangements there would 
be no reason to change. However, this does bring the discussion back to a point 
made earlier by self-justifying answers (Barthelemy & Geyer 2005).The mean rank 
for those that stayed with the existing vendor is noticeably lower than those with 
in-house provision when, all other things aside, they should be broadly similar. 
One of two things can only explain the difference between the two values: either 
they are Talking up the home team' or there is room for vendor improvement in 
the eyes of the client.
Returning to the analysis, the Kruskal-Wallis Test also illustrated that the null 
hypothesis (the distribution of SERVDYN is the same across the sourcing options) 
can be rejected with p<.001. Looking at the total mean rank, the mean rank for 
those that had in-house provision is higher than those that stayed with their 
vendor, switched vendors or backsource. It would seem, therefore, that 
Hypothesis lb , 'The overall combined score for in-house sourced IT will be higher than for 
those that stayed with the existing vendor, snatched vendors or backsourced', is 
supported. Finally, the mean rank for those that stayed with their current vendor 
was higher than those that switched vendors or backsourced. Hypothesis lc  'The 
overall combined score for those that stayed with their existing vendor will be higher than 
those that switched vendors or backsourced.'
6.8.2 Second Level Analysis
The second level analysis concentrated on investigating the relationship between 
the sourcing option and its elements and the relationship between the elements 
across the sourcing options. It appears there is also a significant difference between 
the element scores across the sourcing options (p<0.05 for all tests). This moves the 
process on to the second level analysis and a more detailed examination of the 
SERVDYN elements across the sourcing options.
Unlike the first level analysis, this stage had five dependant variables (the
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SERVDYN elements), so the starting place for this stage of the analysis was the 
Kruskal Wallis Test. This test (Figure 6.8) indicated that the null hypothesis could 
be rejected and that there is a significant difference (at p<0.05) across all the 
elements for all the IT sourcing options. The boxplots of the SERVDYN scores for 
all elements by sourcing option (Figure 6.8) indicated that the values for the in­
house elements were higher than for those that outsourced. It would seem that 
Hypothesis 2a 'The element scores for in-house IT will all be higher than for those that 
outsourced' is also supported. It also indicated that the score for in-house was 
higher than that for those that stayed, switched or backsourced. As a result, it 
would also seem that Hypothesis 2b, 'The element scores for in-house IT will all be 
higher than for those that stayed with their existing vendor, switched vendors or 
backsourced', is also supported. Finally, with the element scores for those that 
stayed with the existing vendor higher than for those that switched vendors or 
backsource, Hypothesis 2c, "The element scores for those that stayed with their existing 
vendor will be higher than for those that switched vendors or backsourced' is supported.
s
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Figure 6.8 Kruskal-Wallis Test: In-house and Outsourcing Elements
The mean ranks were calculated to give a high-level indication of potential 
differences between the various IT options and the SERVDYN elements (Table
6.15). The results of the mean rank test scores seemed ambiguous and at odds with 
the boxplot in Figure 6.8. The scores for those that stayed with their outsourcing 
vendor seemed to be lower than those that stayed in-house or backsourced, whilst 
the in-house scores were broadly similar to those that had backsourced. Are these 
scores significant?
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IT Sourcing
Potential
Quality
Hard
Process
Quality
Soft
Process
Quality
Outcome
Quality Trust
Mean
Rank
Mean
Rank
Mean
Rank
Mean
Rank
Mean
Rank
In-house
(N=17) 79.18 92.27 113.18 114.62 90.61
Outsourcing 
Stayed (N=19) 66.53 54.81 70.21 68.92 56.30
Outsourcing 
Switch Vendors 
(N=28)
80.28 81.66 95.35 99.27 79.17
Outsourcing
Backsourced
(N=13)
87.29 84.32 119.47 111.04 89.68
Table 6 .15 SERVDYN -  Element Mean Rank by Sourcing Activity
Potential Quality (PQ) looks at the judgement of future ability of a vendor by 
respondents. For those that stayed with their existing vendor, the mean rank for 
PQ was lower than for those that switched vendors. In fact, the PQ value for those 
that backsourced was higher than those with in-house provision as well (Table
6.15). A possible reason for both these apparent anomalies lies in with Szmigin's 
(1993) Relationship cycle and the Cullen et al (2006) outsourcing lifecycle. Both 
advocate the possible detrition of the service relationship over time if the 
relationship is not actively managed. It is proposed that outsourcing is not unique 
in this, and that the relationship between an organisation IT provision and the rest 
of the business has to be managed also. The evidence of the Texaco study 
(Hirschheim et al 2003) appears to corroborate this. However, more research 
would be required to understand if this was the case. It would therefore seem that 
Hypothesis 3, 'Potential Quality will be higher for those that stayed with their existing 
vendor than for those that switched vendors or backsourced' and Hypothesis 4, 'There 
should be no significant difference in Potential Quality between those that switched 
vendors or backsourced' are both unsupported.
Hard Process Quality (HPQ) and Soft Process Quality (SPQ) measure the technical 
and functional quality delivered by the vendor. These correspond with the quality 
indicators, product and service, used by Whitten & Leidner (2006). If a client was 
happy with the current outsourcing vendor, the mean rank for HPQ and SPQ 
should be higher than for those that switched vendors or backsourced. The results
from the analysis (Table 6.15) are contrary to this. Szmigin (1993) noted that as a 
relationship develops, more emphasis is placed on hard and soft process quality. Is 
this reflected in the survey? This is difficult to ascertain, as the respondents were 
not asked how long the relationship with the vendor had been in place; either at 
the time of the survey if the relationship was on going, or at the point at which the 
relationship had ended for those that had switched vendors or backsourced. 
However, a noticeable difference in the mean ranks (Table 6.15) between those that 
stayed with the vendor or switched vendors and those that backsourced seems to 
indicate that factors other than service quality influenced the sourcing decision. It 
is therefore found that Hypothesis 5, 'Hard Process Quality and Soft Process Quality 
will be higher for those that switch vendors than for those that backsourced' is not 
supported.
It is interesting to note that Hard Process Quality was consistently ranked lower 
than Soft Process Quality for all IT sourcing options. Szmigin (1993) specified that 
Hard and Soft Process Quality were important to the day-to-day operation of the 
relationship and that they did affect each other,
"If soft aspects of the relationship are going well, it is likely that some hard errors
will be allowed and visa-versa." (Szmigin 1993, plO)
It would seem that this was the case for the respondents to this research.
Finally, the results of the analysis of the SERVDYN element of Outcome Quality 
and Trust also proved surprising. Gounaris (2005a) sees Outcome Quality as 
explaining the clients concern (or otherwise) of the service being delivered, with 
Szmigin (1993) believing that this element will influence the long term strength of 
the relationship, provided hard and soft process quality does not adversely affect 
the relationship. However, the mean ranking for Outcome Quality and Trust were 
noticeably lower for those that stayed with the existing vendor than for those that 
switched vendors or backsourced. If backsourcing was completed because IT was 
seen as strategic, based on the results of the Case Study, the mean ranking for these 
elements should be the other way round. This apparent anomaly is discussed 
further in Chapter 7.
As a result of the findings for Output Quality and Trust in the Survey, Hypothesis 
6, 'Outcome Quality and Trust will be lower for those that backsourced than those that 
switched vendors' is not supported.
6.8.3 Reviewing the SERVDYN Hypotheses
The SERVDYN hypotheses results are summarized in Table 6.16.
Hypothesis Description Supported?
1a The overall combined score for in-house sourced IT will be higher than for those that outsourced Supported
1b
The overall combined score for in-house sourced IT 
will be higher than for those that stayed with the 
existing vendor, switched vendors or backsourced
Supported
1c
The overall combined score for those that stayed with 
their existing vendor will be higher than those that 
switched vendors or backsourced.’
Supported
2a The element scores for in-house IT will all be higher than for those that outsourced Supported
2b
The element scores for in-house IT will all be higher 
than for those that stayed with their existing vendor, 
switched vendor or backsourced
Supported
2c
The element scores for those that stayed with their 
existing vendor will all be higher than for those that 
switched vendors or backsourced
Supported
3
Potential Quality will be higher for those that stayed 
with their existing vendor than for those that switched 
vendors or backsourced
Not supported
4
There should be no significant difference in Potential 
Quality between those that switched vendors or 
backsourced
Not supported
5
Hard Process Quality and Soft Process Quality will be 
higher for those that switch vendors than for those 
that backsourced
Not supported
6 Outcome Quality and Trust will be lower for those that backsourced than those that switched vendors Not supported
Table 6.16 SERVDYN Hypotheses Summary
It would seem that there were a number of anomalies in the results of the 
SERVDYN instrument; these will be discussed in more detail in the next Chapter.
6.9 Summary
The overall impression from the survey data analysis was that it confirmed the 
findings of previous research in a number of areas and contradicted previous 
findings in others. All results, however, have to be treated with caution given the 
size of the survey response.
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In 2009, Gartner (2009a) said that there had been 6 megadeals (outsourcing 
agreements valued in excess of $1 billion), in 2006, however, there had been 12 
(Potter et al 2007). Does this indicate the end of the "megadeal" and a move 
towards selective sourcing, with smaller deals to multiple suppliers? The results of 
the Survey seem to indicate that there are fewer 'megadeals7 than there were 
previously, none of the respondents stated that their organisation was 
participating in total outsourcing. Lacity & Willcocks (1998) found that selective 
sourcing had higher success rates than total outsourcing or total in-house sourcing, 
so perhaps the move away from the large total outsourcing deals is an example of 
organisation learning.
Chapters 5 & 6 have presented findings from an in-depth case study backsourcing 
and a survey of UK organisations using different research methods. Chapter 7 
discusses these findings and reviews the theoretical and practical implications.
7 Discussion
The purpose of this Chapter is to explore the findings of the Case Study and Survey 
phases of the research. These are discussed and expanded upon in light of the research 
objectives. Useful insights on important literatures and current thinking within the 
field of IT sourcing are used to augment this discussion
7.1 Revisiting the Research Aim & Objectives
Before discussing the findings of the research process, it is perhaps appropriate to 
revisit the research aim and objectives for the empirical research set at the start of 
the research.
Aim:
To add to  th e  
understanding of an  
organisation’s  IT 
sourcing d ec isio n s
5 )  Identify the leve ls  o f  
b acksou icing  activity 
within the United 
Kingdom
Survey
Chapter 6
2 ) To explore what is m eant 
b y  backsourcing w ih in  the 
IT environm ent.
Lite rat ire Review
Chapter 2
3) Identify th e  k ey  
strateg ic  and decision- 
m akrig factors to 
b ack sou rce  IT
Case Study
C hapter 5
4) U nderstand th e  
backsourtin g p r o c e ss  in 
com parison with the existing  
fram eworks for outsourcing
Case Study
Chapter 5
6) Und erst and the sourcing  
decision  p rocess  in term s o f  
th e  d ec isio n  m akers, 
m otives and influences
S u rv e y  
Chapter 6
1) U nderstand w hy organisations  
ch a n g e  their IT sourcing 
strategy and explore the effects  
of the c h a n g es  on their 
_____________provision o f  IT._______
Literature Review
Chapter 2
Figure 7 .1 Research Aim and Objectives
One of the original drivers for using triangulation was that the two phases of 
research would be complementary and developmental (Greene et al 1989). The
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findings from the first phase of the research would provide clarification and 
provide input (development) into the second phase of the research (Greene et al 
(1989). After the Case Study was completed, it was clear that there were two 
directions in which the research could progress.
The first was to identify other organisations that had carried out backsourcing and 
complete qualitative research along the same lines as the Case Study. The concern 
for this approach was access to organisations that had carried out the backsourcing 
process within the previous year (as was the case with ClientCo). As has already 
been articulated, organisations do not often announce backsourcing decisions 
(McLaughlin & Peppard 2006, Veltri et al 2008). Even when they do, information 
released to the media is 'controlled', with the majority of the details treated as 
'commercial, in confidence' between the client and the vendor. Thus, the extent of 
backsourcing was largely unknown.
Tlw Dears fur Clangs 
Otfyjng lb? Backsggrting Dk;m3a Backsourcing
jC w ritd g tM a n a g tin tM  
Asset. 0 * n e f^ iip  & Control
The P ow er & Control
A tr t iw r ite
Divorce
3) Identify  th e  key stra teg ic  and 
decision-m aking fac to rs to  
bac k so u rc eIT  (DECISION- 
STRATEGIC)
5 ) Iden tify  th e  levels of 
backsourcing  activity w ith in  th e  
United Kingdom (ACTIVITY)1
CASE
STUDY IT Sourcing SURVEY
IS/IT Sourcing Cycle 
Actions & Deliverables 
Same as outsourcing?
4 ) U nderstand the  
backsourcing  process 
in com parison w ith th e  
ex isting  fram ew orks 
for outsourcing  
(PROCESS)
Stay, switch or back 
Is Backsourcing a Trend? 
Selective Sourcing
6 ) U nderstand th e  sourcing  
decision p rocess  in te rm s  of the 
decision m akers , m otives and 
in fluences (DECISION- 
SERVICE DETERMINANTS)
Service Performance,
Quality (  Relationship 
Using SERVDYN as a Window on 
the Case Study
SERVDYN A the Relationship Cycle 
Revisiting 'IT as Commodity’ vs. 
'IT as Strategic'
Figure 7.2 Research Findings
In the Case Study, the researcher was in a privileged position to access and 
interpret answers in the same manner, as previously discussed in Section 4.3.2. 
This advantage would be limited if the research was to be extended to other
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organisations where backsourcing if IT had occurred. With this in mind, the 
decision was taken to follow the second direction identified, to ascertain the extent 
of backsourcing activity within the United Kingdom and shed light on the decision 
making process in other organisations. This shift in emphasis is what Greene et al 
(1989) would categorise as intuition. This is defined as the desire to explore the 
paradoxes and contradictions found (Greene et al 1989) in the first phase of the 
research, specifically within the decision phase of the IT Sourcing Cycle.
The rest of this chapter reviews the findings, in light of the research objectives, of 
the Case Study and Survey. The following sections are grouped according to the 
research objective, with Figure 7.2 providing an overview of the contents of each.
7.2 Backsourcing IT -  Strategy and Change
This section concentrates on a discussion of the main findings within the areas of 
strategy and change within the IT backsourcing arena. Contrasting the findings of 
the Case Study and the Survey, the implications for practical application are also 
discussed.
7.2.1 Business Strategy & IT Strategy
From the literature review, it seems that business strategy and the IT Strategy are 
inexorably linked. An outsourcing strategy for IT sourcing, therefore, is made at 
the highest level and the IT strategy is set accordingly. The assumption that if there 
is no change is business strategy, then the result should be no change in IT 
strategy. Both the outsourcing and backsourcing of IT at ClientCo were triggered 
by a shift in business strategy -  the interesting thing here is that for outsourcing IT 
was seen as part of the problem, for backsourcing IT was seen as part of the 
solution. For the latter, it was the change in business strategy that led to the review 
of the IT strategy.
From the end of the second interview within the Case Study, it was clear that a 
pattern was beginning to emerge. ClientCo were in the process of rapid 
reconstruction, what Johnson et al (2011) term a Turnaround strategy'
"...where the emphasis is on speed of change and rapid cost reduction and/or
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revenue generation." (p484)
Beer and Walton (1987) stated that change in a turnaround situation is likely to 
proceed quicker because the perceived need to change is higher and the resistance 
to change lower as a result. For the backsourcing decision made by ClientCo, it 
was clear that the perception of the CEO was that the outsourcing agreement was 
not suitable for the organisation as it went through significant change and business 
re-alignment. As a result, the resistance to backsourcing was low within ClientCo, 
it was seen as necessary to facilitate the required 'turnaround strategy'.
Figure 7.3 illustrates the process ClientCo went through in terms of business and 
IT strategy.
Business
Strategy
Review
Business
Change
Strategy
IT Change 
Strategy
IT Strategy 
Review
Figure 7.3 Strategy and Change
Why would ClientCo make a decision on strategy change without IT strategy 
change at the same time? In a way, the IT review revealed a problem discussed 
further in Section 7.2.5 when reflecting on relationship power and control. 
Determining and implementing business innovation with IT as part of the 
'turnaround strategy' would not be an issue with in-house IT -  discussing these 
with a vendor, however, may be a different matter. Although confidentiality
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agreements would be in place, from the researcher's experience such discussions 
with a third party IT provider would still cause unease. ClientCo had an 
inadequate vision of the whole of IT (as discussed in Chapter 5) & therefore felt 
alienated. A full discussion with VendorCo on strategy central to the future 
success of ClientCo would therefore seem unlikely before the business strategy 
had been set. It seems reasonable to assume from the Case Study that in the case of 
ClientCo, business strategy was set & drove the IT strategy review (Figure 7.3). 
This eventually led to the decision to backsource IT.
How Senior Executives view IT also goes a long way towards setting the direction 
of IT strategy. Is IT seen as a core competence or as a commodity - merely a 
necessary cost the organisation has to pay? If business strategy provides the 'what' 
in terms of the direction of IT, the IT strategy sets the 'how' it will be implemented. 
It is at the 'how ' stage that IT becomes more complicated. In the past, the choice 
was between in-house and outsourcing, often as an all or nothing. However, as 
illustrated in the literature review, it is within the IT strategy and the subsequent 
categorisation of IT functions and systems, that the decision can be taken on what 
is considered as 'IT as commodity' or 'IT as strategic' moving more towards the 
idea of selective sourcing (Lacity et al 1996). Selective sourcing is discussed further 
in Section 7.4.2. In the case of ClientCo, the 'what' had been decided, the 'how ' was 
then reviewed and backsourcing seen as the only viable option.
7.2.2 Pushing for IT Strategy Change
A clear finding from the Case Study was that the IT changes under the outsourcing 
agreement were not bringing the expected business benefit. Whether this 
perception was ClientCo wide or just in the eyes of the CEO is not clear -  what 
seemed clear was the perception of a disconnect between IT and the business. Was 
this just because IT had been outsourced? In a longitudinal study within Texaco, 
Hirschheim et al (2003) found that even a successful IT department responsible for 
the corporation was perceived by Senior Executives as ineffective and costly 
overhead. In this study, Texaco had gone through various IT souring models with 
varying degrees of success. Brown & Hagel (2003) stated that in a McKinsey report
only 6 out of 59 industries noted a significant positive correlation between IT 
investments and productivity. It was suggested that it was changes in business 
practices that leveraged IT capabilities (Brown & Hagel 2003). This leads to an 
interesting question; did ClientCo contribute to the failure of the outsourcing 
agreement by not changing business practices to accommodate the new IT systems 
delivered by VendorCo? This is beyond the scope of this research, but certainly an 
area for further research, particularly with the apparent emphasis in literature on 
'strategic outsourcing partners' (DiRomualdo & Gurbaxani 1998, Fan 2000).
7.2.3 Driving the Backsourcing Decision
For the Case Study, it was apparent that the new CEO drove the decision to 
backsource once an organisational review had taken place. Johnson et al (2011) 
stated that the CEO is
"...often seen as 'chief strategist', ultimately responsible for all strategic 
decisions." (p500).
It is no surprise, then, that the backsourcing process could be said to be driven 
from the top. Given the basis for the decision, conflict resolution methods in 
outsourcing disputes proposed by some (Klepper and Jones 1998, Bahli & Rivard 
2003) were superfluous. The desire for a clean break (INT2) meant that 
backsourcing was the only real option. Switching vendors was just dismissed as 
'more of the same'. Interestingly, within the Survey the top reason quoted for 
backsourcing was that cost savings did not materialise. However, the reasons 
ranked second and third were associated with either strategic change within the 
organisation or the strategic perception of IT. Is this a 'throwback' to a point made 
earlier in Chapter 5, where the perception of the interviewees was that the decision 
was made by the CEO for strategic reasons, with reasons such as cost savings were 
given externally?
Looking at the official reasons and benefits stated by the interviewees, it was clear 
that these coincided with those found by McLaughlin & Peppard (2006) and Veltri 
et al (2008), but these were reasons articulated in articles and press releases. It 
would seem that further research into other instances of backsourcing, based on 
empirical research, would be indicated to see if the results are generalizable to the
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backsourcing market in the UK as a whole.
For switching vendors, such reasons linked to strategy were absent from the top 
three reasons in the survey research and were all linked with operational 
efficiencies rather than strategy. Does this suggest that switching vendors is 
completed for reasons of operational efficiencies rather than strategy? This point 
was validated by the findings from the survey when looking at the level within an 
organisation IT sourcing decisions is made (Section 6.5.2). For outsourcing, the 
decision seemed to be more attributable to the CEO, Board of Directors and Head 
of IT. For switching vendors, although the Head of IT was often involved, so was 
Middle Management. This is interesting in itself as the latter were very rarely 
involved in the original outsourcing decision. Would it be reasonable to assume 
that outsourcing is a strategic decision and that switching vendors was completed 
for operational efficiencies? This implies that although the organisation was 
unhappy with the vendor, the strategy to outsource remained intact.
7.2.4 Reaching the IT Sourcing Cycle Tipping Point
In the case of ClientCo it seemed that a Tipping point' had been reached; that point 
at which an organisation moves from Operation to Decision in the IT Sourcing 
Cycle -  a desire to review the current IT sourcing arrangements, whether they are 
in-house or outsourced to a vendor. The decision can be made based on any 
number of criteria, but ultimately comes down to either a specific strategy or 
desired operational efficiencies (Porter 1996) The eventual decision, be it 
outsourcing, switching vendors or backsourcing, basically boils down to 'stick or 
twist'. 'Twist' represents a change to the existing arrangements and, as the 
association with a card game suggests, represents a gamble -  the organisation does 
not know what it is getting until it turns the card.
For ClientCo, one factor that contributed to the 'tipping point' and therefore the 
decision to backsource revolved around the calculation of the switching costs. 
These are often seen as a barrier to making a decision to switch vendors or 
backsource (Whitten & Leidner 2006). Bahli & Rivard (2003) saw these costs as 
being constituted of termination costs and handover and implementation costs.
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For ClientCo, the position on termination costs was complicated by the fact that 
the outsourcing agreement was terminated "for convenience" (INT2). Once the 
decision had been made, the cost of termination had to be negotiated with 
VendorCo (INT5), a situation that essentially held up the transition process for 
three months (INT2). However, even when all the switching costs were taken into 
consideration, the backsourcing decision paid for itself within two years (INTI).
Porter (1997) argues that 'fit' within an organisation is more important than the 
management trends towards 'core competencies' and 'critical' resources ignores 
the idea of 'fit' surrounding functional policies
"Fit locks out imitators by creating a chain that is as strong as the strongest link."
(P70)
and
"Competitive advantage grows out of the entire system of activities." (p73) 
Could this be a reason, then, why companies backsource their IT? Does this 
explain why IT was outsourced by ClientCo in the case study as it was not 
considered a core competence, suddenly became one five years later? Is it that the 
organisation realised that VendorCo (and therefore outsourcing) did not 'fit' 
anymore? DiRomualdo & Gurbaxani (1998) proposed a model that assigned four 
levels of business impact objectives for IT, from better aligning IT with business 
through to implementing IT-enabled business change and performing IT-intensive 
business processes. Again, this returns to the idea that the CEO did not believe that 
the changes required within IT to align with the business change under the 
regeneration programme could occur with VendorCo controlling IT.
The consensus from all interviewees was that the contract was terminated 'for 
convenience', similar to the reasons attributed to the termination of the 
outsourcing agreement between Sears, Roebuck and Co. and Computer Sciences 
Corporation (McDougall 2006b). In this case, each party sued the other but chose 
to accept mediation and a settlement rather than a protracted court case. Sears, 
Roebuck and Co. had a lot to lose going to court; CSC were still providing IT 
services until an agreement was accomplished (McDougall 2006b). There would
appear to be a parallel between events at Sears, Roebuck and Co, where a change 
of senior management led to a review of a major outsourcing deal (McDougall 
2006b) and the circumstances ClientCo encountered.
7.2.5 Relationship Power & Control
The principle of control was a very strong theme within the Case Study and the 
Survey. Contrary to the advice of Currie & Willcocks (1998) and Fowler & Jeffs 
(1998), ClientCo outsourced IT at a time when it perceived to be in trouble. As 
Verhoef (2005) described it, they threw the problem over the fence. As a result, it 
exacerbated the problem in terms of control of IT by abdicating responsibility for 
it. The importance of control and ownership will be returned to later in this 
chapter.
One of the statements made by an interviewee was that they could not judge if 
some of the decisions being made on their behalf by VendorCo were in their "best 
interests", the implication being that decisions on which IT systems packages 
selected were not necessarily the best "fit" for business benefit (INT2). It was clear 
that VendorCo managed to re-platform key systems (INT6), what was not clear 
was whether they were "fit for purpose" (INTI). The clear message from the 
interviewees was that the early work completed by VendorCo on desktop systems 
and other infrastructure systems (INT4), what could be considered as 
underpinning systems in the Strategic Diamond (Figure 2.4). The questions about 
"value for money, fit for purpose" revolved around the systems developed in the 
latter stages, those that could be considered inside the strategic diamond (INT2). 
Was the decision to backsource made partly because expected business benefit 
from those new systems did not materialise? Again, "Fit for purpose, value for 
money" (INTI) comes to mind.
As discussed previously in Chapter 2, Clemons & Hitt (2004) identified three types 
of opportunistic behaviour; poaching, deliberate underperformance and abuse of 
power. It is the third point, the abuse of power, which ran as a common theme 
throughout the case study. The perception was that VendorCo were guilty of this 
during the outsourcing agreement (high costs for new projects just being one
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example) and during the subsequent backsourcing transition (cherry-picking staff, 
withholding access to staff etc.). Although there were no allegations of poaching, a 
concern was expressed that VendorCo's relationship with a major competitor 
presented the possibility of a conflict of interest, with only VendorCo's insistence 
that "Chinese walls" were in place to provide protection against such an 
occurrence (INTI, INT2). It was the unease with this arrangement that provided 
another concern for ClientCo that added to the decision making process.
7.2.6 Asset Ownership & Control
Within the Case Study, it was highlighted that the interviewees stated that the idea 
of control of IT was a major driver for backsourcing. Returning to the framework 
proposed by Cullen et al (2005) mention in Chapter 2, Table 7.1 illustrates that the 
ownership and control of the categories proposed by Cullen et al (2005) within the 
outsourcing relationship. Two specific points in time were considered important 
by the interviewees: the "start" of the agreement and when the review of the 
agreement took place prior to the backsourcing decision. This clearly illustrates the 
imbalance between ClientCo and VendorCo in terms of ownership and control.
Resource Ownership ControlStart Review Start Review
Assets Hardware Joint ClientCo VendorCo VendorCoSoftware Joint ClientCo VendorCo VendorCo
Facilities Offices VendorCo ClientCo VendorCo ClientCoData Centre ClientCo ClientCo VendorCo VendorCo
Labour Direct VendorCo VendorCo VendorCo VendorCoManagement VendorCo VendorCo VendorCo VendorCo
Table 7.1 Resource Ownership Matrix
Along the lines used by Hart (1989), the assets required for the outsourcing 
agreement between ClientCo and VendorCo can be split into nonhum an (non­
specific) and human (highly specific) assets. In the last few years of the agreement, 
the nonhuman assets were owned by ClientCo and the human assets by VendorCo 
(INT6). Essentially, VendorCo owned the specific assets, i.e. the people - ClientCo 
owned the non-specific assets, i.e. the IT infrastructure.
Why could the different ownership of the non-specific and specific assets be 
important in the ClientCo/VendorCo relationship? This idea of ownership seemed 
to have been the source of frustration or even disagreement within the 
ClientCo/VendorCo relationship. It may provide part of the explanation of the 
'black box' impression held by the ClientCo interviewees (INTI, INT2). ClientCo 
eventually gained full control of the non-specific assets purchased as part of the 
joint agreement prior to the termination of the outsourcing agreement (INT6). 
Owning the assets (infrastructure, hardware and software) did not mean that 
ClientCo had control over them. The source of conflict may have been that 
ClientCo only controlled the nonhuman assets. It was the human assets belonging 
to VendorCo that dictated how the non-human assets were deployed and used as 
part of the outsourcing agreement. Control of the assets owned by ClientCo was 
therefore with VendorCo. Returning to the comments made by interviewees 
earlier, it could be that one of the benefits around this question of ownership 
voiced by one of the interviewees is key
"The ability to own the picture, as opposed to anyone else deciding what the picture 
looked like, in terms of how it was run, executed and operated" (INTI)
To take the analogy further, ClientCo owned the picture, knew how big the picture 
was and how much it cost, but not what it looked like. One of the reasons put 
forward for this was that
"You weren't wholly visible of the decisions you were making. The layers between 
the organisations were too thick." (INTI)
A thought occurs when examining the idea of non-specific and specific assets as 
proposed by Williamson & Tweedy (1986). Is this another way of categorising IT as 
commodity (non-specific) and strategic (specific)? Is asset specificity a factor in 
deciding whether an asset can be considered commodity or strategic, particularly 
within an outsourcing relationship?
The split of ownership and control between ClientCo and VendorCo seemed at 
odds with current literature. ClientCo owned the IT infrastructure and VendorCo 
the human assets. Applying the "IT as Commodity vs. IT as Strategic" principle 
and the IT Strategic Diamond (Figure 2.4) framework, it would seem that ClientCo
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did not have ownership or control over any part of the Strategic Diamond or, for 
that matter, the rest of the Triangle. Essentially, ClientCo had ownership of the IT 
infrastructure, but not of the human assets that would transform the "IT as 
Commodity" into "IT as Strategic." Ultimately, it may have been the lack of 
control that provided the main driver to backsource; the cost savings just made the 
business justification easier. ClientCo's perception of IT changed because of the 
recovery programme to seeing the whole of IT as competitive/transformational. 
This may have been due to the black box nature of the agreement with VendorCo - 
they could not see what parts of IT were sustaining/supporting.
7.3 Backsourcing -  Learning the Lessons
The fourth research objective was to understand the backsourcing process and 
compare this with the outsourcing process. It is clear that the backsourcing process 
was different from the outsourcing process for ClientCo in the Case Study, but 
how different?
7.3.1 Actions & Deliverables
Applying the IT Sourcing Cycle to the backsourcing process carried out in the Case 
Study illustrated a number of key actions or deliverables for each phase many of 
which were not apparent to ClientCo when the decision was taken to backsource.
For ClientCo in the Case Study, backsourcing was seen as 'simple' in terms of the 
requirements. As long as they had the people, the commercials and could run the 
systems once it was transitioned that was all that was required (INTI, INT2). This 
seems a little rudimentary in terms of the backsourcing project overall, but it does 
provide the areas key to the success of the process. Table 5.1 identifies the risks 
and issues discovered during the Case Study.
Returning to Cullen et al (2006) discussed previously in Section 3.1.5, it is thought 
provoking to use this list as a basis for what was completed by ClientCo as part of 
the backsourcing process. As mention previously, Cullen et al (2006) created four 
stages within the Outsourcing Lifecycle Model: Architect, Engage, Operate and 
Regenerate. This was compared with the IT Sourcing Cycle and the key activities
were matched with those identified by Cullen et al (2006) as part of the 
backsourcing process. The resultant analysis can be found in Appendix 7.
This analysis seems to indicate a significant difference between the activities 
expected for outsourcing and those indicated as necessary for backsourcing, as 
indicated by the Case Study (see Appendix 7).
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DecisionTipping Point 
Can force
Business Strategy
Broken
agreement Dictates/ Contract
Trigger Point
TransitionBusiness
Operation
T ra n sfer sDemands
Handover
PointProvide 
services 
for PeopleTo carry outIn-house & Multiple Vendors 
Figure 7.4 The IT Backsourcing Cycle
Figure 7.4 illustrates the backsourcing process for ClientCo. Although there is no 
current connection between Operation and Decision, it is suspected that, in 
common with other organisations (Hirschheim et al 2003), the cycle will be 
completed at some stage in the future. Subsequent to the Case Study interviews, 
ClientCo followed an IT strategy based on selective sourcing in order to achieve 
operational efficiencies, thus completing the cycle.
Finally, an area that was not considered during the decision phase by ClientCo but 
became apparent once the transition started, that of 'keeping the lights on' during 
the transition from VendorCo (INT2). Essentially, ClientCo had to fund additional 
VendorCo management resource to manage the transition process whilst the 
existing VendorCo management continued to manage the service provision. This 
additional real charge had not been factored in to the original backsourcing cost
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calculation (INTI).
7.3.2 Lessons from the Transition
It was clear from the Case Study that there were a number of lessons learnt by 
ClientCo during the Transition phase advocated in the IT Sourcing Cycle (Figure 
3.2) that are worth considering in a wider context. One was that business and IT 
capabilities largely abdicated to VendorCo had to be accomplished by ClientCo 
during both the transition and once the outsourcing Transition was complete, 
along with the issue of knowledge management during the backsourcing 
transition. In the case of the later, ClientCo had to ensure that the requisite skills 
within IT were either retained or re-acquired. This is discussed in Section 73.2.2. 
However, ClientCo encountered a larger, unanticipated, issue, that of the 
breakdown of the relationship with VendorCo.
7.3.2.1 The Acrimonious Divorce
Research originally carried out by the author while with VendorCo (Butler 2005) 
seemed to show a disconnect between IT (VendorCo) and the business (ClientCo). 
At the time, however, this was also a 'one way study/ with only the views of 
VendorCo staff available. What both studies have in common was the perceived 
disconnect between IT and the business. This is not uncommon and has been 
found in literature even when the IT department is in-house (Peppard & Ward 
1999, Hirschheim et al 2003). Other studies have shown this disconnect between an 
outsourced IT function and the client (Hirschheim et al 2003, Wong & Jay a 2008, 
Veltri et al 2008). So, is the problem a vendor perception issue, or an IT perception 
issue? For the latter, it would not matter whether IT was outsourced or in-house. 
One of the reasons given in early outsourcing research was the gap between IT and 
the business, the perception that IT was poor value for money, a non-strategic 
function and that the value of IT was just not understood (Willcocks et al 1995, 
Kremic et al 2006). These reasons, though, were used as justifications for 
outsourcing but seem to be as applicable for backsourcing.
One aspect that became clear during the research was that ClientCo was unhappy
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with the agreement with VendorCo, although it had been renegotiated only two
years previously (INT2). The issue was that this re-negotiation was completed
under previous ClientCo IT senior management. Part of the reason for this unease
may be explained by the inexperience of previous management when carrying out
the outsourcing re-negotiation. As Bahli & Rivard (2003) state
"Because of its awareness o f the impact of contractual clauses, a supplier with 
much expertise with outsourcing contracts may very well haggle more than an 
inexperienced one during the process of reaching an agreement" (p215)
Chakrabarty & Whitten (2011) go further, stating that outsourcing contracts
negotiated and managed by "business executives" rather than "IT executives"
tended to lead to lower outsourced product quality. Lacity & Willcocks (2001)
illustrated this by stating
"While these 'CEO-handshake' deals may have saved money in the short term, the 
relationship deteriorated in several cases as the consequences of a poorly negotiated 
deal became evident." (pl61)
The subsequent issue is that as time passes and IT requirements evolve, the
"business executives" tend to make poor deals with the vendor because of their
lack of competence in IT (Lacity & Willcocks 2001). This was a point made by one
of the interviewees during the case study.
"I would say that ClientCo abdicated, not outsourced, abdicated IT. They basically 
said to VendorCo, we don't know how to run an IT function, we've got to make a 
big step change in technology and do it for us." (INT2)
This was very much a 7CEO-handshake7 deal. IT specialists were recruited to 
manage the outsourcing agreement, but only after the contract had been running 
for nearly two years (INT2, INT6). Prior to that, there was no controlling IT 
function, so VendorCo was dealing directly with "business executives". This 
subsequently led to the perception of the new CEO that the agreement had not 
been executed in the best interests of ClientCo.
It is clear from the Case Study that the breakdown in the relationship contributed 
significantly to the issues encountered during Transition and, subsequently, 
Operation. As the contract was terminated 'for convenience7 similar to Sears, 
Roebuck & Co (Tadelis 2007), negotiation of an exit plan was made more difficult 
because VendorCo appeared to act in a predatory manner. As Barthelemy (2003)
noted,
"The end of the outsourcing contract must be planned from the outset. Building 
reversibility clauses into the contract is crucial." (p95)
It is not clear from the research whether the exit strategy in the original contract 
was sufficiently robust, what was clear was that it was sufficiently ambiguous to 
cause major conflict between the parties and held up the transition process. This 
significantly increased the complexity of the transition for ClientCo.
This raises the issue of an exit strategy and its importance. With nearly 12% (n=6) 
that outsourced in the Survey stating that they did not have an exit strategy, a 
follow-up question for those that switched vendors or backsourced may possibly 
have been whether the exit strategy (if it existed) aided the transition from the 
incumbent vendor.
Learning from the Case Study came in a number of areas, the main one of which is
that all is not always as it appears. Bhagwatwar et al (2010) came to the conclusion
that Sainsbury's backsourcing process was successful and that
"Another important aspect of backsourcing is to ensure the co-operation of the 
outsourcing vendor. Sainsbury's, even after the backsourcing decision, was able to 
maintain good relations with Accenture." (pl69)
It would seem then, that all was amicable between the two organisations when the
outsourcing agreement was terminated. These conclusions were reached through a
study of secondary data; company accounts, media releases etc. From the Case
Study, empirical research in the Teal world', it appears that all may not be as
amicable in such a situation as the organisations involved would have the outside
world believe. The Case Study paints a picture that in such a situation a
relationship breakdown -  an acrimonious divorce -  can be the result. The question
to ask is which situation is more likely; the swan above the surface or the parts of
the swan below it? In truth, the real relationship at the time between ClientCo and
VendorCo could be seen as a private/ public persona, the public persona is the
swan gliding across the surface, the private the frenetic activity below the water. A
better analogy may be that of an iceberg, the one third above the water is what the
two organisations involved want the world to see, the two thirds below could sink
the reputations of the organisations of involved, just like the Titanic, if it became
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public. This is the crux of the matter - a mutual interest in the real relationship 
breakdown not entering into the public domain.
Clearly, the breakdown of the relationship between ClientCo and VendorCo made 
the transition difficult in a number of areas, the negotiation around the termination 
of the agreement being one that has been noted earlier in this section. It also had a 
'knock-on7 effect in the key area of knowledge management.
7.3.2.2 Knowledge Management
Johnson & Scholes (2002) stress the importance of knowledge and knowledge 
management when considering strategic capability. If IT had been backsourced to 
increase the strategic capability of ClientCo, it is the application of knowledge, 
tacit and explicit, in the merged organisation that would increase the strategic 
capability of the organisation as a whole. Within the survey, loss of IT technical 
knowledge was seen as one of the main risks of backsourcing.
Referring back to the discussion in Chapter 2 on the effect of learning on an 
organisation when a component is outsourced (Anderson & Parker, 2002) if IT is 
seen as the component outsourced, it would be VendorCo that would accrue the 
learning. This is because the integration piece - the implementation and use of the 
live IT systems - would be shared between VendorCo and ClientCo. The latter 
would be responsible for integrating the new IT system into its business processes.
It became apparent from the Case Study that ClientCo acknowledged a lack of IT 
management skills in a number of areas. To try and put the extent of the skills 
shortage into context, the framework of IS Core Capabilities proposed by Feeny & 
Willcocks (1998) was used; firstly to identify the areas required for outsourcing, as 
proposed by Feeny & Willcocks (1998) & then to apply it to backsourcing and the 
areas of experience needed when backsourcing.
The whole area of staff engagement to encourage staff to transfer back to ClientCo 
seemed to go over and above that which a Vendor starting an outsourcing 
agreement would expect to implement. From personal experience, the engagement
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with VendorCo started within a week of the outsourcing agreement being 
announced. A number of large meetings were held regularly during the 
outsourcing transition. It is apparent that this ran contrary to the co-operation 
from VendorCo during the backsourcing transition, where ClientCo could not 
speak to a member of VendorCo IT without a VendorCo Senior Manager being 
present.
Using the nine IS Core Competencies advocated by Fenny & Willcocks (1998) 
illustrated in Figure 2.1, it would seem that the three categories of 'Business and IT 
vision', 'Delivery of IT Services' and 'Design of IT architecture' would be divided up 
between the client and the vendor in the case of total outsourcing. In the case of 
ClientCo and VendorCo, the 'Delivery of IT services' and 'Design of IT architecture 
would be in the remit of VendorCo, although ClientCo would carry out 'Contract 
monitoring' and 'Vendor development', albeit that the latter was only VendorCo. 
VendorCo themselves dealt directly with IT vendors. However, it is with the 
category of 'Business and IT vision' that conflict may have been created. It was 
found in the Case Study that the IT systems being delivered were not 'Fit for 
Purpose' -  was this due to a mismatch in the business thinking and the design of 
the systems delivered? Alternatively, was it because the business visions of 
ClientCo and VendorCo were different, each wishing to maximise benefit from the 
relationship.
So, it would seem for backsourcing (or even in the case of selective sourcing) that 
all the areas are relevant, this implies a number of areas that suddenly become in 
scope for ClientCo, specifically the 'Design of IT architecture , an area they would 
have relied solely on VendorCo for delivery. This seems to validate a statement 
made by one of the interviewees,
"It's like moving from using a taxi to driving your own car." (INT5)
This concept of capabilities that a backsourcing organisation has to re-acquire is 
also applicable to the issue of knowledge management. This is addressed shortly.
Finally, if IT had been backsourced to increase the strategic capability of ClientCo, 
it is the application of knowledge, implicit and explicit, in the merged organisation
that would increase the strategic capability of the organisation as a whole. Within 
the survey, loss of IT technical knowledge was seen as one of the main risks of 
backsourcing
7.3.3 Are Backsourcing and Outsourcing the Same?
Determining whether outsourcing and backsourcing are the same depends upon 
the way it is viewed. From the perspective of the IT Sourcing Cycle, they both go 
through the same phases. In terms of the detailed tasks and the viewpoint of the 
client, it would appear they are not. In the previous section, the outsourcing 
building blocks and tasks proposed by Cullen et al (2006) were compared with the 
tasks carried out by ClientCo (Appendix 7). It would seem from the evidence of 
the analysis (Appendix 7) that backsourcing and outsourcing are different in terms 
of the necessary processes to deliver a backsourcing or outsourcing project.
For ClientCo, it was clear that the outsourcing and backsourcing process were not 
the same. Issues around knowledge management, staff retention and the lack of 
co-operation from VendorCo highlighted areas for backsourcing (INTI, INT2) that 
were not issues during the original outsourcing process.
ClientCo considered themselves lucky that VendorCo keep the outsourced IT as an 
autonomous, identifiable unit. For many large outsourcing agreements, a client's 
IT, once outsourced, is often broken up and re-distributed among the vendors 
other IT resources. This includes data centre consolidation and using staff on 
multiple client assignments (Hirschheim & Lacity 2000, Kakabadse & Kakabadse 
2002). It was this lack of consolidation by VendorCo that made the backsourcing 
decision easier for ClientCo (INT2).
Finally, can switching vendors and backsourcing be considered the same? Process 
wise and conceptually the answer would have to be no. In the case of switching 
vendors, a client has someone on their side -  the new vendor! This returns the idea 
of ownership and control. The new vendor will own the newly transferred 
infrastructure/functions/systems and it is therefore in their best interest to ensure 
that the transition process runs smoothly. Olzmann & Wynn (2012) confirmed that
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such a transition could be difficult because the old vendor may not be motivated to 
carry out such a process.
7.4 Sourcing Activity in the United Kingdom
The Survey was instigated to advance the understanding of the IT sourcing 
activity and the associated decision making factors within UK organisations. This 
section discusses what was found, along with the implications for practice.
7.4.1 Stay, Switch or Back?
The IT Sourcing Cycle was used primarily during the Case Study, providing a 
structure with which to organise the semi-structured interviews. The Interview 
Guide (Appendix 3), grouped by each phase of the IT Sourcing Cycle, both 
provided a focus and allowed for flexibility in the interview process (Bryman 
2008). Although the interview questions and sub-questions were the basis for the 
order of the interview, it was clear from the majority of the interviewees that the 
process of decision, transition and operation provided a logical split in the way 
they saw the backsourcing process carried out within ClientCo.
The main question, though, is whether the sourcing cycle actually occurs in 
organisations. The research carried out within this thesis seems to corroborate the 
phases in the cycle, but do organisations go through the full cycle multiple times? 
The Case Study demonstrated an organisation that had completed the sourcing 
cycle twice, once for outsourcing and again for backsourcing. Evidence from the 
Survey seems to support similar activity. From the Survey of 69 respondents, 
75.4% (n=52) had outsourced, with half of those (n=28) switching vendors and a 
further 7% (n=5) backsourced after the initial outsourcing. An additional 11% 
(n=8) backsourced after the vendor switch. All of the respondents to the Survey 
stated that they had reviewed their outsourcing contracts, with just over half 
(n=27) stating that they had renegotiated the contract. The Survey results seem to 
endorse that the sourcing cycle has been completed three times (outsource, switch 
vendors and backsource), by at least eight of the respondents. Lacity & Willcocks 
(2000) and Deloitte (2005) both found that outsourcing was not the end of the IT 
journey -  at some stage in the future the sourcing cycle starts again.
7.4.2 The Rise of Selective Sourcing
The Case Study represented the reversal of what Gartner (2007) term as a 'mega 
deal' (those outsourcing contracts worth more than $1 billion). However, these 
deals could be considered as being in the minority and becoming less common 
(Gartner 2010). The findings from the survey seemed to be an indication of this, 
with only 6% (n=3) of the respondents being what was characterised as total 
outsourcing (i.e. greater than 80% of annual IT budget), with the IT budgets for the 
three total outsourcing respondents varying from £1-10 million to greater than 
£100 million per annum. The majority of the agreements seemed to indicate there 
had been a move towards selective outsourcing, a trend also supported in recent 
years (Lacity & Willcocks 2000, Lacity et al 2009). What could be contributing to 
this trend?
Lacity et al (1996) and King & Malhotra (2000) both stated that the total in-house 
sourcing solution was often completed with the purchase of contractors (otherwise 
known as IT freelancers), individuals who had the specific skills on a contractual 
basis to complement the knowledge and skills of IT employees within an 
organisation. These contractors could be hired and terminated according to 
workload, flexibility not possible with permanent employees. However, 
government tax legislation brought into force in 1999 in the UK made IT 
freelancing less lucrative (ContractEye 2011). Along with the downturn in demand 
for contractors post year 2000 and the increasing use of foreign workers (The 
Register 2003a), the result was that work for IT freelancers dried up (The Register 
2003b). Because of the effective reduction in IT freelancers, organisations in the UK 
had to look at ways of augmenting expertise without increasing operational 
expenditure (i.e. via permanent employees). One way was to bring in consultancy 
provision for specific projects from companies such as Tata Consulting, Infosys 
and Cognizant - effectively implementing selective outsourcing (The Register 
2003a). This approach had an added benefit -  reduced cost by way of offshoring. 
Such an approach does not come without its negatives, the discussions of which 
are beyond the scope of this research.
It must be borne in mind, though, that selective sourcing has been around for some 
time, being noticed by Willcocks et al as early as 1995. However, with 50% (n=26) 
of the survey respondents stating that their level of outsourcing was below 20% of 
their IT budget, it is difficult to draw conclusions with the findings of similar 
surveys. Lacity & Willcocks (2000), for example, defined less than 20% of the IT 
budget as total insourcing. It was found that 30% (n=19) of respondents to the 
Survey described this as the scope of their sourcing decisions (Lacity & Willcocks 
2000); the question is whether the organisations actually considered some of that 
spend as being on outsourcing. At face value, it would seem that there is a shift in 
sourcing strategy when comparing Lacity & Willcocks (2000) with the survey 
carried out as part of this research with selective sourcing becoming more 
prevalent. What is not known is whether it is a shift in the perception of what 
constitutes outsourcing or the lack of granularity for the scope of outsourcing in 
the survey instruments themselves.
The categories used to group the level of outsourcing within an organisation 
clearly have to be revised; perhaps even to the level of how outsourcing itself is 
defined. The original definition of outsourcing used in this thesis used was,
"... the significant contribution by external vendors in the physical and/or human 
resources associated with the entire or specific components of the IT infrastructure 
in the user organisation." (Loh and Venkatraman 1992a, p9)
However, what can be considered a 'significant contribution? Would a vendor be 
considered as making a significant contribution if they represented 15%, 25%, 50% 
or 75% of the IT budget? The contribution cannot be decided on IT budget alone, it 
also has to be judged in terms of the impact on the whole business organisation. 
Again, the focus returns to the idea of IT being seen either as a commodity or as 
strategic.
Although Table 6.6 represents the sourcing decisions taken by those organisations 
that responded to the survey, the number of responses (n=69) is too small to be 
able to say that it is representative of the UK IT sourcing market. For backsourcing, 
Lacity & Willcocks (2000) found that 20% (n=4) of respondents within the UK that
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had cancelled outsourcing contracts elected to bring the function back in-house. 
Whitten & Leidner (2006) found the backsourcing rate at 34% (n=54) for their US 
based survey. For this research, backsourcing represented 19% (n=13), if this was 
extrapolated for the total invited to take part in the survey for this research, that 
would represent 150 organisations.
7.4.3 Is Backsourcing a Trend?
As early as 1998, Rudy Hirschheim stated that
"...there's an inexorable move toward backsourcing among companies that 
outsource. I think the trend is unmistakable." (Outsourcing-Center.com 1998)
Given the effort to outsource some or all of their IT, why would an organisation
backsource? Dreyfuss & Scardino (2006) state that
"Insourcing after outsourcing is not a trend. It is most often a response to changes 
in business conditions, leadership or the organization." (p2)
This seems a little dismissive of backsourcing (termed insourcing here). It could 
also be argued that outsourcing was a 'response to changes in business conditions' 
(Baden-Fuller et al 2000). Does that mean that the rush to outsource post-Kodak 
(Loh & Venkatraman 1992b) was not a trend? Looking at the reasons for 
backsourcing identified by Dreyfuss & Scardino (2006) and found in the Survey, it 
is clear that it is a response to business conditions etc., but then again, the same can 
be said for outsourcing. The main influence not mentioned by Dreyfuss & Scardino 
(2006) is that of business strategy. Secondary research (McLaughlin & Peppard, 
2006, Veltri et al (2006) and the Case Study seems to substantiate that backsourcing 
can be because of a shift in the view of IT to being a core competence. This 
represents a change in business strategy. Dreyfuss & Scardino (2006) also state that 
backsourcing often occurs because of a change in CEO. What needs to be 
considered is why the CEO was changed. In the case of ClientCo, it was a result of 
shareholder's perception of poor organisational performance.
Hirschheim (Outsourcing-Center 1998) specified that
"Our prediction is that backsourcing is one of the latest trends in the outsourcing 
arena. One might be tempted to say that outsourcing is like a pendulum. It started 
with companies developing their own IT departments, then it swung totally to an 
environment where the IT service was provided by an external party. The 
pendulum, I would contend, is now swinging back the other way."
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The IT market has become more sophisticated since this statement by Hirschheim, 
as will be discussed in the next section. However, it would seem from the evidence 
of the Survey that backsourcing has been part of the IT sourcing landscape for a 
while & will continue to be so. Nevertheless, from the evidence of the Survey a 
caveat has to be stated. Of the 19% (n=13) that backsourced (Table 6.10), nine 
involved less than 20% of the total IT budget & four represented 20-80% of the IT 
budget.
Finally, Veltri et al (2008) indicated that backsourcing activity seemed to be limited 
to large high-profile deals. Evidence from the Survey seems to contradict this, 
perhaps because the smaller backsourcing deals are not subject to press releases or 
were not considered newsworthy -  just 'business as usual'. In fact, none of the 
Survey respondents backsourced to the extent of ClientCo in the Case Study.
7.5 The IT Sourcing Decision Process
The final research objective was to understand the sourcing decision process in 
terms of the decision makers, motives and influences. The decision-making process 
for outsourcing (Chapter 2) and backsourcing (Chapter 5 and earlier sections of 
this chapter) have already been discussed. The Case Study and the literature 
review seem to confirm that the reasons for outsourcing and backsourcing appear 
to be very similar, as is the case for those that choose to switch vendors. So, one 
question remains - what determines whether an organisation chooses to 
backsource or just switch vendor?
7.5.1 Service Performance, Quality & Relationship
The split between 'commodity' and 'strategic' becomes important when looking at 
the service relationship with a vendor if the function or system is outsourced. If 
commodity, the service relationship is more likely to be maintained at a formal 
contractual level, controlled by the contract and Service Level Agreements. If 
strategic, literature indicates that the emphasis switches to a more informally 
controlled relationship with the vendor, using the flexibility of such a relationship 
to benefit both parties (but specifically the client, or so they hope!). Measuring such 
a relationship then becomes more complex, so the proposal of the SERVDYN
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instrument to gauge the status of the relationship was proposed. This instrument 
emphasises the perception of the relationship from the client user perspective and, 
it is suggested, could act as an early indicator of service relationship issues before 
the relationship breaks down completely.
The results from the survey indicated that nearly 20% of respondents stated that 
their organisation had backsourced some of their IT in the last five years (Table 
6.10), with strategy changes and lack of cost savings being given as the major 
reasons. For those that switched vendor, lack of cost savings and contract issues 
predominated. So, it would seem that a change of strategy, with the view that IT 
had been re-categorised as strategic, was a major factor in the backsourcing 
decision -  a stance that was substantiated by the Case Study. The drivers for 
backsourcing have already been identified in the Case Study, specifically the CEO 
and the business recovery programme. Ffowever, also revealed in the Case Study 
by interviewees was that the perception that the outsourcing agreement was not 
delivering on what was required, with issues of trust being raised. Were there 
other issues in the relationship that contributed to the CEOs view?
7.5.2 Using SERVDYN as a Window on the Case Study
With SERVDYN used in the Survey as an instrument to 'quantify' the perception 
of service performance, quality and relationship, could it be applied to the Case 
Study retrospectively? Reflecting on the Case Study using the SERVDYN elements 
and statements provided an opportunity to shed light on the decision process for 
backsourcing. SERVDYN was not actually administered to the interviewees but it 
was possible to map some of the responses to SERVDYN statements. This mapping 
was completed in terms of whether the statement had a positive, neutral or 
negative effect on the ClientCo/VendorCo relationship. These have been 
summarized in Table 7.2.
Neutral was assigned either where there was no effect on the relationship or was 
not mentioned by the interviewees. A number of the assigned values need a little 
background perspective. Firstly, the statement rating of positive and negative for 
"Accepts tasks enthusiastically" has to be explained. INT2 stated that VendorCo were
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willing to accept all requirements from business users (a positive) but that these 
were accepted, whether right or wrong, because they were a revenue stream for 
VendorCo. This explains why the statements "Challenges i f  necessary" and "Looks 
after our interests" were also negative.
E le m e n t D e s c r ip tio n S ta te m e n t R e la tio n s h ip  E ffe c t
Potential
Quality
Abilitv - characteristics 
that influence the 
provider’s ability to 
excel in both soft and 
hard qualities
Have required personnel Positive
Have required facilities Neutral
Have required management 
philosophy
Negative
Has a low personnel turnover Neutral
Hard
Process
Quality
Technical -  what is 
being performed during 
the service process
Stays in budgets Negative
Meets deadlines Negative
Looks at details Neutral
Understands our needs Negative
Soft
Process
Quality
Functional -  how the 
service is performed 
during the service 
process
Accepts tasks enthusiastically Positive and Negative
Listens to our problems Neutral
Open to suggestions/ideas Negative
Challenges if necessary Negative
Looks after our interests Negative
Outcome
Quality
Contribution - the 
overall rating of the 
quality of the service 
as perceived by the 
client in light of any 
outside influences
Reaches objectives Negative
Has a notable effect Negative
Contributes to our 
sales/image
Neutral
Is creative Neutral
Is consistent with our strategy Negative
Trust
Trust -  the client’s 
evaluation of the way 
the provider acted 
during the performance 
of the hard and soft 
processes
Have our best interests at 
heart
Negative
No need to question their 
motives
Negative
Important decisions are taken 
without us
Negative
Job done right even without 
our input
Negative
Table 7.2 The SERVDYN Elements
Even a cursory look at Table 7.2 would seem to indicate why the decision was 
taken to alter the existing IT sourcing arrangements. With all the elements 
predominantly negative (14 out of 22 statements) and all the Trust statements 
negative, the breakdown of the relationship comes as no surprise.
Reviewing the contents of Table 6.15 (SERVDYN -  Element Mean Rank by
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Sourcing Activity), a pattern was noticed that may be meaningful. Taking the 
mean rank and converting it to a rank order within the four options gives rise to 
Table 7.3.
IT Sourcing
Potential
Quality
Hard Process 
Quality
Soft Process 
Quality
Outcome
Quality Trust
Order Order Order Order Order
In-house
(N=17) 3 1 2 1 1
Outsourcing 
Stayed (N=19) 4 4 4 4 4
Outsourcing 
Switched (N=28) 2 3 3 3 3
Outsourcing
Backsourced
(N=13)
1 2 1 2 2
Table 7.3 SERVDYN -  Element Ordered Ranking by Sourcing Activity
What seems striking is that, apart from potential quality, the in-house or 
backsource options are rated in the first two places. Is this another indicator that 
backsourcing decisions are made on a basis other than that of service performance, 
quality and relationship?
It would seem that there may be a 'chicken and egg' situation here; was the 
decision made by the CEO of ClientCo because of, or in spite of, the service 
provided by VendorCo? Did perceived poor service shape the view of the CEO or 
was the perception there already, with poor service seen as a justification for the 
action taken.
7.5.3 SERVDYN & the Relationship Cycle
The experience cycle (Szmigin 1993) seems to offer an insight into the Client 
Co/Vendor Co agreement. Szmigin (1993) argues that as the clients' experience of 
a service grows, so would their self-confidence in the use of it. As was articulated 
by (INT6) in the Case Study, one of the issues that became apparent was the 
different areas of the business became more and more sophisticated in terms of 
requirements for new systems. Although originally talking of such areas as legal 
services and market research, Szmigin (1993) makes a point that could easily 
transfer to IT in the light of the Client Co decision. Commenting on the use of
those services, Szmigin (1993), said that,
"  using such services on a regular basis may decide, after a certain level of
experience has been reached, to end a long standing relationship and provide all or 
part o f the service themselves by employing expert personnel.. feeling confident 
that they now have the experience to do so." (pl5)
As the cost of IT solutions increased over time, a number of areas within the 
ClientCo business started to go straight to suppliers with system requirements, 
sourcing those requirements outside the agreement with VendorCo (INTI, INT2).
Szmigin (1993) noted that quality issues will arise at some stage in a relationship 
and highlights a number of situations that can lead to changed hard/soft quality 
problems - the perception by the client of the service being offered, changes in top 
management or a change in company objectives being just three of them. This 
would seem to sum up the Case Study in a nutshell. ClientCo changed CEO and 
undertook a major regeneration program. As has already been established in 
Chapter 5, the CEO felt that the service being offered by Vendor Co was not in 
ClientCo's best interest (INT2), with INT6 voicing the opinion that this view was 
" . . .across the board".
The Relationship Cycle, proposed by Szmigin (1993), provides what could be an 
interesting insight. This looks at the relationship in terms of the relative 
expectations/satisfaction of each party to the agreement over time. It is argued 
that the expectations and satisfaction levels of each party in a relationship are 
rarely the same, the danger being that if the levels are too out of line it may result 
in the termination of the agreement. It would seem from the case study the relative 
expectations/satisfaction of ClientCo was in a different place to those of 
VendorCo. ClientCo were not happy in a number of areas - being able to 
implement strategy change, cost and control of IT being the three main areas. Was 
it this misalignment that contributed to the CEO's view that the outsourcing 
agreement was not in the best interests of ClientCo, leading to the decision to 
backsource?
226
7.5.4 Revisiting ‘IT as Commodity’ vs. ‘IT as Strategic’
This brings the discussion back to the idea of "IT as Commodity" or "IT as 
Strategic". For ClientCo, the decision was taken to backsource the whole of IT as a 
unit. There was some discussion around leaving some of the IT functions in the 
outsourcing arena, but this was discounted at an early stage. Does this mean the IT 
was seen as strategic by ClientCo? The important issues were cost and control, 
these seem to align more with Porter's (1996) operational efficiencies argument, 
rather than a strategic improvement. It was clear that IT was seen as important in 
terms of recovery programme, but was it seen as strategic?
Moving on, it was clear in the case study that the strategic change within ClientCo 
was the driver for the start of the review process. ClientCo also saw IT as a 'black 
box'. Could it be the lack of sight meant that they could not distinguish between 
commodity and strategic IT; that ClientCo needed to backsource in order to work 
out what was strategic for the organisations recovery programme? This suggestion 
that IT, once seen as a commodity, may actually be a core function seems to have 
been confirmed in other organisations (McLaughlin & Peppard 2006). Lack of 
flexibility within the outsourcing contract also meant that ClientCo could not 
change IT Strategy without considerable cost within the outsourcing agreement, 
this was essentially what forced ClientCo into reviewing the agreement. During 
contract negotiation, it was clear that backsourcing IT was the cheapest long-term 
option (INTI, INT2).
Does the Strategic Diamond for IT (Figure 2.4) provide an insight into the strategic 
motive for IT backsourcing? There were a number of comments from interviewees 
(INTI, INT2) over the frustration of IT being seen as a 'black box'. It could be 
perceived that this lack of clarity on IT led to ClientCo not being able to clearly 
define the transformation and competitive IT functions and systems in business 
terms. This could lead to business inefficiency because of knowledge of system 
capabilities. This would have created a business-IT disconnect that would have 
become more visible because of ClientCo's desire to restructure the business.
From the survey and the case study results, it seems that the original Strategic
Diamond can be developed further. Looking at the classification of the IT functions 
in Table 2.13, it would appear that they can divided into commodity or strategic 
and that this division apparently aligns with Porter's (1996) split between strategy 
and operational efficiencies. Figure 7.5 illustrates a possible re-conceptualisation of 
the original Strategic Diamond proposed by Edwards & Peppard (1997), with the 
two areas of the pyramid being split to highlight the focus of IT in relation to the 
functions and systems concerned.
Looking at Figure 7.5, it could be argued that the Infrastructure and Sustaining 
triangles are IT as Commodity. Whilst Infrastructure is clearly commodity, the 
Sustaining systems are those that may have been Competitive but the competition 
has caught up, or are systems that may be different to competitors but do not 
provide competitive advantage -  application packages tailored specifically for the 
organisation would be an example. Although this tailoring would make the overall 
system unique, there would be sufficient suppliers in the marketplace with the 
necessary generic skills to make the systems 'commodity-like'. Essentially, both 
areas could be subject to an outsourcing agreement that would not require 
specialist knowledge on behalf of the vendor.
However, the move of a function or system from Competitive to Sustaining may not 
be the end of the story. Szmigin (1993) makes an interesting contribution to the 
Commodity vs. Strategic argument, pointing out that a system could move 
through what Mathur (1984) originally termed a transaction life cycle for the 
industrial products market. The implication is that a system could start as 
Competitive & move to Sustaining, but subsequently be repackaged with new or 
existing software. This augmentation could be perceived as facilitating a move in 
the strategic diamond between the Sustaining and Competitive triangles.
The nature of transformational systems also changes slightly. This could be better 
termed as transitional systems. Transformational systems (processes), as originally 
stipulated by Edwards & Peppard (1997), provide the future capabilities. The 
implication from Edwards & Peppard (1997) is that these are the competitive 
advantage of the future. Within the IT arena, however, this 'creation' of new
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systems can be for a number of reasons and not necessarily just for competitive 
advantage. Systems to improve or streamline business processes, for example, 
would provide operational efficiencies.
The IT Functions & Systems Triangle (Figure 7.5) could also be seen as an 
alternative to the IT Portfolio proposed by Lacity et al (1996). The advantage of the 
IT Functions & Systems Triangle is that it clarifies the split of IT functions and 
systems in terms of their relevance to the business organisation as a whole. As part 
of the strategic review, for example, the business functions could be categorised 
along the lines of the IT Strategic Triangle, classifying business functions as 
infrastructure, transitional, sustaining and competitive. The IT functions and 
systems could then be mapped to the business functions and systems.
Those IT Functions or Systems that 
provide the organisation with a 
competitive advantage
Those IT Functions or Systems 
that provide future capabilities 
(may or may not provide 
competitive advantage)
Competitive \
IT Systems ^
Transitional \ /  
IT Systems f t
I
f  Infrastructure if  IT SystemsSustaining IT Systems
Those IT Functions or Systems 
that are necessary for the 
organisation to operate in the 
chosen industry that are 
different from competitors
Those IT Functions or Systems 
that are necessary for day to 
day operation (Desktop systems, 
email, word processing, 
Spreadsheet software etc)
The IT Strategic Diamond
Indicates possible moves between triangles (Adapted from Edwards & Peppard 1997)
Figure 7.5 The IT Functions & Systems Triangle
There is also a possibility that a system that started out to provide operational 
efficiencies could actually end up as a competitive advantage -  a classic case of an 
emergent strategy (Mintzberg et al 1998). It is also transitional because it is the 
move of an existing or new system to a new state and, at some stage, usually when 
the system 'goes live', will result in a change within the business organisation. This
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change may be evolutionary or revolutionary in nature. However, there is also the 
possibility that the system does not come to fruition, as is the case with around 
11% of all IT projects (El Emam & Koru 2008). What should be clear from the 
outset, however, is whether the transitional system is part of business strategy or 
operational efficiencies, and is therefore TT as Commodity' or 'IT as Strategic'.
One possible emergent property of the IT Functions & Systems Triangle is that it 
could be used to review the overall spend or IT. Is there too much expenditure on 
sustaining systems, do the Competitive systems really offer the expected 
competitive advantage and strategic benefits? A regular reassessment of these 
functions and systems and their categorisation should be treated as a key 
vindication for a system or function to continue as part of the IT organisation.
It would seem, given the change in business strategy to execute a recovery 
programme within ClientCo, that backsourcing might have been partly motivated 
by the desire to implement IT-enabled business change with
"...the ability to say that you want to go in a specific direction without having to 
debate and argue with a third party for the right to do so." (INT2)
This idea of IT-enabled business change seems to return us to one of the Strategies 
for Change (Table 2.2) proposed by Bloodgood and Salisbury (2001), that of 
'Reconfigure with new resources'; the new resources this time being backsourced IT.
In summary, it is possible to set IT sourcing strategy using the IT Functions & 
Systems Triangle to categorise functions and systems, and then make a decision on 
the appropriate sourcing strategy dependent on whether the business drive is 
business strategy or operational efficiencies (using Porter 1996).
One of the conclusions from this study by the author is that total outsourcing is not 
a good option for a prudent organisation. Outsourcing agreements generally last 
over 5 years (as evidenced in Chapter 2) and, as it was for ClientCo, this removes 
flexibility should wider business issues, such as non-competitiveness, need to be 
addressed.
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IT as 
Commodity
Figure 7.6 The
7.6 Reviewing & Evaluating the Research Approach
It is important to review and evaluate the success or otherwise of the research 
process holistically. Whether the research objectives were met is reviewed in 
Chapter 8.
7.6.1 Case Study - Lessons Learned
Although the Case Study interview process went well, it was clear that further 
interviews with key participants in the backsourcing process would have 
enhanced the validity of the research further. Firstly, within ClientCo, the issue 
was identifying potential participants who had the requisite knowledge of the 
backsourcing process. A number of people were available that had transitioned 
from VendorCo, but it was clear from the interviews already held with this group 
that, although senior within VendorCo, they did not have 'inside' knowledge of 
the decision and transition issues identified by the ClientCo Project Team. Those at 
VendorCo at such a level during the transition moved back to VendorCo once the 
transition was complete, part of the "cherry-picking" process mentioned in
Selective
Sourcing In-house
Outsource SelectiveSourcing
Operational Efficiencies Strategy
Business Imperative
IT Sourcing Strategy
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Chapter 5. With no access to VendorCo staff at the time of the research, it has to be 
acknowledged that only one side of the story is being portrayed in this research.
To balance the issue of 'one-sidedness' in terms of views, it must be acknowledged 
that the researcher was one of the members of staff that had been outsourced 
originally to VendorCo, and then backsourced five or so years later. Gummesson 
(2000) believes that the number one challenge for a researcher is ".. .access to reality" 
(pl4). It is questionable whether the access granted to the researcher would have 
been allowed to an 'outsider'. The researcher also has an in-depth pre­
understanding (Gummesson 2000) of the organisation and its culture, both from a 
ClientCo and VendorCo perspective having worked for both.
Unsurprisingly, issues arose during the interview process, the main one of which
was the perceived power imbalance between the researcher and the senior
members of management interviewed as part of the research process.
"Clarke (1995) states that power relations always exist in research situations and have 
the potential to influence subjects. The specific power issues must be identified and 
their likely effects evaluated in every research situation, particularly in insider 
research." (Hewitt-Taylor 2002, p35)
In one particular interview, this resulted in rather terse answers to the first few
questions, so a more 'open discussion' approach was adopted until the interviewee
opened up by answering more fully.
Kvale (1996) proposed two contrasting metaphors to describe the interview 
process:' interviewer as a miner and ' interviewer as a traveller'. The miner unearths 
facts or seeks out nuggets of information to be quantified or understood in the 
context of the real world. The traveller, on the other hand, takes a journey on 
which discovery takes place through talking to people. This dialogue is transcribed 
as stories and remoulded as new narratives via the traveller's interpretations. It 
would seem that for this thesis, the research was a miner and traveller at different 
times within the Case Study; a miner in the initial interview questions, with 
follow-up questions and conversation taking the guise of the traveller. One way to 
perhaps set this in context was that the 'what' questions were as a miner, with the 
'w hy' questions as a traveller -  the context of decisions and actions were just as
important as the decisions and actions themselves.
7.6.2 Assessing the Survey
For a web based online survey, it is very easy for a respondent to exit the survey 
before completion; the 'exit door7 is just one click away! Because of this, an online 
survey is just as likely to suffer from non-response as a paper-based survey (Sue & 
Ritter 2007). For a paper-based survey, a respondent can look through the whole 
survey and decide whether they wish to answer the questions. For a web-based 
survey, they are shown a set of questions (or only one depending on the design) at 
a time and would not see 'w hat is coming'. Given the 'one click away from exit' 
nature of an online survey, it is very easy for a respondent to exit a survey if they 
do not like the next question or set of questions. Although question non-response 
is more likely in paper-based surveys because you can enforce answers online (Sue 
& Ritter 2007), carrying this out may put the respondent in the position of 
answering a question they do not like or just exiting the survey altogether. For this 
research, exiting the survey occurred 12 out of the 81 that started the survey, just 
under 15%. One potential respondent entered the respondent key and exited on 
the first question.
Benamati & Rajkumar (2008)
"A limitation of this study is the low response rate, 5.33% of the executive decision 
makers surveyed. Response rates in surveys of executive level individuals are often 
low due to the numerous demands on their time." (p95)
Cycyota & Harrison (2006), in a study of response rates found in journals
published between 1992 and 2003, noted that the response rates to surveys sent to
top managers declined steadily over time. Cycyota & Harrison (2006) also found
that targeting CEOs was less effective as their mail and email was often screened
by assistants and would often not be seen by the CEO themselves. However,
"We found that surveys that appealed to the right person in the organization and 
about a topic of importance to the industry, of current interest, and with potential 
changes to the organization received higher responses in executive populations." 
(Cycyota & Harrison 2006, pl46)
Given the targeting of the appropriate respondent (via the use of the Computing 
mi database) and the relevance of the subject matter, the low response rate came as
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a surprise. One of the potential respondents actually went to the trouble of sending 
a letter to explain why they were not going to respond to the survey, citing time 
constraints!
Following up the initial survey invitation with a reminder a few weeks later is an 
often-used technique (Dillman 2007, Sue & Ritter 2007). However, one of the 
conditions of use for the Computing mi database was a "one contact only' 
restriction. This meant that a follow-up was not permitted. At the time, this was 
not thought to be a major restriction by the researcher. However, with follow-ups 
often resulting in another half of the original response (Sue & Ritter 2007) this 
could have made a significant difference to the validity of this stage of the 
research.
It would seem that the 80/20 split used to categorise outsourcing as Tittle or no' 
'selective' or 'total' outsourcing was insufficiently granular. Although this 
categorisation has been used in a number of other studies (Lacity & Willcocks 1998, 
Lacity & Willcocks 2000, Lee et al 2004), the move in the outsourcing market 
towards selective outsourcing (Brooks 2006). Goo et al (2007) used eight categories 
for average annual contract amount with the vendor as a percentage of the total IS 
budget. This seemed to swing too far to the other extreme. One of the categories, 
for example, was 'from 3% to less than 7%'; the issue being that the respondent 
would have to know the annual IS budget and the value of the vendor contract. A 
scale of, perhaps, 5% or less, 6-20%, 21-50%, 51-90% and more than 90% may be an 
approach for any future research.
7.6.3 Reviewing the SERVDYN Instrument
SERVDYN as an instrument was used as a 'w indow on IT sourcing', looking at a 
specific outsourcing relationship. A number of the results in Table 6.15 and the 
unsupported hypotheses (Table 6.16) seem to run contrary to the findings of 
Whitten & Leidner (2006). It would seem, on face value, that SERVDYN could not 
be used as an indicator of IT sourcing intent. However, for this research, 
SERVDYN was only answered by a small response set -13  in the case of those that 
backsourced, and was only a 'snapshot' i.e. completed just the once. To test the
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validity of SERVDYN it is necessary to carry out further research.
So, has SERVDYN actually accomplished anything? Looking at the IT Sourcing 
Cycle (Figure 3.2), administering SERVDYN at various stages in the Cycle may 
lead to a clearer picture of IT sourcing intent. Additionally, SERVDYN can be used 
whatever the sourcing strategy within an organisation, be it total in-house, 
selective sourcing or total outsourcing. In a selective sourcing environment, it has 
the flexibility to be applied to each vendor, providing a pluralistic not a unitary 
view of IT sourcing. It could be used as a 'window on outsourcing', a way to 
compare the service performance, quality and relationship of multiple vendors on 
a comparative scale.
It is proposed that SERVDYN should be used as an extension of the standard 
contract management and due diligence process; organisations would carry out as 
part of their outsourcing contract management. SERVDYNs generally subjective 
nature could help to plug gaps identified in earlier Chapters concerning 
incomplete contracts and SLAs (Alborz et al 2003, Ho et al 2003). If completed at 
regular intervals throughout an outsourcing agreement to track how the 
SERVDYN element change over time, mapping these against the relationship 
lifecycle proposed by Szmigin (1993) and the outsourcing lifecycle suggested by 
Cullen et al (2006)
Finally, is SERVDYN affected by the perception of IT as either 'strategic' or 
'commodity'? Such a perception could affect how the SERVDYN elements are 
viewed in terms of importance. For example, if an IT function or system was 
viewed as 'IT as Commodity', service delivery aspect would be seen as more 
important than whether the vendor 'adds to the bottom line' via Outcome Quality. 
The motivation for outsourcing would undoubtedly be to achieve operational 
efficiencies, so adherence to contract and SLAs would predominate in terms of 
service management. For 'IT as Strategic', Outcome Quality becomes more 
important, as does Trust. Strategic agreements as often less stringent to allow for 
changing circumstances (Quelin & Duhamel 2003), being able measure Outcome 
Quality and Trust over time provides a method of tracking the less tangible
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aspects of the service relationship.
7.6.4 Research Limitations
There are a number of limitations within the research carried out that became 
apparent, some that were addressed as part of the research process and others that 
have to be acknowledged is limitations that could be addressed in further research. 
The latter will be covered predominantly in Section 8.4.
A major piece of the jigsaw missing was the views of those that remained with 
VendorCo after the transition was completed. This was acknowledged as a 
weakness as part of the discussion on the Case Study methods in Chapter 4. An 
attempt was made to balance the observations of the interviewees by selecting 
senior management from the project team responsible for bringing ClientCo's IT 
back in-house and these that worked for VendorCo that transitioned back to 
ClientCo. However, it is clear that access to VendorCo interviewees would have 
enriched the research process significantly. Given the level of animosity between 
ClientCo and VendorCo that became apparent during the ClientCo interviews, it is 
not surprising that such co-operation was not forthcoming.
Completing the Case Study interviews a year or so after the backsourcing process 
had been concluded allowed the interviewees to reflect on the process without 
being too long ago for thoughts and opinions of the process to be forgotten. This 
approach had two advantages. Firstly, the animosity that clearly developed 
between ClientCo and VendorCo may have clouded the views of the interviewees 
had the exercise been completed during or just after completion of the 
backsourcing process. Secondly, the one-year gap allowed for meaningful 
commentary on the progress of the Operation stage of the IT Sourcing Cycle. Such 
data may not have been available had the research process been carried out earlier. 
However, it must be acknowledged that that this phase of the research, like the 
survey, represents the observations of the interviewees at a particular moment in 
time. Completing the research as a longitudinal study with multiple interview 
points may have been an alternative approach, although negotiating such access in 
a commercial environment may have been very difficult.
Finally, the Case Study was completed within only one organisation where the 
reasons for backsourcing became very clear. Carrying out a similar exercise in a 
number of organisations would contribute greatly to the validity of the findings of 
the research.
The usefulness of the Survey was restricted by the low response and a number of
improvements for future surveys have been identified in Table 7.4.
Number Issue Resolution
1.
For those that had in-house, no 
opportunity to rank outsourced (check 
wording on survey). For those that 
outsourced, no opportunity to rank any 
in-housed provision.
Change order of section presentation so 
that those with outsourcing have the 
opportunity to complete an in-house 
section as well
2.
Ambiguity of job titles -  did the 
respondents have the prerequisite 
knowledge to answer the questions?
Potential respondents were asked to 
pass the survey invite to a more 
appropriate colleague if necessary -  no 
way of tracing if this was the case.
3. Convoluted method used for online survey -  did this put respondents off?
The survey was large and took around 
15 minutes to complete
4.
Inability to follow up initial invite with a 
reminder would have affected the 
number of responses adversely -  
computing Ml restrictions!
Additional data sources for sample 
required
5. Addition of questions on the length of the relationship
Gives some idea of where in the 
relationship cycle they are positioned, 
with higher mean ranks being attributed 
to a newly formed relationship
6.
Clear that most respondents had some 
in-house IT would have been useful to 
ask “do you have in-house” before the 
question “have you outsourced” -  this 
would have given a more complete 
comparison of in-house vs. outsourced
Same as Issue 1.
7.
What about sending survey to senior 
business executives rather than just IT 
execs
Provides an outsider; view of the IT 
function as may help to offset self- 
justifying answers.
Table 7.4 Identified Survey Issues
7.7 Summary
The findings from the research seem to show that the IT Sourcing Cycle is valid 
and the framework it provided helped to structure the empirical research process.
The re-conceptualisation of the Strategic Triangle proposed by Edwards & 
Peppard (1997) may resolve one of the problem areas in outsourcing identified in
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Chapter 2, i.e. "one man's strategic is another man's commodity". The IT Functions 
& Systems Triangle (Figure 7.5) could be used within any organisation to classify 
the IT functions and systems. The sustaining systems (required to compete within 
a chosen industry) create a pointer to the areas that are more likely to create 
competitive advantage. Bloodgood & Salisbury (2001) advocated that to 
'reconfigure with new resources' provides an opportunity for strategic 
improvements in terms of a move towards the creation of a core competence -  re- 
platforming or upgrading a sustaining system could be seen as such a move.
Systems and functions that are categorised as competitive are those that contribute 
to the core competences of the organisation. These should therefore not be 
considered for outsourcing. The loss of control over such systems can lead to lack 
of flexibility and the ability to change business strategy in the future.
It would seem that the breakdown of the outsourcing agreement between ClientCo 
and VendorCo was almost inevitable from the start. Cullen et al (2005) identified 
that one of the risks of a total outsourcing agreement is a loss of control that can be 
addressed by relationship management. The abdication of control by ClientCo 
over IT at the outset of the outsourcing agreement, and a poorly drafted agreement 
that was considered "naive" (INT2), created a relationship management vacuum 
that VendorCo seemed to take advantage of. Could this situation have been 
predicted? Completing SERVDYN retrospectively based on the responses from 
interviewees seemed to show the areas for concern, although use of SERVDYN in 
the Survey for such predictions proved inconclusive at best.
The Survey did seem to illustrate that backsourcing is an actively considered as 
part of an organization's IT sourcing strategy, with outsourcing IT just one of the 
sourcing strategies within the IT Sourcing Cycle.
The final Chapter looks at the overall effectiveness of the research and covers the 
contribution to knowledge made by this research.
2 3 8
8 Conclusion
This Chapter reviews the effectiveness of the research approach against the original 
research objectives. The contribution to knowledge is discussed, followed by the 
limitations of the research. Finally, the areas for further research are identified, 
concluded with the final thoughts of the researcher.
8.1 Reviewing the Research Objectives
The initial aim of the research was provided an understanding of an organisation's 
IT sourcing decisions, specifically looking at the areas of outsourcing and 
backsourcing, with a view to bringing further understanding in the area of 
backsourcing as an IT phenomenon. This section discusses how the research 
objectives were met and identifies the specific conclusions that have been 
developed.
1) U nderstand w hy org anisation s  
ch a n g e  their IT so u rch g  
strategy and explore the e ffects  
of the ch a n g e s  on their 
proviso  n o f  IT.
2 ) To explore what is m eant  
b y  backsourcing w th in  the 
IT environm ent.
Literature Review
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Chapter 2
4) U nderstand th e  
b ack sou ran g  p r o c e ss  in 
com parison  with the existing  
fram eworks for outsourcing
Case Study
Chapter 5\
Aim:
To add to  th e  
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sourcing d e c is io n s
\
3) Identify th e  k e y  
strateg ic  and decision  
m aking factors to 
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Case Study
C hapter 51
5 ) Identify the lev e ls  o f  
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within the United . 
Kingdom  
---------------------------------------> \ 6) Understand the sourcing  decision  p ro cess  in term s o f  th e  d ec isio n  m akers, m otives and influences
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Figure 8 .1 Research Aim and Objectives
Research Objective 1
To understand why organisations change their IT sourcing strategy and explore 
the effects of the changes on their provision of IT.
The influence on IT Sourcing strategy, specific business strategy and organisational 
change, were reviewed in Chapter 2. This appeared to show that, in process terms, 
Business Strategy provides the "What" and IT Strategy provides the "How". The 
change process then dictates the "Who", "Where" and "When". The reasons given 
in the literature for outsourcing were reviewed and grouped using the 
classification proposed by Porter (1996), where organisational change is considered 
to be for one of two reasons - strategy or organisational efficiencies.
Through the adaptation and application of the Strategic Diamond (Edwards & 
Peppard 1997), it was concluded that IT functions and systems could be classified 
as either 'Commodity' or 'Strategic'. This led to the proposition that only the 
Application Systems Development as a function, and some of the systems created 
by this function, could be classed as truly 'Strategic'. The classification arising from 
the Strategic Diamond was used in later Chapters to guide the phases of the 
sourcing process.
Research Objective 2
To explore what is meant by backsourcing within the IT environment.
To understand the meaning of backsourcing, the literature was examined, initially 
looking at the meaning of the term insourcing, in Chapter 2. Insourcing had been 
used in the United Kingdom to mean bringing outsourced IT back in-house. It 
became clear that insourcing had different meanings in different countries. 
Consequently, a taxonomy of insourcing was developed. As a result, and to avoid 
ambiguity, backsourcing was adopted as the term to describe the process of 
bringing outsourced IT back in-house.
To facilitate the comparison between the outsourcing and backsourcing processes,
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the IT Sourcing Cycle was developed in Chapter 3 using outsourcing literature. 
The Cycle was then validated through its application against the backsourcing 
process and its resemblance to change models (Lewin 1951), along with the 
influence of business strategy on IT strategy and change.
The IT Sourcing Decision Framework was proposed as an extension to a 
previously proposed framework for outsourcing (Kremic et al 2006) using a 
classification proposed by Porter (1996). The IT Sourcing Cycle appears to be valid 
for any starting point on the IT Sourcing Decision Framework.
Research Objective 3
To identify the key strategic and decision-making factors to backsource IT, and to 
contrast these with the outsourcing process.
The key strategic and decision making factors for backsourcing were identified as 
part of the literature review in Chapter 2 and validated via the Case Study results 
in Chapter 5. These were also further explored as part of the Survey detailed in 
Chapter 6. The stated reasons for backsourcing reviewed in Chapter 2 and given as 
part of the 'official' reasons in the Case Study seemed to be very similar, although 
it became evident in the Case Study that the decision was due to a change of CEO. 
This led to a review of the organisation and a change in business strategy that had 
a knock-on effect on IT strategy and the decision to backsource.
Research Objective 4
To understand the backsourcing process in comparison with the existing 
frameworks for IT outsourcing.
The IT Sourcing Cycle was used as a framework to explore the backsourcing 
process and the phases of Decision, Transition and Operation were validated as 
part of the Case Study in Chapter 5 against the same phases proposed for 
outsourcing as part of the IT sourcing process review in Chapter 3. These were 
further explored and validated as part of Chapter 5 covering the Case Study. The 
backsourcing process, in terms of phases, was seen to be the same as outsourcing.
The difference was seen to be the starting point with IT in-house, outsourced or a 
mixture of both.
Research Objective 5
To identify the levels of backsourcing activity within the United Kingdom.
The Survey detailed in Chapter 6 was used to identify the levels of backsourcing 
activity within the United Kingdom. However, the low response rate meant that 
no valid conclusions could be drawn on the levels of backsourcing. The 
categorisation by Lacity & Willcocks (1998) used in the survey, that 20% or less of 
the IT budget constitutes little or no outsourcing, did not seem to be sufficiently 
granular. Half of the respondents in the Survey stated that their outsourcing level 
came into this category. As a result, any attempt to gauge the real level of 
backsourcing within the UK would require further investigation with an improved 
scale distribution. The literature review showed a tendency to concentrate on the 
large backsourcing processes (McLaughlin & Peppard 2006, Veltri et al 2008), 
noting that there were only a few of them. However, the number of respondents 
whose organisation had carried out a level of backsourcing could not be dismissed 
as irrelevant in the IT sourcing market.
Research Objective 6
To understand the IT Sourcing decision process in terms of the decision makers, 
motives and influences.
The Case Study and the Survey were used to investigate the IT sourcing decision 
process and attempted to validate against the findings of the literature review 
(Chapter 2) for outsourcing. The Case Study seems to indicate that the CEO was 
the most important influence on the decision making process, a position that was 
not entirely confirmed in the Survey.
The survey, detailed in Chapter 6, appeared to validate IT sourcing decision 
process in terms of the decision makers, motives and influences found by others 
(Apte et al 1997, Lacity & Willcocks 2000). It seemed to confirm that the starting
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point (whether it be no outsourcing or a review of an existing agreement) for the 
Decision phase, as proposed by the IT Sourcing Cycle, made little difference to the 
Decision process itself. However, the small sample response negates any validity 
judgement. However, a number of the findings are similar to those of others who 
had looked at the outsourcing decision making factors (Apte et al 1997, Lacity & 
Willcocks 2000).
8.2 Contribution to Knowledge
Although the re-conceptualisation of the Strategic Diamond (Edwards & Peppard 
1997) into the IT Functions & Systems Triangle (Figure 7.5) appeared to provide a 
framework that strengthened the IT Sourcing Cycle, it was not a contribution to 
knowledge as such. However, this research has contributed to knowledge in a 
number of areas. These will now be stated and elaborated upon.
Contribution 1 - Derivation & Validation of the IT Sourcing Cycle 
A contribution to knowledge was made in the field of IT sourcing strategies and 
the decision making process. This took the form of the construction of the IT 
Sourcing Cycle based on the literature review and validation of the model based 
on empirical evidence from the Case Study, shedding light particularly in the 
somewhat neglected (in literature) Transition stage.
The IT Sourcing Cycle is applicable to all IT sourcing options, be it for an in-house 
review to introduce internal change, to outsource, switch vendors or backsource. 
This Cycle illustrates the simplicity of the IT sourcing process whilst emphasising 
the distinct stages completed by an organisation reviewing their IT sourcing 
provision.
Contribution 2 -  Empirical Study of the Backsourcing Process 
The Case study research presented in this thesis is one of the first to look at an 
instance of backsourcing from the perspective of the client using empirical data 
collected from those that carried out, or were heavily involved in, the backsourcing 
process. The Case Study represents an illustration of what really goes on "under 
the covers' of such a process and sheds light on the backsourcing process, and
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particularly the Transition phase, in a way not possible through secondary 
research. The latter is only able to comment on the information in the public 
domain, a point made by McLaughlin & Peppard (2006) and Veltri et al (2008). The 
researcher also had a 'pre-understanding7 of the organisation involved and 'lived7 
the backsourcing process as an employee, having been subject to the backsourcing 
Transition. This research therefore provides insights for practice and future 
implementation not available previously from research, providing a depth and 
richness that would not have been available to an outside researcher.
Findings from the research during the Transition stage illustrated areas of interest 
and implications for practice that had been concealed, deliberately or otherwise, by 
the parties concerned in the Case Study.
8.3 Areas for Further Research
As with a research project there are a number of areas highlighted that warrant 
further investigation.
8.3.1 IT - Strategic or Commodity?
As has been illustrated throughout the research, the view that IT is seen as 
strategic or as a commodity has been subject of a heated debate since Carr (2003). 
The reality, from this research, would seem to be that the view of IT i s 7 in the eye 
of the beholder7.
The IT Functions & Systems Triangle (Figure 7.5) provided a framework that 
helped to strengthen the IT Sourcing Cycle though an understanding of how 
organisations can classify their IT functions and systems. Flowever, can IT be as 
easily categorised as the IT Functions & Systems Triangle (Figure 7.5) would seem 
to suggest? Further research would seem to be required, examining organisations 
on how they would categorise these functions and systems within their 
organisation using the Triangle, and the perception of IT functions and systems as 
either commodity or strategic.
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8.3.2 Refinement and Validation of SERVDYN Instrument
The validity and reliability of the SERVDYN instrument could not be confirmed 
from the research completed. As a result, SERVDYN would need to be subjected to 
further research.
In retrospect, a key component of using SERVDYN as a determinant of the IT 
sourcing decision would be the length of the sourcing relationship at the time of 
the survey completion. A logical extension, therefore, would seem to be the use of 
SERVDYN at regular intervals to track how the values of the elements and 
statements change over time. Introducing statements in the Hard Process Quality 
and Soft Process Quality elements for adherence of Service Level Agreements is 
also considered a valuable addition, giving a subjective view on an otherwise 
objective area of service performance.
8.3.3 Selective Outsourcing Relationship Management
Kern & Blois (2002) noted a number of issues that became apparent in an 
outsourcing agreement where the Client outsourced to a number of different 
vendors -  in essence a selective sourcing agreement. The downside of such an 
approach was the increase in transaction costs incurred as a result of dealing with 
multiple suppliers and the conflict that can arise between vendors when thing go 
wrong (Kern & Blois 2002). With the move towards the selective model indicated 
by the survey results, it would seem that relationship management in a multiple 
vendor environment would be a fruitful area for further research.
One thing that became clear was the lack of research into the planning 
organisations perform during the decision stage. The Case Study illustrated that it 
was this lack of planning for the operation of the outsourcing agreement that 
contributed to the eventual breakdown and backsourcing of IT. Although the 
decision to outsource may be seen as a strategic decision that affects IT, the 
repercussions of such an action on the rest of the organisation Teft behind' after 
outsourcing would seem to be an area for further research.
8.3.4 Longitudinal Study
Szmigin (1993), when discussing the relationship cycle, stated that the expectations
of both parties and the satisfaction in the relationship is rarely in harmony,
"If the expectation and reality are too far apart the relationship is likely to founder 
unless one side is brought closer to the other." (Szmigin 1993, pl7)
When a decision to switch vendors or backsource was taken, had the relationship 
between the client and the vendor broken down to the point of no return? The 
survey carried out for this research was just a 'point in time' after the event, be the 
decision stay, switch or backsource. To better understand how the client/ vendor 
relationship changes over time, the SERVDYN instrument could be used as a 
'relationship tracker'. It could be administered at set intervals to track changes in 
the SERVDYN element and statement values over time. The nature of the 
instrument is flexible enough to be employed at different levels - organisational, 
departmental and even project-by-project. Such a layered approach could lead to a 
better understanding of how /w hy/w hen  the client vendor relationship broke 
down, or as an early warning mechanism of potential problems.
A longitudinal study within an organisation (or number of organisations) could 
assist significantly in the understanding of relationship management in terms of 
bringing a level of objectivity to a subjective area.
8.4 Final thoughts
It is interesting to note that outsourcing is one of those management techniques 
that appears to have reached its 'tipping point'. This may have been reached as 
early as 1993, with what Lacity & Hirschheim (1993) saw as a significant 
'bandwagon effect' noted within the business sector. Gladwell (2000) advocated 
that 'something' could reach epidemic proportions, the 'something' observed, as 
part of this research is IT outsourcing. It has developed and evolved since the 
Kodak/IBM agreement in 1989, to the point where it has become part of 
mainstream management thinking. Adeleye et al (2004) believed that widespread 
outsourcing in Nigerian banks could be attributed to what they called "Everest 
Syndrome" -  banks outsourced 'because it was there'. The practice was 
widespread & everyone else was doing it, so they joined in. This would seem to be
a clear illustration of Glad wells (2000) dipping point'. The question that arises is 
whether backsourcing will be considered in such a light in the future. The Survey 
results seem to indicate that is more prevalent than maybe was first thought -  
there only seemed to be a few 'big' cases because these were the only ones that 
received media attention.
One of the key findings of this research is a re-affirmation of the fluidity of IT 
sourcing. Businesses evolve and change constantly in response to their 
environment and the decisions of senior executives and IT as a key enabler 
(Davenport & Short 1990) has to do the same. If an outsourcing vendor provides 
IT, the contract has to be flexible enough to allow for the dynamic business 
environment. This is by no means an original statement. This was stated by 
Willcocks & Fitzgerald (1994), and re-iterated in similar studies (Currie & 
Willcocks 1998, Lacity & Willcocks 2000) over a number of years. The observation 
was that the same mistakes in IT sourcing decisions were being made by senior 
management time and time again (Willcocks & Fitzgerald 1994). Unless the lessons 
of past outsourcing mistakes are heeded, they will continue to happen in the 
future, be it outsourcing, switching vendors or backsourcing.
From a personal perspective, based on over 30 years in IT, it seems that this 
industry is still open to fads and fashion - new functions, ideas and systems come 
and go at a rapid rate. It is therefore no wonder that the less IT savvy CEOs and 
senior managers within organisations continue to make what appears to be the 
same mistakes over and over again. Different outsourcing vendors have diverse 
marketing techniques (Deloitte 2005) but, at the end of the day, they are all offering 
the same box in different wrapping. Like Schrodinger's Cat, you do not know if a 
decision to outsource is the right one until the 'outsourcing box' is opened.
If there is one overriding message on IT sourcing options and strategies it has to 
be,
"What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is
nothing new under the sun." (Ecclesiastes 1:9)
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10.1 Appendix 1: PhD RESEARCH PROPOSAL
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Graduate School of Computing & Management Sciences
PhD RESEARCH PROPOSAL
STUDENT: Nick Butler
COURSE: Doctor of Philosophy
Provisional Title: Insourcing IS/ IT -  making the decision to reverse the outsourcing 
process?
Introduction
Nick Butler has just completed an MSc in IT and Management. This was achieved with a 
distinction overall, finishing top of his graduating class. A study contrasting Business 
Process Re-engineering and Transformational Outsourcing was completed to fulfil the 
dissertation phase of the MSc.
Nick now wishes to 'complete' his studies by pursuing a PhD. This will be studied on a 
part time basis with Sheffield Hallam University and would be 'self-funded'. The PhD will 
take around five years to complete and this proposal is for a 'pilot study' that will form the 
first stage of the PhD.
Research background and objectives
Over the last twenty years or so the topic o f  Information Technology outsourcing has been one o f  
the most debated areas o f  business change, not surprising when considering the value o f  business 
generated. In 2003 the value o f  awarded IT outsourcing contracts totalled $ 1 19bn worldwide, an 
increase o f  44% over 2002.
However, the rush to outsource may be changing. A number o f  companies in the last year or so, 
notably Prudential and Sainsbury’s, have chosen to take back control o f  IT via insourcing and 
terminated the agreement with the outsourcer. This leads to a number questions:-
• How would you define ‘insourcing’? A brief search on G oogle seemed to show that the 
description o f  what constitutes insourcing differs greatly.
•  What are the reasons for insourcing (i.e. the business drivers) -  are they the same as
those advocated for outsourcing? Why was outsourcing deemed redundant?
• Is the insourcing process the same as the outsourcing process? What is different, what do 
they have in common?
•  Is there a general trend towards insourcing? Is there a slowdown in the uptake o f  
outsourcing?
The idea o f  insourcing as a business concept has only appeared in the last few  years. So, the big 
question... ‘Is insourcing merely outsourcing in reverse?’
The overall aim of the research is to investigate the properties and traits of insourcing and 
outsourcing, draw conclusions on their similarities and differences and indicate the 
circumstances in which insourcing may be an appropriate business intervention.
The objectives resulting from these aims are as follows;
(1) To explore what is meant by insourcing within the IS/IT environment.
(2) To identity the key decision-making factors to insource IS/IT and to contrast these with 
the outsourcing process.
(3) To understand the insourcing process in comparison to the existing m odels o f  IS/IT 
outsourcing.
(4) To develop and test a model o f  the insourcing process for an IS/IT environment.
(5) To provide an explanation o f  and recommendations for the use and development o f  the 
m odel within the UK IS/IT environment.
The Case Study
It is proposed that research will be carried out in the form of a case study of the ClientCo 
insourcing process. The published work will NOT identify either ClientCo or VendorCo 
and will be written such that no identification is possible. No publication of results would 
take place for at least two years, further protecting the parties involved.
For this pilot, it is proposed that a case study of the ClientCo/VendorCo insourcing 
process is completed. This would involve a series of semi structured interviews;
• Each interview lasting no more than an hour.
• Six or so Senior personnel from ClientCo that were involved in the insourcing 
process.
• Questions covering the insourcing process and what each perceives as the 
attributes of a 'good or excellent' insourcing methodology, covering also the 
problems encountered (anticipated or otherwise) and the methods/solutions 
used.
This research covers a subject area that does not appear to have been studied academically 
before. An academic review of insourcing will attempt to remove the 'commercial hype' 
and focus on real business benefit.
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10.2Appendix 2: PhD Research Briefing
S h e ff ie ld  H a l la m  U n iv e r s i t y
Graduate School of Computing & Management Sciences
PhD RESEARCH BRIEFING
STUDENT: Nick Butler (IT Division - Service Implementation)
COURSE: Doctor of Philosophy
Provisional Title: Insourcing IS/IT - making the decision to reverse the outsourcing 
process?
Introduction
The proposed interview forms part of a 'pilot study' that will form the first stage of the 
study for a PhD and follows on from a Masters degree in IT and Management (Distinction) 
completed in November 2005.
Research background and objectives
Over the last twenty years or so the topic o f  Information Technology outsourcing has been one o f  
the most debated areas o f  business change, not surprising when considering the value o f  business 
generated.
However, the rush to outsource may be changing. A number o f  companies in the last year or so, 
notably Prudential and Sainsbury’s, have chosen to take back control o f  IT via insourcing and 
terminated the agreement with the outsourcer.
The idea o f  insourcing as a business concept has only appeared in the last few  years. So, the big  
question... ‘Is insourcing merely outsourcing in reverse?’ The overall aim o f  the research is to 
investigate the properties and traits o f  insourcing and outsourcing, draw conclusions on their
similarities and differences and indicate the circumstances in which insourcing may be an 
appropriate business intervention.
The Pilot Study
It is proposed that an initial pilot study research will be carried out in the form of a case 
study of the ClientCo insourcing process. The published work will NOT identify either 
ClientCo or VendorCo and will be written such that no identification is possible. No 
publication of results would take place for at least two years, further protecting the parties 
involved.
For this case study, it is proposed that a case study of the ClientCo/VendorCo insourcing 
process is completed. This would involve a series of semi structured interviews;
• Each interview lasting no more than an hour and will be recorded, subject to 
agreement by the interviewee.
• Questions covering the insourcing decision and transition process, the problems 
encountered (anticipated or otherwise) and the methods/solutions used.
Studies of other organisation's insourcing processes will take place over the next two years 
or so, with another organisation already a possible source.
This research covers a subject area that does not appear to have been studied academically 
before. An academic review of insourcing will attempt to remove the 'commercial hype' 
and focus on real business benefit.
10.3 Appendix 3: Case Study -  Semi-structured Interview Guide
Interview Guide
• Thank for agreeing to be interviewed.
• Ask for permission to record the interview (check that this request is made in
the email confirming the details of the interview).
• The interview will take no more than an hour.
• Confidential
• Anonymous
• Feel free to ask questions
• Add anything you think is relevant
• Ask interviewees what they think are the reasons behind a decision; then ask
them for the 'official' version.
Area Questions Notes
I. Introduction I sent you an Executive Guide 
when we arranged the 
appointment for this interview. I 
hope you found some time to 
glance through it.
Could you summarize your 
position within the organisation.
2. Decision W hat do you think w ere the 
reasons for the review of the 
outsourcing agreement?
W hat were the ‘official’ 
reasons?
W hat other courses of action 
were considered? Why w ere 
they discounted?
W hat were seen as the benefits 
of taking the outsourced IT 
Division back ‘in-house’?
W hat were the ‘official’ 
benefits?
At what level within the 
organisation was the decision 
taken to  insource?
Area Questions Notes
W hat w ere considered as the 
risks of insourcing?
3. Transition W hat was done to  mitigate the 
risks mentioned earlier?
W hat type of issues occurred 
that were not foreseen at the 
start of the transition?
W hat activities during the 
transition did you see as 
important to  the success of the 
process?
How would you assess the 
transition from the outsourcer?
How was knowledge 
management issues and the 
possible loss of key workers 
mitigated?
4. Operation W ere  there any issues with 
resources after the transition 
was complete?
How where these resolved?
How is the IT Division seen 
within the organisation as a 
whole? (Culture?)
W ho is seen as the gatekeeper 
to  IT resources and how is the 
process managed?
W hat are the general aims of 
the IT Division going forwards?
5. General W hat were the factors 
considered to be critical to  the 
success of the process?
How would you judge the 
success of the insourcing 
process?
If you had the chance, what 
would you do differently and 
why?
Area Questions Notes
Is there anything you think that 
is relevant to  this research that 
has not been covered?
Can you think of anybody that 
may be able to  add to this 
research process?
End of Interview -  thank you for your co-operation.
Interview Guidelines (taken from Bryman & Bell 2003 pp348-9)
• Check room available
• Try voice recording, make sure acoustics are OK
• Position furniture
• Position microphone close to interviewee but make sure it cannot be knocked
After the interview, make notes on
• How the interview went (was interviewee talkative, cooperative, nervous etc)
•  Any other feelings about the interview (did it open up new avenues of interest)
10.4 Appendix 4: Survey Invitation to Potential Participants
S h e f f ie ld  H a l la m  U n i v e r s i t y
Cultural, Communication and Computing Research Group (CR31) 
c/o Student Support Team, Room 9104, Furnival Building,
153 Arundel Street, Sheffield. SI 2NU
«Title» «FirstName» «LastName»
«JobTitle»
«CompanyName»
« AddressLinel»
«AddressLine2»
«Town»
«County» «Postcode»
7th October, 2009.
«GreetingLine»
I am writing to request your help with a project forming part of my PhD research 
programme. The aim of the research is to evaluate organisational IT sourcing by 
conducting a survey of leading organisations within the United Kingdom, asking 
about their IT sourcing strategies.
I realise that your time is limited, but I hope that you will take just 10-15 minutes 
to participate in this brief web survey on behalf of your organisation. As an 
incentive, you will have the opportunity to request a copy of the final analysis and 
report that will provide an independent insight into IT sourcing within the UK.
To complete the survey online please go to the URL below, which will forward 
you to the Survey Monkey website where the survey is hosted. Enter the password 
that appears at the bottom of this letter on the first screen and the respondent key
on the second screen to enter the survey.
If you have any problems with the URL link provided below, please send an e- 
mail to npbutler@mv.shu.ac.uk and the link will be sent by return.
If you feel that someone else within your organisation is better placed to complete 
this survey, please pass this letter on to them.
Your answers will be completely confidential. Your respondent key will be used 
for tracking purposes only during response collection. You will need this 
randomized numeric code to complete the web survey, but once the survey has 
closed, the code will not be linked to your identifying information and your 
responses. Moreover, the results of the survey will be reported in a summary 
format and no responses will be identified individually. While your participation 
is voluntary, I very much hope that you will choose to take part and share your 
perspective. The survey closing date for responses is Friday 30th October, 2009.
Thank you in advance for your participation in this valuable project. If you have 
any questions about the administration of the survey, please contact Nick Butler 
via e-mail (npbutler@mv.shu.ac.uk).
Yours sincerely,
Nick Butler
CR3I Doctoral Research Student
Web address: http://research.shu.ac.uk/itsourcinq
Password: 7NgKx2Fy (the password is case sensitive)
Respondent key: «RandomID»
10.5Appendix 5: Survey Questionnaire
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2. P le a se  s e le c t  th e  jo b  ti tle  th a t  b e s t d e sc rib e s  y ou r position  w ith in  y o u r 
o rg a n isa tio n
/•"S(  ^ PT >p#22r t   ^ IT
/“ s / kftn inoa  5 r * s i r  IT ** a s  »
iiaic -*r r*
■ S ti# r  j s -*»i» tpwtity;
3. W ithin  y o u r o rg a n isa tio n  do you have, o r hav e  you h ad  in the la s t  five 
y e a rs , an  o u tso u rc in g  c o n tra c t  w ith  a third p a r ty  fo r an y  of y o u r 
In fo rm atio n  T echnology fu n c tio n s?
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in te rm s  of why your organ isa tion  have kept your IS /IT  functions in- 
house.
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6. Using the  following s ta tem en ts , p lease ra te  your percep tion  of the  
quality  o f serv ice  delivered by your IS /IT  d ep artm en t.
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7. Using the following s ta tem en ts , p lease ra te  your percep tion  of th e  
quality  o f serv ice delivered  by your IS /IT  dep artm en t.
Rate your a n sw e rs  on a sca le  o f 1 - 7 with 1 being Strongly d isag ree ' 
and 7 being *Strongly ag re e '.
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6. From th e  following list, p lease select the s ta te m e n t th a t best 
sum m arizes your o rgan isa tions position on outsourcing.
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9. From th e  following list of specific IS /IT  functions, p lease se lec t those  
a re a s  th a t  you curren tly  have  an outsourcing  con tract. P lease se lec t all 
th a t  apply.
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7. IS/IT Outsourcing
10. Fram th e  fallowing list, p lease ra te  th e  im portance of each s ta te m e n t 
in th e  decision to o u tso u rce  som e or all of your IS  /IT .
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B. IS/IT Outsourcing
11. Were there any other reasons that contributed to the decision to 
outsource some or all of the organisations 1 5 /IT?
12. In the last five years have you reviewed any of your IS/IT  
outsourcing contracts? Please select ail that apply.
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13. Who had th e  initial idea to  explore the  possibility of outsourcing aii or 
p art o f IS /IT ?  P lease  se lec t th o se  th a t  apply.
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14. For your cu rren tly  ou tsou rced  IT functions, who m ade th e  final 
decision to  ou tso u rce  to  th e  se lec ted  v e n d o r/s . P lease se lec t th o se  th a t 
apply.
~ | CVtgit i-» Crff-Hr- | | Fir*?:* Cifmrte- | | IT ¥ a ;l»  ¥ » n  ;»nv«r?
□  ftatrd : f  Cl»avj,f* | | e** rT □  S : r 't  c i w
£rM*r s p * m  ip*r<*y;
15. W as th e  exit s tra teg y  in your IS /IT o u tso u rc in g  c o n trac t review ed a t  
regu lar in tervals?
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10. IS /IT  Outsourcing
16. Using this following s ta tem e n ts , p lease  ra te  your perception  o f th e  
quality of serv ice  you receive from your ou tsourcing  v e n d o r /s .
R ate your an sw e rs  on a  sca le  of 1 - 7 with 1 being 'S trongly d isa g re e ' 
and  7 being S tro n g ly  a g re e '.
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11 . IS /IT  O utsourcing - "'s M i '■-'c • d
17. Using th e  following s ta tem en ts , p lease  r a te  your perception  of th e  
quality of serv ice you receive from  your ou tsourcing  v e n d o r/s .
Rate your an sw ers  on a sca le  of 1 - 7 with 1 being 'Strongly d isa g re e ’ 
and 7 being ’S trongly  agree*.
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IS . W ithin th e  lest five years, have you sw itched  vendors for any of your 
o u tso u rced  IS /IT ?
Raoe 12
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1 3 .  Brf n g in g  I S / I T  b a c k  I n -h o u p *
IS . Within th e  last five years, have you b rought any of your previously 
o u tso u rced  IS / IT back in -house?
O
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20. From th e  following list, p lease  se lec t th e  s ta te m en t th a t  b e s t 
sum m arizes th e  am ount of IS /IT  ou tsou rcing  activity th a t  h a s  been 
su b jec t to  a sw itch of v e n d o r /s .
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21. Who had th e  initial idea to  explore th e  possibility of sw itching 
v e n d o r/s?  P lease  se lec t all th a t  apply.
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22. Who m ade th e  final decision to sw itch v en d o r/s  for som e or all of 
your o u tso u rced  IT. P lease  se lec t th o se  th a t  apply.
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16. IS /IT  Services - Switching Vendors
23. From th e  following list of specific Inform ation S ystem s functions, 
p lease  se lec t th o se  th a t  you h av e  sw itched  v e n d o r /s  for an  IS /IT  
ou tsourcing  co n trac t o r  have  co n tra c ted  to  do so  in th e  n e a r  fu tu re .
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24. W hat o th e r  a lte rn a tiv e s  w ere  considered  a s  p a rt of th e  ou tso u rc in g  
review p rocess?  P lease  se lec t all th a t  apply.
i ~| ? t i t t  a tie  i ;  ■rt»aar.,« | | S: set** il:***r:-rA*i ranht-trac
H  t ? i ? s  r  s  t i *  !S *i?c*5t4i :* s <  si
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17 . IS /IT  S erv ices -  Sw itching V endors
25. From th e  following list of s ta te m e n ts  abou t your o rgan isa tion , p lease  
ra te  th e  im portance of each s ta te m e n t in th e  decision to  sw itch  vendors 
fo r so m e o r all of your IS /IT , 3 - Hit I^ iwnird 3 - Natnl *- Drnf c -imnt S • -mtry 3-i partinCMrji t? nv*’ O 0 o 0 0CH’ jm wttni :r;»i uitir s? *!>!» (nun) 0 o 0 o o■>jt*e-4ra».S tribwm III r it nil*■5*r»r.ilsfy r*» ij-* o o o o o* tf i :r;»ruwM!j»i'4r o n o o
Cjwtc tii r-j* a a 1K in r \ o c o oCi i:r*r:ir» him wtf »»p i:r o o f~\S-J o
26. W ere th e re  any o th er reasons th a t co n tribu ted  to th e  decision  to  
switch vendors fo r som e or all of th e  o rgan isa tions IS /IT ?
t.
i.3.
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18 . IS /IT  S erv ices -  Sw itching V endors
27. Using th e  following s ta tem en ts , p lease  ra te  your perception  of th e  
quality  of serv ice you received from th e  ou tsourcing  v e n d o r/s  you 
sw itched  from .
Rate your an sw ers  on a sca le  of 1 - 7 with 1 being 'S trongly d isa g re e ’ 
and  7 being 'S trongly a g re e ’.
7 -
Satravgty 2 3 * 1 £ 5*r**i5 y
■Jim;-**
At r» c j f - t tz i - .* O O O O O O OAt r * : t  r» : S -rlB M O r \ O O z-%V_/ O O
-I'-*: r*,t* : p*i O ■rs ■w O c O
~**S • i ’n ?*/•*: m »l O /"VV O O W c OZtAfASi 1 S JI J»t« 0 O O O O 0 O
4 m : 0 O O O O 0 O
< u  a: s»t» i 0 O O O O 0 0
.  nnf*bs.:tf iu rr> H d i 0 O O 0 O 0 0
•:»*«* »r :* 4* Jki: :• if 0 O O O O 0 O
u*M»*4 hr- : l,v p.*; s:<*n* 0 f \ O O O 0 O
**» e a* i t* i t j j w i i i i i  4>*t 0 \_y O O 0 O
Page 1?
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28. Using th e  following s ta tem en ts , p lease  ra te  your perception  of th e  
quality of serv ice  you received from th e  ou tsourcing  v e n d o r/s  you 
sw itched  from .
Rate your an sw e rs  on a sca le  o f 1 - 7 with 1 being S trongly d isag re e ' 
an d  7 being 'S trongly a g re e '.
Stnwa 2 3 + I £ *
•jitasi’** a ; a*
Chai +'i»c r i t t t n t r v O o o o kJ c OO w o o o O
:b jac ttt* t o Aw o o G o
as a aetafeVa »7T*" 0 ’-.J O o s.w' / - sw o
iMb*raus»ii ?: -s.r u ia a  rr a;* o C \w o 0 G o 0
m i f t 0 0 o 0 o 0 0
Wa i »?aiE *r*  a b* c.jr w a r* j . o o 0 o o 0
as tur s ta r ar 0 o 0 o o G 0
> u  iws »*aa ■;? c j*»r e-i  na i*  nvi:i.*« o o o 0 o o o
m jc - t a t t  a*r u : r a  A»r* tafc-a? « T»ea: ui o r\ o o G o
Jsb der a r j i i !  #va* w t i i t !  iu r  i»p.jr o r*\X^ y o o O o
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28
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20. Bringing IS /IT  back in-house
29. W ithin th e  la s t five years, have you b rought any of your previously 
ou tsourced  IS / I T  hack in -house?
O ' -
29
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21. IS /IT  services - Bring ousourced IS /IT  back in-house
This scciicr? ar ihfc s js.cy will co.ec? yc-.ii vtana cri iha decision ic bi >1 iairc.’all cf yeci 1S..TT back h  ho.se.
30. From th e  following list, p lease se lec t th e  s ta te m e n t th a t  best 
sum m arizes th e  am oun t of ou tsourcing  activity th a t  h as  been b rough t 
back in -house
\_J ** Tiffi*! ilMi tvi* 3G* friajit IJ.T";
' j  imMctft :i: - l-l> biiiM'^rlS.rTi
£ j  ;r ss. rr t,i:$*t!
31. Who had th e  initial idea to  explore th e  possibility o f bringing th e  IT 
functions back in-house? P lease se lec t all th a t  apply.
□  cmr b n 6 M  Q  p m k .  timcir- Q  IT * a SI *
□  biM :f | | w" rr □  b:r.'t «iw
O f c u r  [ p i a t t t
30
IT Sourcing Survey 2009  ^' - t- ■22 . IS /IT  serv ices  -  Bring ousourced  IS /IT  back in -h ou se (con t)
32. Who m ade th e  final decision to bring th e  IT functions back in -house? 
P lease selec t all th a t apply.
Q  £ * i.r C o c a  V. Crtftoir Q  f tm n a  D la rtw  E H  IT ¥ f iru
□  *r l  ; f 1 1 r*cte a  Q  *■'! t '  IT □  0 : r ' t  v ie *
2tT»r |p*M» ipKi^ y;
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23. IS /IT  services - Bring ousourced IS /IT  back in-house
33. From th e  following list of specific Inform ation System s functions, 
p lease  se lec t th o se  th a t  you have b ro u g h t back in -ho u se  o r have 
co n trac ted  to do  so in th e  n ea r fu tu re
□  A p p H ta tte n i  Sw y-a-ipm **':
□  i s u C r . t  S u a p w t  t  K i l n b u a r s *
□  &»■;• C i r e m  > ) { * • « « «  & t a r a s r :
^  b M k ta p  5ufjp-s?t ;?C i .  a p c n  & * a * rn tr*  
n »  r j * n r  ; » j
S h i r  ip * :* 4?;
□  IT H*p Di*i:<
□  l i p i e - s  e i w i t i u  ;*:u mat: 
n »(* > * % r c »• * » rt  w * ;
J  1 S u j p ^ r t  4 l i l r t i r n c i
i| ^  -*«o*nr- jTicatmiilAt
*1
fU
34. W hat o th e r  a lte rn a tiv e s  w e re  considered  as  p a rt of th e  ou tsou rcing  
review  process?  P lease  se lec t all th a t apply.
j ^  I.MHM4I f t i s r  Hi  IT  P-J p - J - r t l * *  * 
□  S 'd s n  sc * 1  * l :» n » h » *  
iSM»r
□ S ;  is-*- »ls*-'tr f t*  : : r «  c-t'tc
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24. IS /IT  serv ices - Bring ousourced IS /IT  back in-bouse
35. W hat w ere see n  as  th e  b iggest risks w hen making the  decision to  
bring som e or alt of your ou tsou rced  IS /IT  back in -h o u se?  P lease  ra te  
th e  im portance of each  s ta te m e n t.
t * : - h:f 3 - N».f» * - Smpt iMfc 5 • *«#rf ampe'ttit
.■»*« !? »•** e - n r w  km f «■?* o 0 o 0 oJ k z t :f e f t t m  pros**! !c- srlit-s11 rr s*:t iy>»c.»■» o o o O 0
•»► :r s f  r *m -; s»«» p ■* r> tr » .*sse-* o o o o o./> * *  ‘sT T  e»l »rsw o o r~s o o
.*:* s f  Prh:i.!i r* r t - o o o o oTmr e***r j* af wntar peisn-n* y u m  ttVM 
lllt llt
%*w*' o r \' S r \<w o
uMruptrtr tvs t jt t in  eMrattini o o A 0 o
36. W ere th e re  any o th e r risks w hen considering th e  decision to  bring 
back in -house som e o r a II of th e  orga n isabons 15 / IT?
i.
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25. IS /IT  serv ices - Bring ousourced IS /IT  back in-house
37. From th e  following list, p lease ra te  th e  im portance of each s ta te m e n t 
in the decision to bring back in -house fo r so m e or all o f you r IS /IT .
. i : <  s f  *i * s > rt*« b? IT  '  -* •  r*  te  ‘t& ta t  » r r :
C h i r . j *  r  r e - • r “  iv»a  * * * ' »• te-r r *
■srsar **35-?
‘• • r . s w  ■etv# / *  v * t
C h i r . j *  i*
O n r - ] ( «  a t r  l  : r j i r  u r - j r  n w ; * -  : r  » : ; u « i : i : r |  
O j t t e  j ra t -J  3(3 r-st >■•**?>5«-s< 9»e*P3l2Grf•tf IPS*
C P ir - jM  . n l r  e rfA *  C,»r (• i r  :
Csk ! i i  r-j* net im  it*
i  -  Hs: 2  -  Ha t ^ 4 * 5 '  . » r r
r c i t r *  I t r**srt*P it • s - n . r j J r r p s r t*  Tt vnF& rfemto o ov y o 0o 0 r ' \ 0 00 O O 0 oo o r " s v J o
O o ■s_> o OO w o oO o W o oO o r \U o o
38. W ere th e re  any o th e r reaso n s th a t  co n trib u ted  to th e  decision  to  
bring back in -h o u se  th e  o rg an isa tio n s  IS /IT ?
Pace
34
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2©. IS /IT  serv ic e s  -
39. Using th e  following s ta tem en ts , p lease  ra te  the quality of service you 
received from  th e  IS /IT  outsourcing  v e n d o r /s  you 'in -h o u se d ' from .
Rate your a n sw e rs  on a sca le  o f 1 - 7 with 1 being 'S trongly d isag ree ' 
and 7 being 'S trongly ag re e '.
i * ? .StreijlY 2 2 4 s t atMRit vHugra* »;■»*jri raqu:n»4 O D o o o O O41 mii. MI o o o o r~\V_r o O4i r-4* f o o r~^u o o4i a s'* ;u*;«rtr o /"I■w' r \ o r*>,w /■> \ - j oittr*c i * ji j»m o o o o r~\w o oImi !?■*« o n r*\ o vy 0V J \ .j w.as<»s 4: Safctit o o o o o 0 0
.  ««fihse 0 o o o o o 0Ae:»l»«d ticks »r r* jt m* » 0 o 0 o o o 0Usbstfrl fs :u* p--; s-*i* o o o o o o QVni Man ta n it o o o o o o
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27 . IS /IT  se r v ic e s  -  Bring ousourced  IS /IT  back in -h o u se
40. Using th e  following s ta tem en ts , p lease  ra te  the quality of service you 
received from  th e  IS /IT  outsourcing  v e n d o r /s  you 'in -h o u se d ' from .
Rate your an sw ers  on  a sca le  of 1 - 7 with 1 being 'S trongly d isag re e ' 
and  7 being 'S trongly a g re e '.
t  - ?  -
S t n n s t f 2 a s £ v
• i l l l g 'W i ;  '**■
C M I* * g » e  f  i i » m O o o o o o oO jT% o o r \V . / o oo c r*% o o o o
Jki ■ ? r c » t  ■* §iT#»r: o w r ~ \s _ / o c o
Cm fcrau tiiS  m  4 i r  u Im  — » j* o o o o o o o
w »  e s n n &m o o o o o 0 o
W .II 3 » ? ilK » r£  a k * t j r  t t - i t * j r o S o 0 o c 0
*S iH* » * t  U ’T t M e i  I t  1*1"! o o O 0 r ' \ 0 o
T t w *  w i t  ta. ? * M  t s  M  t o n *  m o th * * 0 0 O 0 r \y - J o o
JftSfr-tteT t 0 » :  U ir .s  * » r*  :•<■** * n ;  u i o AVw> o o o 0 0
J : t -  - l? r  » r s i i :  *y-** : l * i tp - j t o s _ / o o o o o
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28. About your organisation
Ai*i3 !Y a  y? s o  << Ir tfa  tTtW>-jt : S f e X i  yiiis v*a\Ki ...
41. P lease give an  indication of the  num ber of cm picyees in to tal th a t  
w ork w ithin your organisation
o  ■C J&t Q  iCllS • Jt<lS Q  bMr
0  30Sa • 5WM
O 541",osia O 51
42. P lease give an  indication of th e  overall tu rnover of your organ isation
f  )  iJ'Si • i S M  r r t m e n  £ j  taut it*
j  i  S i s  • * iO C i j  T i n - s -  
)  G r v a i w  i l a r  »  i O I :  T i l t s ?
\  I  > ! i a r  * ’i i  r, i k o
O ' 151 * *1 -•■s TiiMr
O  fifci ■ j >5£ m -ir
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43 . P lease give an  indication of th e  num ber of em ployees th a t  work 
w ith in  th e  IS /IT  area in your organisa tion .
0 « - «  0 j5s
0  S i  -  i « i  Q  S tia  • t « 0
0  aS I -  i S I  Q  »  i tO S
44. P lease give an indication of your o rg an isa tio n s overall IS / IT budget.
> 0  j n M i  I -  n l H i  ( 0  * v .  - S t  n l M i  0 -  te x
0  I :  -  i t  n r ile -r ,  ( 0  i  Ss • s t t  m k r r
• 0  i t i  - J d  (T ilunii £  )  i jrw a tp r it« r»  i  UM  T i il ia r
45. Would you like to receive a sum m ary rep o rt of th is  su rvey? Ju s t to re ­
iterate , no individual re sp o n ses  will be identified as p a r t of the analysis 
and  rep o rt.
38
10.6Appendix 7: SERVPERF-INDSERV Statement Mapping
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10.8 Appendix 9: Reasons for Decision - Results
Reason Not
relevant
Unimportant Neutral Important Very
Important
High level of in-house 
technical expertise 0 1 1 7 8
Synergy between business 
and IS/IT 1 0 3 4 9
In-house IS/IT seen as 
cost efficient 1 0 4 5 7
Retain up-to-date technical 
expertise 0 2 3 7 5
IS/IT is seen as core 
business 0 4 2 3 8
Inadequate
supplier/market conditions 3 3 7 4 0
Lack of trust about supplier 
motivation 3 1 10 2 1
Table 8.5 Reasons for staving In-house
Reason Not
relevant
Unimportant Neutral Important Very
Important
Access to skills/expertise 2 2 5 19 24
Focus on core capabilities 4 1 6 28 13
Cost reduction 3 0 13 23 13
Quality improvement 4 3 11 24 10
Greater flexibility 5 4 10 28 5
Access to latest 
technology/infrastructure 7 8 15 20 2
Faster delivery of new 
systems 7 3 23 18 1
Improve
accountability/management 10 5 18 16 3
Transfer fixed costs to 
variable 11 15 14 11 1
Capital infusion 14 12 18 8 0
Political reasons 22 7 18 4 1
Table 8.6 Reasons for outsourcing
45
Reason Not
relevant
Unimportant Neutral Important Very
Important
Changes within 
organisation (merger or 
acquisition)
7 3 4 12 2
Contractual issues with 
vendor 5 2 8 10 3
Cost savings did not 
materialise 9 0 9 5 5
Change in organisation 
strategy 11 4 4 6 3
Outsourced systems did 
not keep track with 
technology change
7 3 10 7 1
Changes within 
organisational senior 
management
12 3 7 6 0
Table 8.7 Reasons for switching vendors
Reason Not
relevant
Unimportant Neutral Important Very
Important
Cost savings did not 
materialise
2 1 2 5 3
Lack of visibility of IT -  
desire to regain control 2 0 4 7 0
Change in role -  IT now 
seen as strategic to the 
organisation
4 0 3 4 2
Change in organisational 
strategy 4 0 4 3 2
Vendor failed to achieve 
specific objectives 3 1 6 2 1
Changes within 
organisational senior 
management
6 0 4 2 1
Changes within 
organisation (merger or 
acquisition)
6 1 4 2 0
Outsourced systems did 
not keep track with 
technology change
7 1 4 1 0
Table 8.8 Reasons for backsourcinq
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